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Chinese artificial intelligence companies are driving down costs to create competitive models, as they contend with US chip restrictions and smaller budgets than their Western counterparts.
Start-ups such as 01.ai and DeepSeek have reduced prices by adopting strategies such as focusing on smaller data sets to train AI models and hiring cheap but skilled computer engineers.
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Bigger technology groups such as Alibaba, Baidu and ByteDance have also engaged in a pricing war to cut “inference” costs, the price of calling upon large language models to generate a response, by more than 90 per cent and to a fraction of that offered by US counterparts.
This is despite Chinese companies having to navigate Washington’s ban on exports of the highest-end Nvidia AI chips, seen as crucial to developing the most cutting edge models in the US.
Beijing-based 01.ai, led by Lee Kai-Fu, the former head of Google China, said it has cut inference costs by building a model trained on smaller amounts of data that requires less computing power and optimising their hardware.
“China’s strength is to make really affordable inference engines and then to let applications proliferate,” Lee told the Financial Times.
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This week, 01.ai’s Yi-Lightning model came joint third among LLM companies alongside x.AI’s Grok-2, but behind OpenAI and Google in a ranking released by researchers at UC Berkeley SkyLab and LMSYS.
The evaluations are based on users that score different models’ answers to queries. Other Chinese players, including ByteDance, Alibaba and DeepSeek have also crept up the ranking boards of LLMs.
The cost for inference at 01.ai’s Yi-Lightning is 14 cents per million tokens, compared with 26 cents for OpenAI’s smaller model GPT o1-mini. Meanwhile inference costs for OpenAI’s much larger GPT 4o is $4.40 per million tokens. The number of tokens used to generate a response depends on the complexity of the query.
Lee also said Yi-Lightning cost $3mn to “pre-train”, initial model training that can then be fine-tuned or customised for different use cases. This is a small fraction of the cost cited by the likes of OpenAI for its large models. He added the aim is not to have the “best model”, but a competitive one that is “five to 10 times less expensive” for developers to use to build applications.
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Many Chinese AI groups, including 01.ai, DeepSeek, MiniMax and Stepfun have adopted a so-called “model-of-expert” approach, a strategy first popularised by US researchers.
Rather than training one “dense model” at once on a vast database that has scraped data from the internet and other sources, the approach combines many neural networks trained on industry-specific data.
Researchers view the model-of-expert approach as a key way to achieve the same level of intelligence as a dense model but with less computing power. But the approach can be more prone to failure as engineers have to orchestrate the training process across multiple “experts” rather than in one model.
Given the difficulty in securing a steady and ample supply of high-end AI chips, Chinese AI players have been competing over the past year to develop the highest-quality data sets to train these “experts” to set themselves apart from the competition.
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Lee said 01.ai has approaches to data collection beyond the traditional method of scraping the internet, including scanning books and crawling articles on the messaging app WeChat that are inaccessible on the open web.
“There is a lot of thankless gruntwork” for engineers to label and rank data, he said, but added China — with its vast pool of cheap engineering talent — is better placed to do that than the US.
“China’s strength is not doing the best breakthrough research that no one has done before where the budget has no limit,” said Lee. “China’s strength is to build well, build fast, build reliably and build cheap.”
Additional reporting by Cristina Criddle in San Francisco
Throughout history, leaders have sought to reshape the Middle East. From the heights of my village on Mount Lebanon, I can contemplate the passage of successive empires: the beautiful remnants of a Roman temple, a Byzantine church or a (much less charming) French military bunker, there to remind me of the region’s magnetic pull and the fleeting nature of power.
The area stretching from the Taurus Mountains to Arabia Deserta and from Shatt al-Arab to the Mediterranean is strategically located, symbolically intense, socially diverse and, therefore, politically unstable. Imposing some kind of order on its vulnerable states and uncertain, volatile identities has been a temptation for conquerors and politicians alike. Cyrus of Persia and Alexander of Macedonia tried; so, more recently, did George W Bush.
As the 20th-century colonial empires receded and the era of independence bloomed, a largely arbitrary political map took shape, distributing among the new (non-nation) states mountains and plains, plateaus and deserts stretched around the Jordan, Orontes and Euphrates rivers. These modern creatures proved to be fragile, permanently threatened by ethnic strife and political mismanagement.
State-building is a desperately difficult endeavour in plural societies, never accomplished, always reversible and often viewed as a mere cover used by one group or another (Alawi, Tikriti, Maronite) to impose its will. It is rendered even more difficult when emerging regional hegemons keep attempting to transform these fragile units into obedient satellites.
