It is misleading to tar all Europe’s ‘new right’ parties with one brush

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There are at least three differing political currents running through the European parties labelled “hard” or “far” right. The more these develop — some as conservatives appealing to largely working and lower-middle class audiences, some as radicals with obvious authoritarian tendencies — the less they will resemble each other. For the present, they are lumped together, overwhelmingly negatively, under these rubrics in the media and political debate. But because of the sharp differences among them, they are better labelled as “new right”. 

They have, in common, opposition to an EU still dedicated to increasing its powers and thus decreasing theirs. They no longer commit themselves to leaving the union but insist that their governments will be fully sovereign. 

They are strongly against mass immigration: this largely remains the policy most attractive to a wide public. Most European states have adopted tougher rules, some of which — as in Sweden and Finland — have been framed and administered by new-right parties either in coalition with or offering parliamentary support to the centre right. 

Yet these common positions differ in practice. Since 2022, Giorgia Meloni, the new-right politician who serves as Italy’s prime minister, has worked closely at times with the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. Meloni also supports Ukraine’s war of self-defence against Russia and puts herself firmly in the pro-Nato camp — as do the Sweden Democrats.  

Marine Le Pen, the leading figure in France’s Rassemblement National, used to have pro-Russian leanings, and her party accepted a loan from a Russian-controlled bank (now repaid). Yet in a speech to the French assembly in March, she said President Vladimir Putin had “triggered a war on the EU’s doorstep and a geopolitical crisis that is without doubt the most dramatic of the last 20 years . . . It is the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people that will lead to Russia’s defeat.” This appeared to be a sharp policy turn. The RN is now France’s most popular party, and Le Pen, its likely candidate in the 2027 presidential election (though she faces a legal case that could stop her from running), would on present showing win. 

Russia is an important player in the new right’s rise. Many of these parties, taking their cue from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, remain closer to Russia than to a US-dominated west. They tend to be based in former communist central Europe — but arguably the most significant among them is the Alternative for Germany, the main German new-right party. Similar Russophile sympathies are displayed by the smaller Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, whose leader combines leftwing economics with a commitment to reducing the numbers of immigrants, present and future. She argues that the German working class is losing out in the contest for homes, medical care and social services. 

From this still changing scene, the main currents include the new-right parties of Italy, France and Sweden, which profess themselves to be fully democratic and part of the western camp; and a larger if so far less successful group, many in central Europe, which are at least rhetorically more militantly anti-EU, more fiercely anti-immigrant and more deeply attached to the values of Christianity, family and tradition.   

Between these are a number of parties that straddle both currents, and which include Hungary’s Fidesz, Spain’s Vox, Portugal’s Chega and most importantly the AfD. The Thuringian AfD leader, Björn Höcke, tends to play with Nazi themes, shouting at meetings: “Everything for Germany!”, a Nazi storm troopers’ slogan banned in Germany (he has been twice fined for this). The co-leaders, Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel, are regarded as relative moderates by comparison and seek to unite the party. Chrupalla has many times pleaded with the members to unite, and “stop thinking in camps” — though he has been prominent in the pro-Russian camp.

“Far” or “hard” right can reasonably be used of Höcke and the many thousands who follow him. The policies developed by some other parties would also qualify. It is inappropriate when used of those that profess democratic bona fides and live up to them: the labelling prevents an understanding of the sources of and reasons for their anti-establishment stances. It is of course possible that they are engaged in a long game of protesting moderation while preparing for authoritarianism when in power. The impact and political positioning of Donald Trump, who has regarded all of these parties as comrades in arms, will be crucial in this — as will their ability to govern. But so far, so anti-totalitarian.