Using an ad blocker is good for your security, privacy, and even the FBI recommends them to defend from online harms. But as much as ad blockers are great for cleaning up your browsing experience, these tools often do little to prevent the pervasive tracking from ads within apps.

Now, thanks to a new feature in iOS 26 and macOS 26, one developer has built the first device-level ad blocker that works across all of Apple’s main products — iPhones, iPads, and Macs — and isn’t just limited to the browser.

Filtr is a new tool created and maintained by Kaylee Serena Calderolla, the developer behind the popular Safari browser ad blocker Wipr. Wipr prevents ads from ever appearing in Safari, meaning that the ads won’t load, nor will their tracking code that advertisers use to follow you around the web and snoop on which websites you visit. The result is a cleaner browsing experience, free from advertisers watching over your online activity.

Filtr is an additional paid-for feature bundled into Wipr that goes one step further than ad-blocking in the browser by blocking ads in iPhone, iPad, and Mac apps. Filtr does this by using a new feature embedded in the latest Apple software called URL filters, which lets developers block access to certain websites or domains at the network level, rather than just in the browser.

I use ad blockers across various devices all the time (even if websites like this one ask that you switch them off). I have — full disclosure — used Wipr as my main ad blocker on my Apple devices for years as a paying customer. I also use ad blockers on other browsers on my desktop computers and make use of a Pi-hole ad blocker, a small server that sits on my network at home and prevents ads from reaching any of my devices connected to my home Wi-Fi. 

But that still leaves my devices largely open to ads when I’m not on my home network, as well as the various apps that I use that are chock full of ads — including web browsers that aren’t Safari. 

As you can imagine, I was keen to give Filtr a spin. Filtr particularly appealed because, as Calderolla states in her privacy policy, her apps “do not collect personal data.” Her apps also don’t need to access any personal information to work, and neither does Apple’s URL filter feature.

For me, it was a no-brainer — all upside, and no tradeoff. I paid for the $5 annual subscription, added the URL filter to my iPhone, and that was that. The relief was immediate. Every app I opened loaded without its usual flood of ads. Some ad slots showed greyed placeholder spaces where the ads would have loaded.

Calderolla told me this week that Filtr is the first app so far to utilize the URL filters feature; though, that may be in part because it was a “nightmare” to get it to work, some of which she described in a May blog post. Calderolla said that Apple’s documentation on the URL feature was sparse, requiring her to do much of the work to understand how to implement and use the feature.

The URL filter feature relies on an advertising blocklist that Calderolla maintains. Calderolla explained that Filtr consults a “pre-filter” blocklist that is stored on the user’s device and is kept constantly up-to-date via automatic updates in the Wipr app. The pre-filter list determines if a website is not on the block list and, most of the time, the website loads as normal. But if the pre-filter list finds that a website might be on the block list, it will quickly confirm against the list on Calderolla’s servers. Calderolla said that these requests are routed through Apple’s servers as a proxy so that app developers do not know who is querying their blocklists.

This means that you can set up Filtr once and generally never have to think about it again. (For a security or privacy product, that’s high praise.)

There are some caveats, but far from dealbreakers. No ad blocker is perfect, period, but minimizing exposure to the ad networks as much as possible is a major win for your privacy. Filtr does not always block ads that are served directly from the websites you visit. That means you may still see ads in the Facebook, Google, and Reddit apps, as well as any other app that serves ads from its own domain, as blocking these could break the apps altogether. Calderolla said, however, that Filtr can at times block these ads as the feature relies on filtering specific web addresses, rather than the entire domain. (Lifehacker also tested and reviewed Filtr and found that using their mobile websites instead of their apps will still allow Wipr to block the ads.)

Wipr is a universal app that costs $5 in the Apple App Store and works across all of your Apple devices. Filtr costs an additional $5 each year, or $25 for a one-time lifetime payment, via in-app purchase.

That means the chances of the attackers decrypting one of the encrypted vaults they obtained is very small in the event the master password was strong, meaning long, randomly generated, and has high entropy. However, not everyone uses such master passwords. In the event the master password was included in word lists exchanged by password crackers, the chances of success would be higher, although still unlikely.

