2003: Harry Barnes at Labour Against The War event, London | Image by: PA Images / Alamy

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I was very sad to hear that the former MP Harry Barnes had passed away. Harry was born in Easington, County Durham. He became a member of the Independent Labour Party and its successor organisation Independent Labour Publications in the 1970s, and was later elected as the Labour MP for North East Derbyshire in 1987 – a seat he went onto serve for almost 20 years.

Harry entered Parliament shortly after I did. He was very active throughout the 1984-5 miner’s strike and supportive of the very just cause of the miners in all parts of the country. He was a great friend of the trade union movement – and a regular speaker at the annual Chesterfield May Day Gala. A dedicated local MP, he was always focused on how to represent his community in Parliament. It is no surprise that so many tributes have poured in for Harry, who was a champion for his constituents for so many years.

He was, alongside me and fellow Derbyshire MPs Tony Benn and Dennis Skinner, a member of the Socialist Campaign Group, and we worked very well together on trying to steer the Labour Party in a socialist direction, rather than the retreat into neoliberal managerialism that occurred with the development of New Labour. He also worked well with great colleagues and friends in Sheffield such as Bob Cryer. He was a very different character to all of them, but they all blended well together – and were a real example of how differences in personalities and approaches can be a positive force in the development of a powerful political presence.

Harry was not afraid to rebel against the Labour whip – one thing we had in common! Harry rebelled against Tony Blair on issues such as asylum, benefit cuts for single parents and the privatisation of air traffic control.

In Parliament, Harry was particularly interested in Ireland and the relationship between Britain and Ireland, and I found discussions with him very interesting and thoughtful – even at times when we weren’t exactly on the same page. We travelled together to Northern Ireland, along with Dennis Canavan and other MPs on a delegation, during which time I got to know him much better.

Harry was not afraid to rebel against the Labour whip – one thing we had in common!

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Harry was relentless in pursuing issues of social justice and workers’ rights, and particularly passionate about opportunities for adults in further education. He believed that too many people were unable to achieve what they wanted in life because of the barriers they faced in an inadequate education system. 

As an MP, he frequently held Sunday evening discussion group meetings, where he would come into his own with his encyclopaedic knowledge of labour movement history.

After he stepped down from Parliament, Harry, to his credit, remained very active in local affairs, serving as the political education officer for the Dronfield branch of the Labour Party. He was still very involved in local events, local politics and his community. As he had done as an MP, he always made himself open to debate and discussion.

When I visited his old constituency with Chris Peace, the Labour candidate for North East Derbyshire in 2019, Harry was there strongly in support – it was wonderful to see him. Harry set an example to many of us, and I was so grateful for his solidarity and comradeship. He was a decent, thoughtful socialist, who always sought to share his knowledge and share his ideas, and bring other people on board in that same direction. Thanks, Harry. 

My thoughts are with his friends, family, and all those he touched with his wisdom and kindness. Rest in peace.

Jeremy Corbyn is Independent MP for Islington North

Zeno Leoni, Benjamin Jones, Sarah Tzinieris, Bence Nemeth, Michele Groppi, and Zoha Naser summarise their recent report* on European security. They offer four recommendations on how to increase European resilience and defence capabilities in light of geopolitical crises and the unreliability of the US as an ally. 

For decades, European security has rested on a simple assumption: that the United States would ultimately step in to defend the continent. Today that assumption is becoming harder to sustain. Developments in Washington, combined with wider shifts in global politics, mean that European governments increasingly need to prepare for a future in which American support may be limited, conditional, or slow. This requires European countries to increase resilience to achieve strategic autonomy. This remains challenging in the short term.

Calls in Washington for Europeans to shoulder more of the defence burden are not new. Successive US administrations have said this for years – in 2011 Secretary of Defence Robert Gates referred to NATO as a two-tiered alliance, one providing ‘soft’ capabilities and one ‘hard’ capabilities. But the tone and method have changed.