The Middle East has of late experienced many such episodes. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt used a fervent wave of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s to try to impose its primacy, only to be brutally contained in its ambition by Israel’s superior arms, conservative Arab regimes’ machinations and active western hostility. Khomeinist Iran, promoting Shia emancipation and political Islam, engaged in a similar project from the very first days of the revolution, leading among other effects to a horrible eight-year war with Iraq, and the sponsoring of non-state armed groups such as Lebanon’s Hizbollah, Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi and Palestine’s Hamas. Tehran tried to organise that network into an “Axis of Resistance”, which looked very much on the ascendant until recently. Not to be outdone, Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has tried its hand at reasserting Ankara’s influence, through subtle means as well as less subtle ones, over an area that had lived under Ottoman rule for some four centuries.
The latest to be tempted is Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu. He talks about his ambition and demonstrates, one tactical victory after another, that he means what he says. Following the brutal Hamas eruption of October 7 2023, he transformed Gaza into a huge field of ruins, displacing, bombing, starving and dehumanising its population at will. Then he moved north to put an end to the low-intensity warfare Hizbollah had engaged in against Israel in support of Gaza, and he did it alla grande.
He bombed the port of Hodeidah in Yemen to punish the Houthis, who had considered it their duty to help Gaza by disrupting international navigation and firing missiles at Israel. He kept hitting arms depots and, of course, Iranian and pro-Iranian militants in dismembered, disabled Syria. At the time of writing, he is preparing to bomb Iran, a response to the missile attacks of October 1 that not only entails overflying a few neighbouring countries but also drawing the US into providing support.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu has never let anybody forget that his most cherished aim remains the annexation of the occupied West Bank (and therefore the extinguishing of any possible Palestinian state), where assassinations of militants, destruction of whole villages and expropriations of land are, if anything, redoubled. His finance minister Bezalel Smotrich is busy altering the legal system of “Judea and Samaria” in anticipation of what many fear will be full-fledged annexation and possibly the transfer of some 3mn Palestinians east of the River Jordan; recently he has been ruminating publicly about a Jewish state that could extend from Iraq to Egypt.
Militarily, Israel’s behaviour in Gaza has looked instinctive, chaotic, a retribution rather than a war (Isaac Herzog, the Israeli president, has accused all the Strip’s inhabitants of being accomplices of Hamas and therefore legitimate targets). During the year that followed October 7, Israel kept bombing hospitals and schools, mosques and churches, villages and camps, without stating, without probably knowing, what to make of the “day after”.
In Lebanon, its war has been, by contrast, a meticulously planned one: the most recent confrontation with Hizbollah in 2006 was inconclusive, and Israeli cognoscenti have believed since then that a new confrontation with Hassan Nasrallah’s fighters was inevitable. Hence the implementation of a war plan that has been refined down to its smallest details and regularly updated during the past 18 years. The result is a campaign that combines almost sci-fi intelligence with relentless bombing from a dominating air force and state-of-the-art drones, all areas where Israel has a clear superiority, not to say supremacy. By the end of last month, in the wake of Nasrallah’s assassination, Netanyahu was half declaring victory, hailing Israel’s success in “changing the balance of power in the region for years”.
Israel’s cascade of tactical successes on both fronts is indisputable — still more so following the news this week that its troops had killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza. Military experts are feverishly anticipating the next Israeli innovations. Many pro-Israeli observers are in a state of awe, if not euphoria, and all this has inevitably encouraged Netanyahu to start thinking of a new Middle East, re-engineered by Israeli arms and reflecting the new hegemon’s will. Israeli cartographers are regularly asked to equip their prime minister with maps to show from the UN lectern in which a flourishing and prosperous Middle East is on the verge of replacing a tenebrous, barbaric one.
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There indeed is no doubt that Israel has altered the balance of power, substantially crippling Hamas and Hizbollah, and putting itself in a position where its government thinks it can dictate the new regional configuration — helped as it is by its victorious army, by Arab passivity, American generosity (in weapons, dollars and diplomatic support) and a broken international system. How to remain rational, let alone modest, under such a constellation of stars?
The question is not that of this substantial change’s reality but of its durability. If anything, past attempts to reshape the Middle East have generally ended in failure: Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin entered a deep depression when examining the results of his attempt in 1982, and Bush might be ruminating still over the US-led initiative, proclaimed in 2003, to export democracy across the region through regime change.
Starting the re-engineering of the region with an incursion in Lebanon has, in particular, been a curse for Israeli politicians: Begin and his defence minister Ariel Sharon had to resign after their 1982 large-scale invasion of their northern neighbour, which had been justified in terms very similar to Netanyahu’s now. Shimon Peres was defeated in the elections that followed his “grapes of wrath” campaign of 1996 and Ehud Olmert’s misadventure there in 2006 combined with corruption cases to bring about his downfall. The repeated promise of a “new Middle East” after each of these invasions has naturally not seen daylight.
