Crypto World
Coinbase’s fastest product ever: prediction markets
Coinbase spent 2025 losing an argument about what it was. Trading volumes softened, the stock fell from $419.78 in July to the mid-$160s, and the market delivered its verdict on a company whose revenue still rose and fell with bitcoin: a leveraged bet on crypto activity, priced accordingly. Then in December it launched four new businesses at once, including one nobody had asked it for.
Summary
- Coinbase prediction markets reached $100 million in annualized revenue in under two months.
- The product’s early growth reflects Coinbase’s distribution advantage through existing funded accounts.
- Most prediction market volume is tied to sports, complicating the category’s information-market framing.
- State regulators are challenging sports-related event contracts as illegal gambling.
- The real test is whether volume holds after the World Cup and legal challenges progress.
By the first quarter of 2026, that one had passed $100 million in annualized revenue in under two months. Coinbase called prediction markets one of the fastest scaling products in its history, which is a striking claim from a company that once onboarded a country’s worth of retail traders in a single bull run. It sits in the same quarterly report as a $394.1 million net loss and revenue down to $1.43 billion from $2.03 billion a year earlier.
That juxtaposition is the whole story. Coinbase’s fastest growing product is not crypto. It is an event contract business that mostly trades sports, launched into a category that Kalshi and Polymarket have already scaled to volumes exceeding America’s legal sportsbooks, and that attorneys general in at least four states are currently arguing is illegal gambling.
What the $100 million number actually measures
Precision first, because the figure is doing rhetorical work that deserves inspection.The metric is annualized revenue, meaning a run rate extrapolated from a short period, not $100 million collected. The window was less than two months from a December 2025 launch. Coinbase disclosed the figure in its first quarter 2026 shareholder materials alongside the claim that retail derivatives annualized revenue exceeded $200 million and that derivatives volume over the trailing twelve months had grown 169% year over year. Every one of those numbers is a rate, and rates from launch windows measure enthusiasm as much as they measure business.
Against Coinbase’s own scale, $100 million annualized is roughly 7% of a single quarter’s total revenue projected across a year. It is not, on its own, a company changing number. What makes it interesting is the derivative: how fast the line rose, from zero, in a category the company entered late, against two incumbents with years of liquidity advantage. Growth that steep from a standing start is either a real demand signal or a launch spike with a decay curve, and the two look identical for exactly one quarter.
The context that makes the bullish reading credible is the sector data. Combined monthly trading volume across Kalshi and Polymarket rose from under $5 billion in September 2025 to roughly $24 billion by April 2026, according to a Pew Research analysis of figures from The Block. For scale, legal American sportsbooks handled around $14 billion a month on average across 2025. Prediction markets, a category that spent a decade as an academic curiosity and a regulatory orphan, now move more money monthly than the entire regulated sports betting industry that lobbied for a decade to exist.Coinbase did not create that demand. It arrived after the demand was proven and applied the one thing the incumbents lack: an existing base of funded accounts.
How the category got here
The speed of prediction markets’ arrival is easy to underrate, because the idea is old and the business is not.Event contracts existed for decades as academic instruments and offshore curiosities. Intrade, Augur, PredictIt: small, legally embattled, intellectually respected, commercially irrelevant. The turn came in October 2024, when a United States court ruled that Kalshi could legally offer election contracts, and the platform relaunched within hours, thirty two days before a presidential election. The press coverage that followed did what a decade of academic papers had not, and gave the category a proof of concept moment in front of a mass audience.
What followed was a distribution war instead of a product war. Kalshi launched sports contracts across all fifty states in January 2025. A March 2025 partnership put Kalshi’s markets in front of Robinhood’s twenty seven million funded brokerage accounts, and Super Bowl volumes alone exceeded $1 billion. Polymarket acquired QCEX, a CFTC registered contract market and clearing organization, creating a legal path back to American users. Google Finance began embedding live odds. Prediction market prices started appearing in mainstream news coverage as though they were data, which drove users back to the platforms, which deepened the markets, which made the prices better data.
By February 2026, geopolitics had taken over from crypto as the volume driver. A single contract on whether the United States would strike Iran attracted $73 million, the largest geopolitical market in Polymarket’s history, and the platform set a single day volume record of $425 million on February 28, surpassing its Election Day 2024 peak. The category had escaped its founding use case.
Coinbase launched in December 2025, roughly fourteen months after the court ruling that made the category viable and two months after ICE announced its Polymarket investment. That is late by crypto standards and early by any other. The company did not spot the trend. It waited for the trend to be proven and then applied the largest retail distribution base in American crypto to it, which is a different decision and arguably a better one.
Why it worked, and what that says about Coinbase
The mechanics of a prediction market are not the interesting part, and crypto.news has covered what a prediction market is and how event contracts settle in detail. The interesting part is distribution.
Kalshi and Polymarket had to acquire every user they have. Coinbase had millions of funded accounts already holding balances, already verified, already accustomed to a trading interface. Adding an event contracts tab to that base is not a product launch in any meaningful sense. It is a shelf placement. The company’s December expansion, which added stocks, commodity futures, perpetual futures, and prediction markets simultaneously, was an explicit bet that distribution beats product in retail finance, and the first quarter’s numbers say the bet is paying.