The Trump administration relies on pressure in its dealings with allies. Even if this approach is intended as a negotiating strategy – seeking concessions through cycles of escalation and de-escalation rather than a disruption tout court of NATO – it generates uncertainty among allies. At the same time, US strategic documents continue to underline the importance of alliances, and Congress has introduced legal constraints that would make a formal withdrawal from NATO difficult. These factors suggest that influential pro-alliance forces remain alive within the broader American political system.

Still, assuming that the current period of uncertainty will simply pass once the Trump presidency ends would be risky. Debates in the United States about overseas commitments run deeper than any single administration. While US grand strategy increasingly emphasises projecting military power and influence from the seas, with limited interventions – a foundational element of many American strategies since the end of the Second World War – this administration is more strongly influenced by domestic political developments than its predecessors.

In response to the changed geopolitical environment, defence spending across the continent is rising, and several governments have announced major rearmament plans. But spending more money may not by itself solve the underlying problem. Many of the capabilities required for modern military operations – from intelligence and surveillance to space assets and advanced command systems – remain heavily dependent on the United States. These capabilities are expensive and complex, taking time to develop. Europe’s reliance on American support cannot be eliminated quickly.

Institutional fragmentation also complicates the picture. European defence efforts operate through multiple frameworks, including NATO and the EU, while national procurement systems remain largely separate. Greater coordination is clearly needed, but deeper cooperation can also slow decision-making and complicate procurement. Debates about European “strategic autonomy” have emerged partly in response to these challenges. Yet the concept itself remains politically sensitive and somewhat ambiguous. For some, it appears to suggest distancing Europe from the United States or weakening NATO. In reality, the issue is more practical than ideological. In the near future, the goal is not to replace NATO or to detach Europe from the transatlantic alliance. Rather, it is to ensure that European countries have enough capability to act with limited US support.

In near term, four recommendations should be considered.

The first step is to move away from a “D-Day mentality” and recognise that long-standing assumptions about automatic US intervention are no longer sufficient for planning. However, while strategic autonomy remains controversial, framing efforts around resilience rather than strategic autonomy may prove politically more productive and less sensitive. Building resilience means identifying capability gaps that could emerge if US support were limited and gradually working to fill them, while maintaining transatlantic ties. Diversifying partnerships beyond the Euro-Atlantic space will also become increasingly important, including deeper cooperation with countries such as Japan, Australia, and India.

Operationally, European security should adopt a strategy of flexibility to have more options. NATO will remain the central framework for collective defence, but practical initiatives will increasingly emerge through smaller coalitions capable of acting quickly when necessary. Coalitions of the willing of various geometries – including EU+ frameworks that allow non-EU members to participate or exclude some EU members– are likely to allow Europeans to react to Trump’s pressure. These arrangements could remain anchored to NATO standards while preserving the flexibility needed to respond to fast-moving crises. In other words, multilateral institutions remain essential, but smaller coalitions of countries are often better placed to move quickly.

In procurement, Europe should prioritise the ability to integrate quickly when required. Investments should focus on speed, scale and usability rather than technological sophistication alone, with greater emphasis on training, standardisation and interoperability. Defence systems should also be designed with future cooperation in mind, allowing integration when needed rather than treating it as an immediate objective. This will also require clearer signals from politics to the defence industry. Governments need to provide more credible long-term commitments if companies are to expand production capacity and invest in new technologies; but also intervene more profoundly to keep energy costs low and support manufacturing. Without addressing the energy–industry nexus, efforts to expand manufacturing and defence output will remain structurally constrained.

While strategic autonomy remains a longer-term ambition, the immediate goal should be to strengthen European resilience to buy Europe time while expanding its strategic options.

By Dr Zeno Leoni, Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College of the UK; Dr Bence Nemeth, Senior Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College of the UK; Dr Benjamin Jones, Teaching Fellow, Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London; Dr Sarah Tzinieris, Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College of the UK; Dr Zoha Naser, PhD Candidate, Department of War Studies, King’s College London; and Dr Michele Groppi, Senior Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College of the UK.

*This commentary summarises findings from a wider report produced at King’s College London. The report consolidates recent research and insights from a confidential Track 1.5 dialogue held at King’s College London in early January. The research was supported by the New Government Fund of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), administered by King’s College London.