Broadly speaking, the incident has similarities to the 2022 LastPass breach, which also allowed attackers to obtain encrypted user vaults. Eventually, the attackers managed to obtain decrypted information from some of them. The success was the result of two things.

First, certain fields, such as website URLs, remained unencrypted in vaults. That meant attackers could read them even without the master password. Second, some of the stolen vaults used outdated algorithms that didn’t adequately intensify the process for converting the plain-text password into a hash. Dashlane has said that no user fields in vaults are unencrypted. Further, when algorithms are periodically strengthened to account for advances in cracking abilities, the process occurs automatically, with no interaction required. The algorithm update process for LastPass vaults at the time came with more user friction.

Dashlane’s initial notification left out key details of the attack and led to considerable confusion about the ongoing risk users faced.

Out of an abundance of caution, both master passwords and the contents of any of the recovered Dashlane vaults should be changed immediately to reduce the chance, however unlikely, that the attackers succeed in breaking the master password. Unaffected Dashlane users don’t need to take any such action.

Valve has confirmed that Steam Machine is shipping this summer, giving PC gamers a real launch window for its SteamOS living room PC. The missing piece is still price, and that’s the detail many buyers need before they can decide whether it fits their setup.

The update came as Valve expanded its Verified program to cover Steam Machine and Steam Frame. For Steam Machine, games will be checked for default controller support, default graphics settings, and how well they run without manual setup. Valve says the hardware is roughly six times as powerful as Steam Deck, while still using SteamOS, the Steam interface, and Proton.

How your library will look

Steam Machine Verified should look familiar if you’ve used Steam Deck. The requirements are nearly identical, so you’ll get a clearer read on whether a game is ready for the TV before you spend time changing controls or graphics settings.

Valve already has a large foundation for that work. Tens of thousands of titles have gone through Steam Deck verification, and Valve is testing Steam Machine support for games that missed Deck performance targets because of CPU or GPU limits. On stronger hardware, some of those games could meet the new bar without developers changing anything.

Why the price gap lingers

The summer timing makes Steam Machine more concrete, but the missing price keeps the comparison unfinished. Buyers still don’t know whether Valve’s living room PC will sit closer to a Steam Deck, a gaming laptop, or a compact Windows gaming PC.

That comparison goes beyond raw performance. Valve has to show that a TV-connected SteamOS PC can make PC gaming easier in the living room than the options people can already buy. Verified labels should reduce setup uncertainty, but price will decide whether that convenience looks worth paying for.

When buyers get the rest

Valve has also added Steam Machine and Steam Frame tabs to the Partner Dashboard, where some games already have Verified results for the new devices. That gives developers more guidance before launch, but it isn’t the full consumer reveal yet.

For now, you shouldn’t make room for Steam Machine in your budget until Valve shares the remaining hardware details. Price is the big one, but final availability timing and configuration options will also shape whether it’s a smart upgrade or a wait-and-see PC gaming box.

For the past two years, the technology industry has raced to make AI agents more capable — teaching them to write code, navigate software interfaces, manage files, and orchestrate multi-step workflows with increasing autonomy. What the industry has not done, at least not with any consistency, is answer the question that keeps chief information security officers awake at night: what happens when an agent goes wrong?

On Tuesday at its annual Build developer conference, Microsoft offered what may become the definitive answer. The company introduced Microsoft Execution Containers, or MXC — a policy-driven execution layer, built into the Windows operating system itself, that lets developers and IT administrators declare exactly what an AI agent can and cannot access, with those boundaries enforced at runtime by the OS kernel.

The announcement, buried within a sweeping set of developer-focused updates, is arguably the most consequential platform move Microsoft made at Build this year, and it has the potential to reshape how every enterprise on Earth thinks about deploying autonomous AI software.

MXC is not a product you buy. It is an SDK and a policy model — a foundational primitive embedded in Windows and the Windows Subsystem for Linux — that provides what Microsoft calls a “composable sandbox spectrum.” That spectrum ranges from lightweight process isolation, already adopted by GitHub Copilot’s command-line interface, all the way up to micro-virtual machines, Linux containers, and full cloud instances running on Windows 365.

The system separates an agent’s execution from the user’s desktop, clipboard, user interface, and input devices. Critically, it binds every agent to a strong identity — either a local ID or a cloud-provisioned identity backed by Microsoft Entra — so that every action the agent takes can be attributed, audited, and governed.

