Trump’s 2.0 and the Future of the Taiwan Strait Conflict  – The Diplomat

As the world braces for the return of Donald Trump to the White House, the geopolitical landscape is set for a seismic shift. Nowhere will this be more keenly felt than in the delicate and contentious relationship between the United States and China over Taiwan. With Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy and his administration’s expected hawkish stance on China, the future of the island hangs in the balance. 

Three key factors set up the potential consequences of Trump’s second term on Taiwan. First, we can expect a significant shift in U.S. discourse, from a values-based defense of democracy to a more strategic and business-driven approach. Second, Trump’s inner circle, filled with China hawks, is likely to push for increased militarization of the region and even for a proxy war in Taiwan. Finally, Beijing is certain that a “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) administration will move in this direction, prompting Chinese authorities to ramp up their own preparations for conflict.

Trump’s Transactional Approach to International Relations

After Trump’s re-election, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, extended his congratulations, highlighting “the longstanding Taiwan-U.S. partnership, built on shared values and interests.” But what exactly are these “shared values”? Values are often portrayed as timeless, fundamental principles that define a nation’s spirit. Yet, values are not static; they evolve.

So, how far will the narrative of “shared values” hold up when it’s tied to a leader who has been repeatedly labeled a fascist, a racist, and a threat to both liberal democracy and the liberal international order? After all, aren’t Trump’s values, by virtue of his position, now representative of the United States? The key lesson from the U.S. election is clear: American values have shifted, at least for the majority of voters, and those new values now shape the country’s identity on the global stage.

This raises important questions for Taiwan and its foreign policy. There’s a real risk that Taiwan’s rhetoric, emphasizing a partnership based on values, may overlook the growing dissonance between U.S. and Taiwanese values, particularly if the Trump administration’s rhetoric and policies take a more divergent turn.

Under the Biden administration, U.S. policy toward Taiwan was framed largely around the defense of democratic values and a commitment to a rules-based international order. This was, for example, exemplified during former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022. However, Trump’s approach is likely to prioritize U.S. self-interested geostrategic and economic reasons over democratic ideals. 

During his campaign, Trump accused Taiwan of exploiting the United States by “stealing” the semiconductor industry and suggested that the island should pay more for its defense – specifically, by increasing defense spending to 10 percent of GDP, a demand that many Taiwanese lawmakers have called unreasonable. In response, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung countered, stating that “Taiwan has been paying the U.S. for its defense for decades.” Lin pointed out that Taipei currently has outstanding orders worth $19 billion for U.S. weapons systems. Nonetheless, Trump is likely to push for even more of this “protection money.”

The Influence of China Hawks in Trump’s Inner Circle

While Trump may have a more transactional view of Taiwan, individuals close to him – such as Mike Waltz, Marco Rubio, Mike Pompeo, Robert O’Brien, or Elbridge Colby –  are Taiwan advocates and/or staunch China hawks who can end up influencing Trump’s approach to the island. For this cohort, the priority is not defending Taiwan for its values, but rather ensuring that the United States maintains its primacy over China at all costs. This faction of the MAGA camp has long warned of the need for a “generational effort” to prepare for a war with China, aiming to prevent Beijing from achieving hegemony in China’s own region.

As the “China threat” narrative became bipartisan and dominant in Washington during the first Trump administration, military escalation in the region only intensified under the Biden administration. The fabricated notion that China plans to attack Taiwan in 2027 provided the U.S. security state another incentive to accelerate militarization. For example, in 2023, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, whom Trump has picked as his secretary of state, introduced the “Taiwan Peace Through Strength Act” to reinforce Taiwan militarily, “as the island faces the increased threat of a CCP military attack.” Similarly, Representative Mike Waltz, picked as national security adviser, has advocated for the accelerated arming of Taiwan as a means of deterring China. 

The fast-paced militarization of the Taiwan issue, which began during the first Trump administration, is part of a larger strategy to maintain primacy against China. This also included the formation of new anti-China military alliances, such as the Quad and AUKUS, as well as NATO’s increasing involvement in Asia. It also involved the construction or strengthening of new U.S. military bases in the region, alongside the strengthening of existing ones – such as those in the Philippines – to support Taiwan if necessary. All in all, this further cements an already unbalanced “balance of power” in the region, with China surrounded by U.S. military bases and unfriendly neighbors armed by and allied with the United States.

This strategy, aimed at coercing and dominating China so that it does not become a challenger to U.S. hegemony could ultimately become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would be naive to assume that China would not respond in kind to U.S. efforts at containment. In fact, Beijing has already taken a range of military, diplomatic, and economic steps to counter these initiatives. These actions include expanding its military presence in the South China Sea and near Taiwan, as well as using its economic and political leverage to influence countries that align with U.S. policies.