Contact: Dr Zeno Leoni – [email protected]

Trump said America “knew nothing about this particular attack” on the South Pars Gas Field, even though the US and Israel are meant to be working together in the war.

Iran then launched a retaliatory attack on Qatar as the conflict threatens to spiral out of control.

The president said: “NO MORE ATTACKS WILL BE MADE BY ISRAEL pertaining to this extremely important and valuable South Pars Field unless Iran unwisely decides to attack a very innocent, in this case, Qatar – In which instance the United States of America, with or without the help or consent of Israel, will massively blow up the entirety of the South Pars Gas Field at an amount of strength and power that Iran has never seen or witnessed before.”

Commenting on X, Morgan said: “Trump is losing control of this war.”

His comment came just days after he told the BBC that he does not think Trump has a “clue” what he is trying to achieve in the war.

Morgan said: “I think he thought he could pull a Venezuela here – decapitate the leadership of Iran and it would all get settled quite quickly.

“I think two weeks in, what is very clear, is this is not going to get settled quickly.”

While the first US and Israel strikes on Iran did kill the country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei last month, he has been replaced by his son and the Islamic regime is still intact.

The Dalkia Team in Parliament.

For more than 25 years, Dalkia UK has helped keep this historic environment safe and resilient.  We work alongside a number of other teams across a diverse estate, where every space brings its own character and challenges. From medieval structures to more modern additions, daily work ranges from the routine to the intricate, but is always carried out with an understanding that heritage and function must coexist.

In recent years, we have strengthened both how we plan and how we deliver on site. The introduction of our annual maintenance planner has helped bring clarity to operations, reinforcing the rhythm of maintenance across a complex estate. Reactive performance has improved too, and our commitment to smaller works has grown. These gains reflect the steadiness of a team who have spent years listening closely to what the buildings, and their occupants, need.

Alongside these improvements, Dalkia’s Project team continues to form an important part of our delivery, expanding our contribution to the estate’s future with a number of multi-year engineering programmes – demonstrating the scale and sophistication of work required behind the scenes. Our wider activity across London, including BMS upgrades and energy-led improvements, continues to inform what we bring back to Parliament itself, helping us to continue delivering our best.

It was in that same spirit of partnership that we proposed and carried out a detailed efficiency survey in one of Parliament’s Northern Estate buildings. The aim was straightforward: to identify practical opportunities to improve how the building operates without compromising its resilience or the services it supports. This aligns naturally with EDF’s commitment to helping organisations run smarter and more effectively. The findings provide a clear roadmap for optimising performance, but just as importantly, they demonstrate the value of long term partners working proactively and taking responsibility for continuous improvement.

All these improvements couldn’t have happened without our people on site, and an off-site support team, who remain central to everything we do. Our apprenticeship pathway is flourishing, with new joiners learning the specific craft of heritage-sensitive engineering. Their confidence grows quickly, supported by the experience of colleagues like Shakira Green, our Apprentice of the Year 2024, whose journey reflects the energy and ambition that is shaping the next generation. Equally, colleagues like Chris Lynn, recognised as Changing Gear Employee of the Year 2024, demonstrate the care and problem-solving that underpin safe, reliable service delivery.

Wellbeing is another thread woven through our work. We have been proud to support Parliament’s Mental Health Fitness events and to share the practical steps we take to promote good mental health across our teams. Our involvement with the Parliamentary Apprenticeship Scheme, support for Reservists and Veterans and volunteer activity at events such as Remembrance Week all reflect a commitment to being part of the wider community of the estate.

Through all these developments, our core purpose remains unchanged: to support the wider maintenance and facilities teams in providing a dependable foundation for the daily functioning of Parliament. In an environment where a million visitors pass through each year, reliability is not just an operational goal but a civic one. We play our part in ensuring that meetings can take place, debates can proceed and the work of democracy can continue without interruption. As we look to the future, our contribution will continue to evolve as we keep balancing expert heritage care and new energy improvements, all while nurturing future talent that will one day inherit the estate’s complexities.

This is not only an important place to work; it is a uniquely privileged one, and all of us take pride in being part of the wider Parliamentary community. And if, from time to time, we hear that our work is so seamless it goes largely unnoticed, we regard that as a mark of success. After all, in buildings like these, silence usually means everything is working exactly as it should.