The implications are enormous. Until now, the enterprise deployment of AI agents has been stuck in a paradox: the more autonomous and useful an agent becomes, the more dangerous it is to let it operate on a corporate network without guardrails. MXC is Microsoft’s attempt to break that paradox — not by making agents less capable, but by making the environment they operate in fundamentally more controlled.

Why every autonomous AI agent is a security incident waiting to happen

To understand why MXC matters, consider what an AI agent actually does when it runs on your computer. Unlike a traditional application, which operates within well-understood boundaries — a word processor reads and writes documents, a browser fetches web pages — an AI agent is, by design, unpredictable. It receives a goal in natural language, reasons about how to achieve it, and then takes actions: opening files, executing code, calling APIs, browsing the web, interacting with other software. Each of those interactions creates what security professionals call “attack surface.”

Microsoft’s own blog post framed the challenge in stark terms. The company wrote that “as agents become more capable and autonomous, they’re delivering material productivity gains. But they’re also introducing new risk, and the issue isn’t just the agent. It’s the entire system the agent operates across.” Every interaction between agents and humans, tools, applications, models, and other agents “exposes new attack surface and introduces different failure modes.” Microsoft characterized this as “a multi-layer systems problem.”

This is not a theoretical concern. In the months leading up to Build, security researchers demonstrated numerous ways that AI agents could be manipulated — through prompt injection, through malicious tool calls, through data exfiltration disguised as normal workflow. For enterprises that handle sensitive data, proprietary models, and regulated information, the absence of a trusted execution environment has been the single biggest barrier to moving agents from demo to deployment.

Microsoft’s answer is a sandbox that scales from a single process to a full virtual machine

MXC operates on a deceptively simple principle: declare what the agent can do before it runs, and let the operating system enforce those declarations at runtime. A developer or an IT administrator writes a policy that specifies which files, directories, and network resources an agent is allowed to access. MXC then creates a contained execution environment — a sandbox — that enforces those boundaries regardless of what the agent attempts to do.

What makes MXC unusual, and potentially very powerful, is the breadth of its isolation options. Microsoft designed the system so that a single SDK and policy model can map to the appropriate isolation construct for any given workload. For a lightweight coding assistant that just needs to read the current project directory, fast process isolation may be sufficient. For an autonomous agent that executes arbitrary code downloaded from the internet, a full micro-VM may be required. The system is designed to be “dynamically composable based on intent and risk,” meaning that the level of isolation can be adjusted based on what the agent is actually doing, not just what category it falls into.

Session isolation is a particularly important feature. MXC separates the agent’s execution from the user’s desktop, clipboard, UI, and input devices. This directly mitigates several classes of attacks that security researchers have identified as particularly dangerous for AI agents: UI spoofing, where an agent manipulates what the user sees to trick them into approving a malicious action; input injection, where an agent sends keystrokes or mouse clicks to other applications; and cross-session data leakage, where information from one user’s session bleeds into another.

A live demo showed an AI agent trying to delete files — and failing, because the OS wouldn’t let it

During a pre-briefing with VentureBeat the night before the announcement, a Microsoft developer offered a vivid demonstration of the technology in action. He had set up the open-source agent framework OpenClaw running inside MXC’s sandbox on his personal development machine. He then instructed the agent to delete all the files on his desktop. The agent attempted to comply — but the sandbox prevented it. “If you look at my desktop here, you see how clean my desktop is,” the developer said during the demo. “That’s a lie.” The files, he explained, were completely safe because “the container won’t allow it.”

The demonstration went further, showcasing the granularity of MXC’s controls. Users can mark specific files as read-only for the agent, restrict access to the browser and screen capture, control whether the agent can see location data, and have all of those permissions managed centrally by an enterprise IT department through Intune policies. The agent operates inside what is effectively a one-way mirror: it can do the work it has been asked to do, but it cannot see or touch anything outside the boundaries that its policy defines.

Pavan Davuluri, Microsoft’s Executive Vice President for Windows and Devices, underscored during the pre-briefing that the primitives MXC introduces — security, containment, isolation, and user control — are essential to making AI agents commercially viable.