Could the present Israeli prime minister do better? There are a few good reasons for scepticism. First, aspiring hegemons need to be ready to redraw borders and promote regime change. Some application of force is indispensable and that’s why only countries with substantial military resources (Saddam Hussein was under the illusion that he possessed them) engage in such endeavours.
However successfully they are pursued, these goals usually exact a heavy price in human lives and material resources. Netanyahu has gone so far as to predict regime change in Iran “a lot sooner than people think”. But grabbing more land while imposing obedient leaders on a few neighbouring countries is probably a tall order; Israel can hardly do both at the same time, as each objective (and sometimes both) will be vigorously opposed by other players.
The second reason for scepticism is that Arab regimes’ passivity during the past year is very much linked to the identity of Israel’s main targets, two pro-Iranian champions of political Islam. By destroying them, Israel is also hitting what most Arab regimes consider their most serious adversaries. If and when Israel’s activism goes beyond this fortuitous convergence of interests, Arab passivity could suddenly disappear. Attempts to transfer Palestinians into neighbouring countries would in particular be opposed as a major source of political instability. Israeli attempts to impose a form of political hegemony in the Levant would not be acceptable to Egypt or Saudi Arabia and other would-be regional hegemons.
A third reason is that the excessive use of force will keep Israel’s adversaries in a state of anger: Israel can accumulate tactical wins but it cannot translate them into a stable hegemony. With the fundamental issues remaining unresolved, Hamas (or a successor group) and Hizbollah can reinvent themselves any time in the coming years, their most recent humiliation playing as an incentive rather than a deterrent (there are reasons to believe that, while being pounded like hell, both groups have been able to attract new recruits).
Fragile states in the region, when not accomplices of anti-Israeli movements, can hardly prevent the re-emergence of groups with deep cultural roots and what they consider a legitimate cause. It seems likely that the Palestinian cause will continue to play the role of the Bible’s burning bush, extinguished only to be reignited immediately after.
Fourth, an Israeli hegemony would be built on sheer, naked, arrogant power. All Israel’s neighbours are presently on the defensive: Syria is effectively occupied; Iraq has not recaptured its national unity since its “liberation”, nor been organised by strong, transparent institutions; Jordan fears the annexation of the West Bank and its own transformation into an alternative Palestinian state (something that had been part of the programme of Netanyahu’s Likud party for decades and has recently risen up the agenda in Tel Aviv and possibly in Mar-a-Lago as well).
As for my country, Lebanon, it is financially bankrupt, politically paralysed (with no president, a government with limited powers and a dormant parliament) and threatened by the recurrence of civil war. Israel’s hegemony, if it is established, would be an easy victory but in an unstable, frustrated, angry environment that could hardly be pacified. Even if the war stopped today, Lebanon would still need years to recover. Israel might find informants in such an environment but would search desperately for allies and proxies.
This is more so because the kind of regional hegemony Israel is attempting to build is totally non-Gramscian: it does not seek to integrate the defeated but, on the contrary, keeps excluding him. Its expansionist messianism is unpalatable even to the least bellicose of the region’s populations simply because they could have no part in it. They consider themselves utterly removed from the Holocaust inflicted by Europeans on the Jews and are therefore unwilling to pay, yet again, for Europe’s misdeeds. Integration of the weak into the powerful’s domain, as analysed by Antonio Gramsci or, long before him, by the great Ibn Khaldūn (who wrote of a process by which the weak accept a lesser standing as long as they are part of the ruler’s network, probably a precondition for sustainable hegemony), is impossible in these circumstances.
FT Edit
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In this respect, the domestic evolution of the country is a mirror. Since its victory in the 1967 war, Israel has changed. This can be seen in the Druze community, traditionally a disproportionate source of recruits to the Israeli military, where there is growing unease about a redefinition of Israel that solidifies their standing as second-class citizens. It was evident too in the protests throughout the spring and summer of 2023, when liberal Israelis demonstrated in hundreds of thousands against the Netanyahu government’s “reforms” of the judiciary, meant to constrain its autonomy.
In other words, a reconfiguration of Israel as a religious entity (as illustrated by the settlers’ increasing influence on politics or the large increase of religious militants in the officer corps) makes it even more exclusivist: liberal Jews and — certainly — Arab citizens of the state are not welcome. This transformation of the Israeli polity (not its mere “slide to the right”, as often reported) has been going in parallel with the attempt at regional hegemony, a combination that can hardly reassure large segments of the Israeli population or the country’s neighbours in the region.