James Cartlidge has an ambitious project for a shadow defence secretary with no civil servants, no budget, and no immediate prospect of either. He wants to complete “a strategic defence review in opposition” – a worked-through plan, costed and ready, so that should the Conservatives arrive in government in 2029, they don’t spend their first year staring at blank pages.

It is, he would be the first to recognise, a response to experience. When Labour won in 2024, it commissioned a sweeping external Strategic Defence Review – an exercise that consumed the better part of a year and, in Cartlidge’s telling, achieved rather less than advertised. “Labour just wanted to trash the previous government and do a completely fresh Strategic Defence Review – a boil the sea approach,” he says.

When it landed last June, Cartlidge condemned it as “underfunded and entirely unimpressive” – the review answered the broad questions and saw hard ones about how to put recommendations into actions deferred to a Defence Investment Plan to follow. For Cartlidge, who served as Defence Procurement Minister and understands the MOD-Treasury relationship with some intimacy, having been in both departments, the diagnosis was clear enough: “Labour has allowed the treasury to dominate the Ministry of Defence.”

Privately the contrast is made to the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review announced by the coalition government: it was internal and costed. Labour’s version, Cartlidge argues, outsourced the difficult choices and buried them.

The practical result has been a procurement freeze, with the SDR used as a fig leaf. The DIP is still nowhere to be seen, despite having been promised first in autumn 2025, then Christmas – and now it looks like it won’t be until at least after the local elections as purdah will strike from March 26.

While ministers wait for their review, purchasing decisions have stalled. Munitions stocks – already drawn down substantially by transfers to Ukraine, which Cartlidge supports – remain worrisome. He refers back to the previous Conservative government’s plan at the last election: £10 billion in additional munitions spending, funded by reducing the size of the civil service. It did not survive the change of government. “We don’t have to have shortages,” Cartlidge says. There are choices to be made.

Cartlidge’s answer to the regularly deployed 14-years argument – that the Ukraine transfers were right, that a replenishment plan existed, that Labour cancelled it – is not without merit, though whether it cuts through is doubtful.

What is more interesting is what he is trying to build now. The insistence on fiscal rigour is genuine. “We are really disciplined on ‘how are you going to find the money’ to do something,” he says – and is in close communication with LOTO and the shadow treasury team. Take the sovereign defence fund, intended to mobilise both public and private capital for capabilities, which gestures toward hardware.

The other policy work done so far is primarily about people – recruitment, retention, the not-unreasonable aspiration that those who serve should be able to have families. He wants the party to be seen as the one “most in step with technology.” And he wants the whole prospectus to be “all in line with Conservative values.”

One of the most eye-catching proposals has been the plan to reinstate the two-child benefit cap and direct the proceeds toward defence spending and a larger army. Cartlidge has given this ideological scaffolding that he calls “the end of dependency” – a phrase that does two jobs at once. It describes the geopolitical imperative to reduce reliance on other countries, and the domestic argument for individuals’ standing on their own two feet. It is a framing of choice: directing public spending away from welfare and into defence.

“There is a huge tectonic shift which means we have to spend more on defence and less on welfare,” he says. Expect more policies to come up that put that on display.

There is, running beneath all of this, a values argument that Cartlidge is quite open about. Policy in opposition is not just preparation for government – it is a signal of intent, a way of communicating what the party stands for at a moment when it is renewing and can’t make specific announcements of commissioning a new ship, for example, while making it sound believable right now. 2029 is still far away, so the opposition defence review he speaks of is a long-term project, and one that will be built up with those specific policies nearer the time.

But this is not to be too cynical about it. “It’s critical,” Cartlidge says. “I don’t want to repeat the same mistake should we find ourselves in government. We don’t want to waste months without specific plans.” That is a sensible ambition.

The security environment is not in doubt and defence is migrating – with some speed – from the margins of British political debate to somewhere near its centre. As opposition pitches go, it is not immediately the most stirring, but if it means there is an implementable defence plan come 2029 then it is a venture worth completing.