That said, Beijing is unlikely to intentionally provoke a major conflict in the Taiwan Strait, as it believes time is on its side. A serious confrontation – whether through direct military conflict or a blockade of Taiwan – would likely only occur if the United States were to formally recognize Taiwan as an independent state. This could occur if the expected escalation of the already existing trade and technology wars fails to achieve its goal of containing China. A MAGA administration might then resort to blackmailing Beijing by playing the “Taiwan card” as a bargaining chip. However, it is likely that Chinese President Xi Jinping sees no room for negotiation on the issue, as he considers Taiwan an inseparable part of China.

In this situation, the biggest risk posed by the return of Trump to the White House is that the militaristic, nationalist, and primacist interests of the MAGA movement could consciously provoke a proxy war between Taipei and Beijing – possibly as a last resort – intended to weaken China. Provoking such a conflict could be as simple as formally recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state. Such a move could ultimately lead to a Chinese action over Taiwan that would certainly provoke U.S. sanctions against China and efforts to diplomatically isolate it. Whether such a strategy would succeed beyond the Global North remains uncertain.

The fact that Taiwan would likely be devastated and economically crippled for decades in the event of a military conflict would be seen by some China hawks as a necessary sacrifice – a price to pay for what they view as the ultimate goal of securing U.S. hegemony. For example, Colby, the upmost representative of this growing faction of “yellow peril fanatics,” suggested in an online discussion that whether or not to blow up Taiwan’s TSMC chip foundries in the case of a Chinese invasion should not be Taiwan’s decision, as the issue is “far too important for the rest of us.”

The United States could potentially execute this strategy at relatively low cost by arming Taiwan with asymmetric defensive equipment, which would complicate China’s already gargantuan task of launching a successful amphibious invasion of the island. In fact, both Colby and O’Brien have called for Taiwan to increase its defense budget, from 2.45 percent of GDP to 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively. With such a buildup, the U.S. could avoid direct ground intervention while still inflicting significant damage on China, all the while benefiting from arms sales and supporting its military-industrial complex. 

Most worryingly, this potential proxy war may need to occur before 2028. First, a MAGA White House, convinced of the inevitability of conflict with China, could seek to precipitate this proxy war while it still holds power in Washington. Second, for such a scenario to unfold, Taiwan must remain under the control of a pro-independence, pro-U.S. government. If, after the 2028 Taiwanese presidential election, the island were to be governed by a party with a more conciliatory or neutral stance toward China, the likelihood of a military confrontation between Taiwan and China would diminish, as was the case during the Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008-2016).

China Has Been Preparing

China has become increasingly attuned to U.S. intentions regarding Taiwan and has been actively preparing for a potential confrontation. While Trump himself has expressed little desire for large-scale military conflict with China, Beijing is deeply aware of the broader dynamics within U.S. policy – particularly the influence of the national security establishment and the MAGA hawks.

During Trump’s first term, China recognized that the president’s personal rapport with Xi Jinping often served as the “softest link” in an otherwise hardline administration. Beijing is also aware of the growing possibility of a more radical second-term Trump, with Chinese experts predicting that Trump’s foreign policy could be even more destructive to China-U.S. relations, particularly on issues like trade, technology, and Taiwan. 

For Beijing, developments since 2020 have confirmed long-standing suspicions that the U.S. views China not just as a rival, but as an enemy to be contained and destabilized before it is too late. This perception has driven Beijing to accelerate its military buildup, particularly around the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea, while preparing for the risks posed by a more aggressive U.S. posture. 

Recent actions – such as Elon Musk, a close Trump ally, advising his Taiwanese suppliers to relocate production abroad, and Taiwan urging its companies to repatriate production from China – are clear indicators to Beijing that decoupling between China and Taiwan is accelerating. As economic interdependence decreases, the geopolitical landscape is shifting in a way that arguably makes starting a conflict less costly for China, but also for the United States. 

While a common perspective argues that this growing decoupling is making it harder for Washington to deter Beijing from acting on its ambitions over Taiwan, another viewpoint could suggest that this is precisely what the United States seeks: to deliberately create conditions for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This is what China believes. By pushing U.S. companies and allies further away from China, the dominant perspective in Beijing is that Washington is trying to set the stage for a conflict that would be less costly for the United States than for China. As an example, in 2023, Xi reportedly told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that Washington was trying to provoke Beijing into attacking Taiwan.

Beijing’s leadership is convinced that a new Trump administration will swiftly ramp up preparations, which will, in turn, influence their strategic calculations and responses toward Taiwan. If the Trump administration decides to clearly break with the “status quo” that has maintained peace in the Taiwan Strait for decades, the Chinese Communist Party is unlikely to back down or simply yield. 

Renouncing its claim over Taiwan would be costly in terms of domestic political legitimacy and strategically disastrous for China as the United States militarizes the region against it. Eventually, if the Trump administration forces Beijing to choose between accepting an imposed U.S. hegemony in East Asia – one that perpetually subordinates China, even in the Taiwan Strait – or engaging in a conflict over Taiwan, it may choose the latter. And Beijing will be well prepared for it.