Those the gods afflict with hubris free themselves from reason. UN secretary-general António Guterres was declared persona non grata only because he reminded Israel that international humanitarian law also applies to it. Emmanuel Macron was promised hell because he suggested that arms deliveries to Israel should be halted. The International Criminal Court was demonised when it spoke of war crimes being committed; we do not know whether it will issue arrest warrants for Israeli leaders. Even countries that have normalised their relations with Israel are disoriented by its elastic definition of its security and contempt for others’ concern for theirs.
Similarly, the idea of Israel as a bulwark of civilisation against barbarism is a pretension that finds an echo in the west (certainly in the US Congress) but can hardly describe the region’s ancient civilisations nor adequately reflect the Israeli army’s behaviour in Gaza. Closer to reality is Israel’s attempt to be an advanced military fort for the west, and many in the west are happy with that role. But an advanced military fort cannot be a regional hegemon, much less a beacon of civilisation.
In this tortured, agitated, broken region, there still is a way to avoid the worst. It is by bringing back to the forefront the heart of the matter, the issue that has been around for a century and a half of conflict, the issue that many Israelis want to forget: the Palestinians’ basic political rights. Israel’s regional adventures often look like a flight from that ever-present, painful fact. Unless the Palestinians’ right to a state of their own alongside Israel is recognised and materially implemented, they will not cease to be a source of (fully legitimate) disruption, making their life and that of their neighbours impossible.
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The aspiring hegemon has concluded that if force does not pacify the Palestinians and those who, sincerely or cynically, support their cause, the remedy is in the application of even more force. If history is of any use, it teaches us that the use of force to settle complex political issues is always sterile and often counter-productive. In any case, the ruins left by Israel’s present pounding of Lebanon have none of the charm left by Romans and Byzantines in my village: they are instead the mark of an unconstrained, unbearable hubris.
The writer is a professor of international relations emeritus at Sciences-Po (Paris) and a former senior adviser to the United Nations secretary-general
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THOUSANDS of brits could pocket an extra £200 to help with soaring winter energy payments – check if you’re eligible.
The Household Support Fund offers families a helping hand when they may need it most, whether it’s with the food shop, school uniform or paying essential bills.
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Thousands of brits could pocket an extra £200 to help with winter energy bill payments – check if you’re eligibleCredit: Getty
In September, the Department for Work and Pensions announced the HSF in Birmingham will be extended from October 2024 to March 2025.
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Thousands may be eligible to claim the cash boost from Birmingham Voluntary Service Council (BVSC).
The £200 grant can be put towards household essentials including energy and food bills.
It won’t have an effect on any other benefits you may be receiving or be entitled to.
The payment is usually transferred directly into a bank account in the applicant’s name.
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Who is eligible
According to Birmingham City Council, you must meet the following requirements to be eligible:
be a Birmingham resident
be experiencing financial hardship, particularly with covering costs linked to food and energy
not have received a £200 grant payment in the last 12 months
Each household is only eligible to receive one £200 grant payment in a 12 month period.
How to apply
To apply, those eligible need to complete the Hardship Grant Community Fund expression of interest form.
This can be accessed on the Birmingham City Council website under Cost of Living Support, Household Support Fund 2024 to 2025.
All applicants will be contacted via email with details of the next steps should they be accepted.
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If you’re invited to apply, you will likely need to provide proof of your address and proof that you’re receiving means-tested benefits, if applicable.
Further support
Information can be accessed through these websites
What is the Household Support Fund?
Households in need can claim support to help with the cost of living via the Household Support Fund.
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The funding is supplied from a £421million pot by the Department for Work and Pensions.
It was first introduced in October 2021 and has been extended five times.
Councils up and down the country get a portion of the cash to allocate to vulnerable households.
Check with your local council to find out what support is available and the eligibility criteria.
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Household Support Fund explained
Sun Savers Editor Lana Clements explains what you need to know about the Household Support Fund.
If you’re battling to afford energy and water bills, food or other essential items and services, the Household Support Fund can act as a vital lifeline.
The financial support is a little-known way for struggling families to get extra help with the cost of living.
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Every council in England has been given a share of £421million cash by the government to distribute to local low income households.
Each local authority chooses how to pass on the support. Some offer vouchers whereas others give direct cash payments.
In many instances, the value of support is worth hundreds of pounds to individual families.
Just as the support varies between councils, so does the criteria for qualifying.
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Many councils offer the help to households on selected benefits or they may base help on the level of household income.
The key is to get in touch with your local authority to see exactly what support is on offer.