He emphasized that these capabilities are “not unique to OpenClaw” and that “this pattern repeats itself over and over” for any agent running on a Windows device. The primitives that exist in the operating system now “for the file around security, containment, isolating them, having users in control,” he said, are what will make agents safe enough for ordinary consumers and corporate deployments alike.

Defender, Entra, Intune, and Purview integration arriving in July turns MXC into an enterprise control plane

For corporate IT departments, the most significant element of the MXC announcement is not the SDK itself but its integration with Microsoft’s existing enterprise security stack through what the company calls Agent 365. Arriving in preview in July, Agent 365 layers Microsoft’s Entra identity service and Intune device management platform on top of MXC, so that IT administrators can govern agent containment centrally while developers choose the level of isolation their workload demands.

The integration goes further: Microsoft Defender will provide runtime threat protection, Entra will handle identity and access management, Intune will enforce device-level policies, and Microsoft Purview will extend its data governance and compliance capabilities to agent activity. This means that an enterprise could, in theory, allow employees to run AI agents on their corporate machines — even powerful, autonomous agents that execute code and manage files — while maintaining the same kind of centralized visibility and control that IT departments currently have over traditional applications.

Microsoft described the identity layer in its official blog: “Windows assigns agents a local ID or a cloud provisioned identity backed by Entra and attributes all activity from the container to that identity, so you can clearly differentiate human from agent.” For regulated industries — financial services, healthcare, government — the ability to produce an audit trail that distinguishes between human actions and agent actions on the same machine could prove to be a regulatory requirement, not merely a nice-to-have feature. Every agent action attributable to a specific identity, every containment boundary enforceable through the same policy infrastructure that already governs hundreds of millions of Windows devices — this is the architecture that could finally move AI agents from pilot programs to production.

OpenAI, Nvidia, Manus, and Nous Research are already building on MXC — and that changes the calculus

Platform announcements at developer conferences are often aspirational. What distinguishes the MXC launch is the breadth and specificity of the partners already building on it. Microsoft named five: OpenAI, Nvidia, Manus, Nous Research (maker of the Hermes agent), and the OpenClaw open-source project. Each is integrating MXC in a distinct way that illuminates a different use case for the technology.

OpenAI’s involvement is particularly striking. David Wiesen, a member of OpenAI’s technical staff, said that “working with Microsoft on the Microsoft Execution Containers (MXC) allows us to explore new patterns for AI agents to safely and efficiently generate and execute code.” He added that by combining Codex’s capabilities with MXC’s execution environment, the goal is “to help developers move from intent to reliable execution faster, while maintaining the security and control enterprises need.” The reference to Codex — OpenAI’s code-generation agent — suggests that MXC could become the default execution environment for one of the most widely anticipated agent products in the industry.

Nvidia is bringing its OpenShell framework to Windows built on MXC, providing what Microsoft described as “an easy-to-deploy package for autonomous, always-on agents safely.” Manus, the Chinese-born AI agent startup that gained viral attention earlier this year, is also integrating. Tao Zhang, Manus’s Chief Product Officer, said that MXC “gives developers a policy-driven way to define what an agent can access and enforce those boundaries at runtime, so more autonomous agents can operate safely in enterprise environments.” And Dillon Rolnick, the CEO of Nous Research, offered what may be the most concise articulation of why MXC matters: “Continuously-running local agents, like Hermes Agent, require intentional isolation. Developers need control over what an agent can access and trust that those controls will hold.”

How an open-source agent framework became Microsoft’s proving ground for AI safety on Windows

One of the more revealing stories behind the MXC announcement involves OpenClaw. During the press pre-briefing, a Microsoft developer described how the partnership came together organically — Peter Steinberger, OpenClaw’s creator, sent him a direct message in January expressing interest in collaborating. What began as a casual conversation evolved into a full-fledged platform partnership, with Microsoft developers contributing to the OpenClaw Windows companion app, built as a native WinUI application rather than a wrapped web app.

The OpenClaw integration serves as what Scott called “the ultimate test app for all the stuff that [the Windows platform team] is making.” If OpenClaw — which by its nature gives agents broad autonomy to execute tasks on a user’s machine — can run securely within MXC’s containment boundaries, then the containment system is robust enough for any agent. Scott explained the philosophy driving the work: “Think of OpenClaw Windows as the ultimate test app… If OpenClaw can succeed on Windows, that means that the Linux support is there, the container support is there, the containment is there.”

