How to secure an acceptable deal for Ukraine

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Alongside the Middle East, the future of Ukraine is one of the crucial geopolitical questions of the coming year. US president-elect Donald Trump has talked of ending Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression on its neighbour within 24 hours of returning to office. Kyiv has hinted at a readiness for a deal, on its own terms. Despite strains in Russia’s economy, however, Vladimir Putin — whose troops have made slow but steady progress in the past year — shows little inclination to come to the table. The biggest risk is that Ukraine is pushed into a truce that is bad for the country, for European security, and ultimately for the US and other allies too.

The fear in Europe is that Trump might prioritise a rapid agreement as an early trophy of his presidency. He has mooted forcing Kyiv into talks by threatening to cut off US aid. Without pressure on Moscow too, however, this would almost certainly amount to bowing to Russia’s demands, including neutrality and demilitarisation for Ukraine.

The perils of such a deal are obvious. A badly weakened rump Ukraine might slide back into Moscow’s orbit, or succumb to a further Russian assault later. Kyiv’s leadership might not even accept a deal amounting to submission but choose to fight on, even without US support; European countries would feel a moral and strategic obligation to help. Either way, though Trump might see extricating the US from Ukraine as freeing it to focus instead on China, any appearance that Washington had forsaken an ally would embolden not just Beijing but the likes of North Korea and Iran.

An alternative deal is at least conceivable, far harder to achieve but much better for Ukraine and its allies. It would seek to ensure that, while Russia might retain de facto control of some territory in Ukraine — however repugnant that prospect might be — the rest would be able to rebuild, join the EU and prosper.

There are two central challenges to realising such a vision. One is forcing a recalcitrant Putin to the table with a preparedness to compromise; his aim, after all, has always been less about seizing territory than undermining Ukraine’s statehood. But it might yet be possible to push Russia’s leader towards a deal by warning — as Trump has suggested — that the US would otherwise give Ukraine “more than they ever got”.

This would require not just promising but rapidly delivering much increased military aid to Kyiv to demonstrate seriousness. Risks of Russian escalation would increase. Yet as some people close to the US president-elect acknowledge, a “bad” deal for Ukraine could amount to “Trump’s Afghanistan”, referring to the disorderly 2021 withdrawal under Joe Biden, which Trump is said to revile. European allies should be pressing this argument with the new president.

The second challenge is that any deal enabling the rest of Ukraine to rebuild would have to be backed by security guarantees robust enough to deter Moscow from future attacks. Since a consensus on inviting Kyiv to join Nato might be impossible, and Trump is looking to scale back not enlarge US military commitments in Europe, it might fall to European countries to provide such arrangements. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has led consultations on security guarantees, including possible deployment of troops. But progress has been limited. Adequate arrangements would require a mobilisation of currently depleted European forces and resources on a scale not seen for decades.

Neither a “bad” ceasefire nor a long continuation of a ruinous war with dwindling hope of restoring Ukraine’s integrity is an attractive option. An acceptable deal would be complex to attain and costly to underpin. Shouldering those costs now, however, might avoid much greater costs down the line.