And don’t delay, the scheme has been extended until April 2025 but your council may dish out their share of the Household Support Fund before this date.
Once the cash is gone, you may find they cannot provide any extra help so it’s crucial you apply as soon as possible.
Analysing travel bookings as well as working with global travel consultants, the island was one of the few European destinations to make the list.
The website states: “Laid-back Paros has become the Greek island of choice for many.
“The cultural scene is vibrant here, and the rocky coastline is studded with beaches, secluded coves, and sea caves.
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“A mere 40-minute flight from Athens—or three hours on a ferry—this windblown retreat is also easy to get to.”
Around 200,000 people visit a year – just 10 per cent of the annual tourists that go to Santorini.
This means you can expect the island to be much quieter, and off-the-beaten track.
Its famous for a few things. This includes its marble, which was considered to be the best in ancient times, but there are other attractions too, including its many beaches.
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The town of Naoussa is the second largest town on the island and has been called a “smaller version of Mykonos”.
Expect amazing seafood when there too, with most of it caught at fresh before being served up
How to do two Greek islands in one holiday – with stunning private-pool rooms
They included the destination because of its “distinctive culture, coastal scenery and miles of seaside walking paths like the GR34 trail”.
Mont-Saint-Michel is one of the region’s most famous attractions, located in the bay shared by Normandy and Brittany.
One beach that’s proven popular among holidaymakers because of its long stretch of sandy beach, stunning views, and tranquil waters is Plage de Tahiti.
Ferry is a popular option for travelling to Brittany from the UK – with routes from Plymouth and Poole.
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American Express Travel’s 2025 Trending Destinations
Brisbane, Australia – located between the Gold and Sunshine Coasts, Brisbane offers excellent museums as well as vibrant dining and nightlife.
Brittany France – Distinctive culture, coastal scenery and miles of seaside walking paths like the GR34 trail top the list of reasons to visit the Brittany region.
Franschhoek, South Africa – Franschhoek, the mountain-ringed gem in the Cape Winelands region, is an ideal add-on to a safari vacation with nearly 50 wineries, farm-to-table restaurants and hiking.
Koh Samui, Thailand – 88-square-mile Koh Samui offers a dreamy combo of lush jungle, white sand beaches, and turquoise waters, perfect for active travelers or those looking to relax. The island will be featured on a popular TV show scheduled to air next year and is sure to inspire set-jetting travelers.
Macau, China – Though The Historic Centre of Macau enjoys UNESCO World Heritage status, and the local Cantonese-Portuguese fusion cuisine is a must-try for foodies, the supersized casinos are the reason this densely populated peninsula, known as the “Las Vegas of the East,” boasts a number of award-winning restaurants.
Moab, United States – As the gateway to Utah’s “Mighty Five” national parks, Moab is a perfect starting point to explore the American Southwest. Travelers come for world-class rafting, mountain biking, and canyon hiking – or simply to bask in the red rock scenery.
Nikko, Japan – This tucked away mountain retreat in mostly rural Tochigi prefecture blends elements of Kyoto and Mt. Fuji, with photogenic waterfalls and abundant hiking trails.
Paros, Greece – Laid-back Paros has become the Greek island of choice for many with a vibrant cultural scene and rocky coastline studded with beaches, secluded coves, and sea caves.
São Paulo, Brazil – This multi-ethnic city is one of the great cultural destinations of South America and home to rich architectural heritage and some of the continent’s best museums, street art, and homegrown fashion.
Sun Valley, Idaho, United States – With fewer crowds than other Western ski resorts, Sun Valley appeals to premium travellers and everyday outdoor enthusiasts alike. During the summer months travellers can enjoy trout fishing, whitewater rafting, mountain biking and more.
What is wise in 2024 remains a much-debated topic: but the value of a great education is something about which few would argue. For this week’s cover story, we followed Oxford student Grace Clover as she enjoyed her final days as an undergraduate at Wadham College, in a university recognised by many as being the world’s most prestigious. Grace writes about her experiences in a piece to accompany the pictures, and captures the strange contradictions, exhilarations and adventures that come with student life. In particular, she notes the peculiar isolation that comes with fulfilling the weekly essay deadlines, the “constant socialising” and the tremendous privilege of being surrounded by so much history and beauty.
As someone who has just delivered their child to university (though not Oxford), I found Grace’s essay especially pertinent. I also felt a huge nostalgia for that short moment where one stands on the precipice of “grown-up” life. The undergraduate experience is emotionally intense, confusing and wonderfully liberating. The pictures capture the great gift it is to be a student. Side note: it also bears testimony to the many friendships forged in adolescence – the shoot’s photographer, Tom Craig, and I were both in the same graduating year at Edinburgh.