The companion app demonstrates the full spectrum of MXC’s enterprise controls — file permissions, network access, screen capture restrictions, location data — all manageable centrally through Intune policies. Microsoft donated the project to OpenClaw and plans to continue contributing to it as open source. As one member of the Windows leadership team put it during the briefing: “All agents, all comers, everyone is welcome on Windows… It’s going to run great on Windows, because the primitives are there. The base of the pyramid is solid.”

Building containment into the OS gives Microsoft a strategic edge over Apple’s walled garden and Google’s cloud-first model

MXC arrives at a moment when the technology industry is grappling with a fundamental tension. AI agents represent what may be the most significant new category of software since mobile applications, and every major technology company is racing to build them. But the security and governance infrastructure required to deploy these agents responsibly in enterprise environments barely exists. Microsoft’s approach is distinctive because it locates the trust layer at the operating system level rather than in the agent framework, the model provider, or a third-party security product.

This is a deliberate architectural choice. By building containment into Windows itself, Microsoft ensures that the security guarantees hold regardless of which agent, which model, or which framework a developer chooses.

It also means that the hundreds of millions of Windows devices already managed through Intune and secured through Defender can, in principle, become agent-ready through a software update rather than a rip-and-replace deployment.

Apple’s approach to AI agents leans heavily on its walled-garden ecosystem, offering security through restriction — limiting which agents can run and what they can do. Google’s approach, centered on its cloud infrastructure, offers security through centralization. Microsoft’s approach offers security through declaration and enforcement — allowing any agent to run, but containing its impact through OS-level policy.

For enterprises that operate in heterogeneous environments with diverse toolchains and multiple AI providers, the Microsoft model may prove the most practical. The competitive dynamics are already shifting: with OpenAI’s Codex, Nvidia’s OpenShell, and independent agent frameworks like Manus and Hermes all building on MXC, Microsoft is positioning Windows not just as the platform where agents run, but as the platform where agents can be trusted to run.

The hardest part isn’t building the sandbox — it’s writing the policies that go inside it

MXC is available now in early preview, meaning developers can begin building against the SDK and testing containment policies. The Agent 365 integration with Defender, Entra, Intune, and Purview is scheduled for preview in July — a timeline aggressive enough to suggest that much of the engineering work is already done, but far enough out to allow for refinement based on developer feedback.

The real test, however, will come when enterprises begin deploying agents at scale on production networks. Containment is only as good as the policies that govern it, and writing effective agent policies for complex enterprise environments will be an entirely new discipline — one that IT departments have not yet developed and that no vendor has yet figured out how to teach. The technology is promising, but an empty sandbox is just an empty box. Filling it with the right rules, for the right agents, in the right contexts, will require a level of organizational sophistication that most companies are only beginning to contemplate.

Still, the significance of what Microsoft announced on Tuesday is difficult to overstate. For the first time, a major operating system vendor has proposed a comprehensive, kernel-level answer to the question of how autonomous AI software should be contained, identified, and governed on the devices where most of the world’s work actually gets done. The industry spent two years teaching agents to act. Microsoft is now betting that the bigger business — and the harder engineering problem — is teaching the operating system to watch.

Apple is all set to host its yearly Worldwide Developer Conference next week, where it is expected to announce the long-awaited Siri update. As excited as I am for the smart assistant to finally work like it was supposed to all these years, the iOS 27 sneak peek could potentially confirm Apple’s next big launch: the foldable iPhone Ultra.

I say this because iPhones have trailed behind their Android counterparts in true multitasking capabilities. Sure, they have a Dynamic Island that pops up crucial information with a press-and-hold without leaving the current app. But it isn’t the same as running multiple apps side-by-side simultaneously or one app on top of another. Such use cases are crucial for big-screen foldable phones – or even big slab phones for that matter. This iOS limitation is one of the reasons I believe the 6.9-inch screen estate on Pro Max models isn’t utilized to its full potential. But this might change at next week’s WWDC.

