Donald Trump’s concern about the strategic positioning of Greenland is rational. But the way the US president has approached the issue is not – and could still rupture Nato and cause enduring harm to North Atlantic political and economic relations. The question for those attending the World Economic Forum in Davos all week has been how to respond to Trump’s ambition for the US to own Greenland by hook or by crook.
His speech on January 21 – which appeared to concede that the US will not take Greenland by force – and his subsequent claim of having negotiated what he referred to as a “framework agreement” with the Nato secretary-general, Mark Rutte, have at least given the assembled heads of state something to work with.
But America’s allies are faced with a series of options. They could try to wait out the 1,093 days left in Trump’s term in the hope that nothing drastic happens. They could appease Trump by conceding to some of his demands. Or alternatively they could activate the economic “bazooka” threatened by the French president Emmanuel Macron – although this is now less likely due to Trump’s decision to row back back on his threat to impose additional sanctions on countries that opposed his Greenland plans.
Finally, they could try to actively resist US aggression towards Greenland. Although, thankfully, Trump appears to have backtracked – for now – on his threat to use force.
A key strategic location
The US president’s Davos speech pitched his interest in Greenland in strategic terms. The Pituffik space base (formerly Thule air base) is a prime location to monitor Russian and Chinese aerospace and maritime activities as well as being an early warning base for missile protection.
This is increasingly important, given Russian military activity and stated claims to the polar region and China’s reference to the Arctic in its “Polar Silk Road” strategy.
In economic terms, Greenland’s melting ice has revealed the world’s eighth-largest deposits of rare earth elements and an estimated 31 billion barrels of oil. These are important to the US, which is seeking to reduce its dependency on China and to exert its own mineral and energy dominance. In the Davos speech, Trump emphasised US energy requirements while claiming not to covet Greenland’s mineral wealth.
Melting ice has similarly opened up Arctic shipping routes. This has made Greenland a strategic location both for influencing global trade and for projecting military power.
Trump has framed his desire to acquire Greenland in terms of his ambition to provide security for the west as a whole. Owning Greenland, he told the WEF, would allow him to build the “greatest Golden Dome ever built” – a missile defence shield which he claims would provide security for the whole world.
His speech revealingly framed his intentions towards Greenland in existential terms which also had echoes of his real estate origins. He said: “And all we’re asking for is to get Greenland, including right, title and ownership, because you need the ownership to defend it. You can’t defend it on a lease.”
This, of course, is wrong. Denmark has made it clear that the US is welcome to grow its military presence on the island, pointing out that during the cold war it had tens of thousands of troops stationed there. Equally the US would be welcome to invest in mineral exploration and investment with Denmark’s blessing. And
the fact is that Denmark cannot sell Greenland without the consent of the 57,000 Greenlandic people.
But in turning the whole thing into a raw power struggle, the situation has become akin to the 19th-century “great game” played out by the colonial powers.
PA/Gian Ehrenzeller
Stephen Miller, a senior Trump advisor throughout his time in office, said recently that the world has always been ruled by “strength” and “power”, not the “niceties of international law”. Trump has gone further, telling the New York Times in a two-hour interview published on January 11, “I don’t need international law”, and that he is only constrained by: “My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me, and that’s very good.”
An American world?
If it comes down to it, Europe will find it very hard to resist America. Europe is almost inextricably intertwined – economically and militarily – with the US. A separation would have severe consequences, with military and intelligence capabilities compromised and access to modern computing and finance seriously curtailed. For the UK outside of the EU, since Brexit, the position is – if anything – even worse.
There is a dawning realisation that the US might be Europe’s adversary, not ally. The Belgian prime minister, Bart De Wever, commented in a panel discussion at Davos that a “number of red lines are being crossed” by Trump and Europe now appeared to be facing the loss of its self-respect: “Being a happy vassal is one thing, being a miserable slave is something else. If you back down now you’re going to lose your dignity.”
Much is being made of the contrast between the US president’s speech on January 21 and the speech delivered by the Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, the day before. Carney’s speech was hailed by many as being epoch-defining, in the words of one journalist on a par with Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech.
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Carney talked of “a rupture in the world order, the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality”. The rules-based order, Carney said, was “fading” and that the multilateral institutions on which the world depended were under serious threat from great power dominance. It was now up to the rest of the world to stop pretending and face up to the new harsh reality.
It is in this context that America’s Nato partners need to decide whether Trump should be appeased or resisted. Once we know more about his mooted “framework” for the future of Greenland, that choice should become clearer.