Few things are more revolting than eating soup with a wooden spoon
Next, a personal obsession: since the ban of single-use plastic cutlery in England in 2023, restaurants and fast-food outlets have had to introduce a range of sustainable alternatives. There are now dozens of options when it comes to compostable cutlery, but most make for an unpleasant eating experience – there are few things more revolting than eating one’s lunchtime soup from a “cringey” and rough-sided wooden spoon. Ajesh Patalay investigates the state of eco cutlery, the issues of trying to make something both satisfactory and sustainable, and whether the current composting options are even viable. He finds that few options are especially compliant: I’ve vowed therefore to try to keep a real spoon around the desktop.
On the subject of the working lunch, how many of you have a kitchen or catering facilities in your office? You’ll probably enjoy Grace Cook’s piece about some of the world’s great staff canteens. From Polentina, an Italian restaurant set in a garment factory in east London, to Kantine, the kitchen restaurant that feeds the staff – and visitors – of David Chipperfield’s Berlin headquarters, Grace has looked at the new wave of cooks and forward-thinking employers who are rehabilitating this much-derided catering genre. I am rather envious of the folk at On Labs in Zürich, who have a dining room designed to mimic a living space where they get to enjoy a “vegan buffet”. Thankfully, many of these kitchens are open to non-staffers: you don’t need a visitor’s pass to try them for yourselves.
Cash incentives are regularly launched by banks to entice new customers, but do be sure to check the small print.
Most of these offers have certain criteria that you need to meet in order for you to get the cash.
For example, some accounts require you to pay a certain amount each month to maintain them.
While others might charge you for setting up an overdraft.
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Be sure to check that the account you chose is right for you in the long term before switching.
Once you’ve decided you’ll need to make the switch using the current account switching service (CASS) which takes just seven days, and the new bank handles it for you.
We explain further down how the CASS works, but first here’s the full list of the offers available now that could tempt you to move.
Lloyds Bank – £200
If you switch your current account to Lloyds you could get £200.
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Both new and existing customers can take advantage of the free cash offer available for those who switch between now and December 10.
Those who switch to the Club Lloyds account can expect the £200 to be paid within ten days of completing the switch.
It is important to be aware that the account comes with a £3 a month fee unless you pay in £2,000 a month.
To finalise the switch, customers can either scan the QR code available on the bank’s website or use the mobile app.
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Once completed, Club Lloyds customers will be able to select from a range of perks, including a 12-month Disney+ subscription, a choice of Vue or Odeon cinema tickets, a magazine subscription, or a Coffee Club and Gourmet Society membership.
But remember you pay a fee for the extras, so work out if it’s worth paying the fee to get these.
New customers can get the bonus, and so can existing Lloyds customers if they don’t already have a Club Lloyds account and open a new one.
Those who already received a switch bonus since April 2020 from Lloyds, Halifax or Bank of Scotland (all part of the same group) won’t be eligible.
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The same bonus is also available when switching to the Club Lloyds Platinum Account and Club Lloyds Silver Account but these comes with a £22.50 and £11.50 a month fee, respectively, on top of the £3.
How do I switch bank accounts?
SWITCHING bank accounts is a simple process and can usually be done through the Current Account Switch Service (CASS).
Dozens of high street banks and building societies are signed up – there’s a full list on CASS’ website.
Under the switching service, swapping banks should take seven working days.
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You don’t have to remember to move direct debits across when moving, as this is done for you.
All you have to do is apply for the new account you want, and the new bank will tell your existing one you’re moving.
There are a few things you can do before switching though, including choosing your switch date and transferring any old bank statements to your new account.
You should get in touch with your existing bank for any old statements.
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When switching current accounts, consider what other perks might come with joining a specific bank or building society.
Some banks offer 0% overdrafts up to a certain limit, and others might offer better rates on savings accounts.
And some banks offer free travel or mobile phone insurance with their current accounts – but these accounts might come with a monthly fee.
First Direct – £175
First Direct has relaunched its popular cash switch incentive for anyone who opens a 1st Account.
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Customers can receive a payment of up to £175 by using the CASS.
Users have to switch at least two direct debits or standing orders within 30 days of opening the account to qualify for the cash.
Switchers also need to add at least £1,000 into the account, register and log on to internetbanking and use the debit card at least five times within 30 days of opening the account.
Customers who meet the criteria should expect the free bonus in their accounts by the 20th of the following month.
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The bank revealed that new customers switching to their current account to first direct can expect several extra perks, including a £250 interest-free overdraft.
You won’t qualify for the switching incentive if you have previously held a First Direct product or opened an HSBC current account on or after January 1, 2018.