According to a Bloomberg report, Apple’s foldable iPhone will feature an “iPad-like interface when opened.” It could support running two apps side-by-side and add sidebars to many apps. We’ve never had an iPhone running multiple apps on the screen simultaneously, and if  Apple demos such an instance at WWDC 26, it’ll likely point towards the launch of an iPhone with a larger screen – hopefully, one that folds.

However, iOS 27 needs more than just an iPad-like multitasking UI to take advantage of its bigger canvas. After using most of the foldable phones launched in the last five years, I have a few notes for Apple to maximize the big screen potential.

Multitasking with intuitive window management

The Oppo Find N6 is my favorite foldable phone. It has an anti-reflective screen for better outdoor legibility, big battery all-day endurance and above all, a software experience that makes it a multitasking powerhouse. It is much more than having a simple split-screen at your disposal. That’s not to say I don’t use split-screen multitasking but running two apps side-by-side isn’t ideal when you have to type in one app (like Google Docs). Once the keyboard pops up, you get less space to type.

Oppo (and OnePlus) solved this issue in 2023, when you could run two apps side-by-side and a third one in full-screen at the bottom. It lets me reference search material from a webpage on the left half of the screen and have a PDF running on the other half, while also running Google Docs at the bottom to type my story on the go.

The latest Oppo Find N6 takes it to the next level with its Free-Flow Window feature, which lets you run up to four apps simultaneously in resizeable windows. Is four apps too much? Yes. But is it logical? Also yes. I thought it was overkill till I was at the airport and had to urgently submit my invoices. I opened Google Sheets (to create the invoice), Calculator (to calculate my month’s income for taxes), Keep (to take tax notes), and Chrome (to cross-check my published work.

I could do all of this on a slab phone by constantly flipping between each app. However, having the ability to run all of these apps without exiting another and resize them to your liking truly helps save time and effort. I’ve also used this feature to take notes while attending meetings and referencing shared PDFs simultaneously.

I’d love to have this feature on the iPhone Fold with an iPad-like taskbar at the bottom. It could make the iPhone Ultra like an iPad Mini when unfolded but one that fits inside my pocket.

More iOS tweaks for intuitive use

The iOS 27 redesign could touch Siri, Search, Camera, Safari, Weather, Image Playground and more. For the sake of iPhone Fold’s big screen, I hope it also adds two things to the system user interface.

First, I’d love to get a Samsung Galaxy Z Fold 7-like sidebar. It might not sound very useful in theory but every foldable phone has this feature now, and it is for a good reason. When AI Select was first rolled out on a Samsung phone, it was only possible to access it through the sidebar. This Galaxy AI feature allowed me to highlight a portion of my current screen and suggest contextual actions.

For instance, I used it to add Calendar events from my emails. I could open an email invite, swipe the sidebar to access AI Select and highlight the event information to automatically have the date, time and address on my Calendar app. Unless you have Gemini enabled on your Gmail account, you’d need to manually add these details to create a Calendar event.

I also use the sidebar to access the Files app and other apps for pop-up (like Calculator), which I don’t have on my taskbar. While the Bloomberg report said a sidebar could make its way to certain apps, I’d love to have system-wide accessibility so I can use it on top of my on-screen content, no matter what app I’m currently using.

Second, I want more smartphone manufacturers to borrow Honor’s extended folders. It helps keep apps within one-tap access, while also letting me group them. It is the best of both worlds – having a folder as well as a single app icon on the screen.

This feature was adopted by more Android skins last year but most of them are limited to three apps. Honor allows me to add up to five apps in a vertical or horizontal extended folder, which groups my favorite apps without needing me to tap on a folder to access them. It is a neat feature that I’ve missed immensely since I shifted back to my iPhone 17 Pro Max. The best I can do on an iPhone right now is move apps closer to each other, or use Smart Stack to group a few widgets together.

These iOS 27 additions would make the upcoming Apple foldable easier to use and help maximize its big screen utility. I hope we can get our first look at some of them next week at WWDC 26, alongside the other more exciting iOS 27 features. Either way, it is going to be a packed week for Apple software!

Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky has had enough of merely being an artificial intelligence kingmaker. He now plans to back a new AI lab of his own. The news, broken by Bloomberg and confirmed to TechCrunch by a person familiar with the situation, marks Chesky as one of many Silicon Valley machers who are unsatisfied with the models coming out of the frontier labs.