Customers moving across to the bank will also get access to a regular savings account paying 7% interest, one of the best deals around, as well as a 0% overdraft on the first £250.
Nationwide – £175
Nationwide Building Society has launched a new offer of £175 to switch to its FlexDirect, FlexPlus or FlexAccount current accounts.
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The free-cash perk is a joint-market leading sum with First Direct.
The FlexDirect account gives the holder 5% credit interest on balances up to £1,500 for the first 12 months.
This account also offers an interest-free overdraft for the first 12 months.
Those who open a new FlexDirect account will still get the 5% credit interest rate, and will also receive 1% cashback for the first 12 months on debit card purchases, capped at £5 per month.
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For new FlexDirect account openings, the previous interest-free overdraft offer will be withdrawn.
But if you are an existing customer who is benefiting from an interest-free overdraft offer then don’t worry, this will continue until the end of their 12-month period.
You also can’t have switched into a Nationwide account, or have received switch cash from Nationwide, since August 18, 2021.
Co-op Bank
The Co-operative Bank has announced eligible customers could receive up to £150.
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The first £75 is given when a customer completes a switch to the bank.
Then, the bank is offering three monthly instalments of £25 – another £75 – to make up the £150.
Both new and existing customers can apply to switch to a current account to make themselves eligible for the payment.
Customers must apply for a Standard Current Account or Everyday Extra account.
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To be eligible, customers must not have benefited from a switch incentive at The Co-operative Bank since 1 November 2022.
And to receive the first £75, customers need to follow a series of rules.
They are:
Deposit a minimum of £1,000 into their new account (this includes balances transferred as part of the switch).
Have 2 active Direct Debits.
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Welcome back. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine this week unveiled a five-point “victory plan” for the war against Russia. Even from Ukraine’s western friends, the plan didn’t receive unqualified support.
One way of approaching this topic is to turn matters round and ask: will Russia prevail in the war, and what would constitute “victory” for President Vladimir Putin? I’m at tony.barber@ft.com.
Zelenskyy’s plan
Zelenskyy’s initiative had five main components, summarised here by the BBC:
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Joining Nato
Strengthening Ukraine’s defences and securing western support to use long-range weapons in Russia
A non-nuclear, postwar deterrent to contain Russia
Joint Ukrainian-western exploitation of Ukraine’s natural resources
A Ukrainian contribution to the west’s defences after the war
Mark Rutte, Nato’s new secretary-general, gave a guarded response to Zelenskyy’s plan:
The plan has many aspects and many political and military issues we really need to hammer out with the Ukrainians to understand what is behind it, to see what we can do, what we cannot do.
Some Ukrainian politicians were not convinced, either. Opposition lawmaker Oleksii Honcharenko said:
“It’s kind of a wish list from Ukraine for our partners . . . And it doesn’t look realistic.”
One large, unanswered question about the plan is whether an end to the war would leave Russia occupying the roughly one-fifth of Ukrainian territory that it now holds.
The plan contains annexes, not made public, that may address this point. Clearly, territorial control would lie at the heart of any negotiations, no less than Ukraine’s postwar security.
For the moment, I think we can assume that neither Ukraine nor western governments are inclined to cede formal, legal control over the occupied territories to Russia.
A truncated but successful Ukraine?
It isn’t difficult, however, to imagine an end to the fighting that leaves Russia in de facto control of Crimea and much of south-eastern Ukraine.
Most western governments now acknowledge privately, if not publicly, Ukraine is not likely to drive Russian forces from all the Ukrainian land they have seized since 2014.
For Graham, the key point is how a truncated Ukraine would develop after the war. Would it revert to “the poor, corrupt, oligarchic country of little interest to the west” that it was before the 2014 Maidan revolution?
Or would Ukraine emerge as “a strong, prosperous, democratic, independent country” anchored in western institutions?
Framing the issue in this way clarifies the question of what would amount to victory for Russia.
Control of territory: far from the only issue
Viewed in purely territorial terms, Russia’s war aims are to retain Crimea and the four eastern regions over which Moscow proclaimed its sovereignty in 2022.
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However, even after the gradual advances of Russia’s armed forces in the east this year, the Kremlin does not fully control these four regions. It follows that an end to the fighting that froze the battle lines more or less as they are now would not completely fulfil Russia’s territorial war aims.
Putin launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022 under the pretext of demilitarising and “de-Nazifying” Ukraine. Put differently, his aim was to destroy the independent Ukrainian state that emerged in 1991 out of the rubble of the Soviet Union, and to discredit the very idea of a Ukrainian national identity separate from that of Russia.
Putin’s views . . . reflect his embrace of the fundamentally anti-western, anti-European concept of russky mir [the Russian world], a partly historical, partly ideological construct that draws on the idea of “holy Rus” of the 10th century – itself an “invention” of 19th-century historians.
It encompasses late tsarist ideas of an ethnocultural pan-Slav bond between the eastern Slavs, and it is fuelled by memories of victory over fascism in the “Great Patriotic War” [the second world war].
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Looked at from this angle, Russia has already fallen short of its aims. Ukraine’s national identity has been forged in the fires of war and cannot now be subsumed into some nebulous Russian-dominated east Slav brotherhood.
Furthermore, even a dismembered Ukraine would remain a functioning state and part of the international system. Still, as Graham says, it would have to continue along the road of internal reform and would need credible guarantees of western protection.
Building Brics
Putin’s ambitions, stimulated by the Ukraine war, also encompass a revision of the world order in favour of Russia and its sympathisers, and to the disadvantage of the US and its allies.
How is that going?
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Next week, leaders of about two dozen countries will meet in Kazan, capital of the Russian region of Tatarstan, for a summit of the Brics club.
The Oct. 22-24 summit . . . is being presented by Moscow as evidence that western efforts to isolate Russia have failed. It wants other countries to work with it to overhaul the global financial system and end the dominance of the US dollar.
However, even some Russian commentators sound cautious about the usefulness of the Brics group, which has expanded beyond its original membership of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
Fyodor Lyukanov, editor-in-chief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs, says that, from Moscow’s viewpoint, it is positive that “the west’s ability to determine the entire global situation is rapidly disappearing”.
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But, with regard to the Brics group of existing and aspiring members, he adds:
The difficulties are obvious. With such a number of completely different states with different cultures, different interests, different levels of development, finding a consensus, a common denominator is extremely difficult. And the more states, the more difficult.
Iran, North Korea and China
In some respects, Russia has found it more beneficial to expand co-operation with Iran and North Korea, which are explicitly anti-western in a way that isn’t true of Brics countries such as Brazil and India.
This month, Putin met Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s new president, in Turkmenistan (the FT’s Charles Clover and Najmeh Bozorgmehr wrote a good piece on the military dimensions of the Russian-Iranian relationship).
How close are Russia and Iran? Perhaps less close than meets the eye.
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According to Tatiana Stanovaya, an independent Russian political scientist, the Kremlin remains reluctant to share military, space and especially nuclear technology with Iran.
Trade volumes between Russia and Iran fell last year, underscoring the mistrust of Russian businesses towards their Iranian counterparts, she says.
As for North Korea, ties with Russia have unquestionably deepened the longer the Ukraine war has gone on. Putin visited Pyongyang in June and signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership pact” with Kim Jong Un.
However, in this piece for the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, Hugo von Essen comments:
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[The partnership] could . . . have serious negative impacts for both China and Russian-Chinese relations. These include a destabilised Korean peninsula, greater US attention and resources spent in the region and a strengthened US-Japan-South Korea trio.
With regard to Russia’s relationship with China, let me highlight for you this excellent analysis by Eugene Rumer for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
He points out that Moscow and Beijing have much in common — authoritarian domestic politics, tensions with the US. But he stresses that they do not see eye to eye on everything and that, during the Ukraine war, the relationship has tilted in China’s favour.
Russia’s militarised economy
Finally, some thoughts on Russia’s war economy. As Bank of Finland analysis in the chart below shows, military expenditure is soaring:
But few topics more sharply divide western commentators than the prospects for the Russian economy.
On one hand, some specialists emphasise Russia’s resilience and the limited effectiveness of western sanctions. Wolfgang Münchau, writing for the New Statesman, comments:
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“The Russian war economy is running on steroids and generates huge revenues for the state.”
On the other hand, Anders Åslund, a longtime Swedish expert on Russia’s economy, says:
“My own view is that the current sanctions regime shaves off 2-3 per cent of GDP each year, condemning Russia to near stagnation.”
He makes the interesting point that Russia’s central bank, whose main interest rate stands at 19 per cent, estimated annual inflation in August at 9.1 per cent. Åslund says:
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“Nobody should believe such figures. Most likely, the authorities are repacking inflation as real growth.”
My own view is that, whatever Russia’s difficulties and manipulation of data, an end to the fighting in Ukraine is likely to arrive sooner than a breakdown of the Russian economy.
What do you think? Will Russia win the war? Vote here.
One year on from October 7, Palestinians face their most severe crisis in 75 years but have no unified leadership to guide them, Omar Rahman writes for the Italian Institute for International Political Studies
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