While Airbnb has adopted AI coding tools, Chesky said last year it hasn’t struck an LLM partnership because existing products weren’t quite ready.

Still, Chesky has plenty of insight. He met Sam Altman in 2006 through Y Combinator, which incubated Airbnb, and stayed in touch. When OpenAI took off, he began meeting regularly with Altman to offer advice about managing a hypergrowth tech company.

Chesky, who was reportedly considered a potential OpenAI board member, helped broker Altman’s return to power after its board of directors fired the CEO for lack of candor. Chesky advised Altman on public relations and rallied support for him among Silicon Valley bigwigs.

Now, however, he appears to be entering competition with his mentee’s company.

It’s not clear what the focus of Chesky’s new AI lab will be, although the Bloomberg article mentions user interaction and design, areas that he has emphasized at Airbnb.

That’s not unlike what Brett Adcock is doing at Hark, the AI lab he launched late last year to develop a novel user interface for an AI assistant, although the startup is also emphasizing hardware products.

Chesky also won’t be going into “founder mode” at this operation; a person familiar with the situation says he will remain as Airbnb’s CEO and not lead the new lab himself. Whoever gets the job will have to contend not only with the other AI labs, but also with a founding chair (we presume) known as a micromanager.

A representative for Airbnb and Chesky declined to comment.

On Thursday, Cisco warned of a high-severity, unpatched zero-day in the Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager (tracked as CVE-2026-20245) actively exploited in attacks enabling root privilege escalation.

The zero-day flaw impacts all deployment types, including On-Prem Deployment, Cisco SD-WAN Cloud-Pro, Cisco SD-WAN Cloud (Cisco Managed), and Cisco SD-WAN for Government (FedRAMP).

In a Thursday advisory, Cisco said the issue stems from insufficient validation of user-supplied input, and it can allow local attackers with low privileges to execute arbitrary commands as root.

“An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by uploading a crafted file to the affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform command injection attacks on an affected system and elevate their privileges as the root user,” the company explained.

“To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have netadmin privileges on the affected system. This would require valid credentials or exploitation of CVE-2026-20182 or CVE-2026-20127. Cisco is not aware of successful exploitation by other methods,” it added. “Cisco is not aware of successful exploitation by other methods. Cisco has observed limited cases where the exploitation of this bug resulted in a configuration change pushed to edge devices.”

Formerly known as SD-WAN vManage, this network management software helps admins monitor and manage up to 6,000 Catalyst SD-WAN devices from a single dashboard.

Cisco’s Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) became aware of CVE-2026-20245 exploitation in June after Google Cloud cybersecurity subsidiary Mandiant reported the flaw but did not share any details.

However, it shared indicators of compromise (IOCs) warning admins to check their SD-WAN /var/log/scripts.log file for attempts to upload tenant configuration data to vSmart controllers to escalate privileges through legitimate commands, as in the following example:

Apr 15 09:44:57 vmanage vScript: Tenant list upload per vsmart serial number: /usr/bin/vconfd_script_upload_tenant_list.sh -cli path /home/admin/malicious.csv vpn 0

“For help determining if a Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager has been compromised, customers may open a case with the Cisco TAC,” the company added, advising admins first to generate an admin-tech file to help with the review.

Security patches not yet available

Last month, Cisco also tagged a maximum severity Catalyst SD-WAN Controller authentication bypass flaw (CVE-2026-20182) as actively exploited as a zero-day to gain administrative privileges on unpatched devices.

While Cisco has not yet released patches for CVE-2026-20245, it advised customers to upgrade to the software fixed for CVE-2026-20182 on May 14.

In February, Cisco patched another Catalyst SD-WAN Manager information disclosure security flaw (CVE-2026-20133), which CISA flagged as actively exploited in late April, and, two weeks later, warned that two more flaws (CVE-2026-20128 and CVE-2026-20122) were being abused in the wild.

In March, it also addressed and flagged a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability (CVE-2026-20127) that has been exploited in zero-day attacks since at least 2023.

Over the last several years, CISA has tagged 90 Cisco vulnerabilities as abused in the wild, four of them in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager and six others exploited by ransomware operations.

Security teams log 54% of successful attacks and alert on just 14%. The rest move through your environment unseen.

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