That thesis has a name inside the company, the Everything Exchange, and prediction markets are its proof of concept. Coinbase’s argument is that a user who trades bitcoin, equities, perpetual futures, and the World Cup through one login is worth vastly more than a user who trades only crypto, and is vastly harder to lose to a competitor. Analysts covering the stock have picked up the framing directly: Cantor Fitzgerald noted that investors increasingly view prediction markets as the next growth leg for platforms like Coinbase and Robinhood precisely because traditional crypto trading volumes are softening. The product is not a hedge against the crypto business. It is a hedge against crypto.
The acquisition tells the same story. In December, Coinbase agreed to buy The Clearing Company, a prediction markets startup founded that same year on a $15 million seed round, for an undisclosed sum. That is not a technology purchase. A company with Coinbase’s engineering base does not need a one year old startup to build binary contracts. It is a purchase of regulatory positioning and domain staff, which tells you what Coinbase thinks the scarce resource in this category actually is.
The thing nobody wants to say about the volume
Here is the part that complicates every bullish framing: this is mostly sports betting.Sports has accounted for roughly 80% of Kalshi’s total trading volume since July 2024, and in March 2026 the figure was closer to 87%. Sports, politics, and crypto together account for 91% of Kalshi’s global volume and 90% of Polymarket’s. The 2026 World Cup has been described by analysts as the largest gambling event in history, and the numbers support it: Kalshi cleared more than $30 billion in June volume, up over 70% from May’s $17.9 billion, running above $1 billion a day since the tournament opened on June 11. Polymarket set a record $10.8 billion in the same month. Sector wide daily volume rose roughly 75% from the tournament’s start. Open interest reached $1.8 billion by the end of June, a 54% monthly increase.
Look at Coinbase’s own prediction markets interface on any given day this month and the composition is unambiguous. World Cup outcomes clearing $16 million on a single match. Total points in a basketball game. LeBron James’s next team. What a reality television cast will say during a finale. Somewhere in the mix sit contracts on the Federal Reserve’s July decision and where bitcoin closes, the markets that justify the category’s intellectual case, and they are dwarfed by the ones that do not.
The information markets argument, that event contracts aggregate dispersed knowledge into a price that beats polls and pundits, is real and demonstrably useful. Prediction market odds on the CLARITY Act have become the industry’s most watched barometer of the bill’s fate, a dynamic crypto.news examined in its coverage of the Senate showdown, and Google Finance now embeds live Polymarket and Kalshi odds directly. That is genuine market infrastructure performing a genuine public function.
It is also roughly a tenth of the volume. The other nine tenths is people betting on football, and the honest description of Coinbase’s fastest growing product is that it is a sportsbook with better epistemics attached as a garnish.
The regulatory bill is already in the mail
Which is why the legal exposure is not a tail risk. It is the central case.On April 23, Wisconsin sued Kalshi, Polymarket, Robinhood, Crypto.com, and Coinbase over sports related event contracts, arguing they function as sports wagers and violate state gambling law, and seeking orders to stop them being offered in the state. New York and Illinois have opened their own fronts. Nevada’s gaming regulators sued Kalshi in February. Arizona’s attorney general filed in March. The industry’s federal position rests on the Commodity Exchange Act and a CFTC that withdrew proposed restrictions in January 2026 and issued Polymarket a no-action letter, which is a strong federal hand and precisely the kind of hand that invites a preemption fight rather than settling one.
The structural problem is that states run gambling. That authority is old, jealously guarded, and enormously lucrative, and the sector’s entire growth story consists of routing around it by calling a bet on a football match a commodity derivative. Regulators have already delayed event contract ETFs while they decide whether these products belong in retail fund wrappers at all. Kalshi has been penalizing congressional candidates for betting on their own races, which is exactly the sort of headline that writes state legislation.
Coinbase now sits as a named defendant in that fight, and it does so having just lost its chief legal officer: Paul Grewal, the architect of the company’s regulatory strategy through the SEC years, exited on the eve of the CLARITY endgame. The company entered the most legally contested growth category in American finance and changed the driver at the same moment.
What the incumbents’ numbers say about the ceiling
The most useful way to size Coinbase’s opportunity is to look at what the leaders have already built, because it frames both the prize and the problem.Kalshi’s disclosed figures are extraordinary for a company that was a niche regulated venue two years ago: $178 billion annualized volume, annualized revenue above $1.5 billion, institutional trading volume up 800% in six months, a $22 billion valuation on a $1 billion round led by Coatue. Polymarket carries an $8 billion valuation with the New York Stock Exchange’s parent company on the cap table. Neither is public, so neither faces quarterly scrutiny of whether the growth is durable, which is a structural advantage Coinbase does not have.
Those numbers cut two ways for Coinbase. On one hand they prove the category can support a real business at scale, which is the entire bull case: if Kalshi generates $1.5 billion annualized, a $100 million run rate from a standing start is a beginning, not a ceiling. On the other hand they describe exactly how far behind Coinbase is, and in venue businesses the gap tends to widen instead of closing. Liquidity is the product. The deepest book gets the largest orders, which deepens it further, and a $4,500 ticket that clears at a two cent spread on the leading venue moves the price six cents somewhere thinner. Traders do not choose venues for the interface.
The one asymmetry favoring Coinbase is that it does not need to win. Kalshi and Polymarket are prediction market companies whose valuations demand category dominance. Coinbase is a distribution company for which event contracts are one surface among several, and a permanent third place at a $300 million run rate would still be a good outcome against a product that cost almost nothing to launch. The strategic question is not whether Coinbase beats Kalshi. It is whether the surface stays legal and whether the flow stays after the tournament.
The case for Coinbase
Take the bull argument at full strength, because it is not weak.Diversification is working, measurably. Coinbase’s crypto trading volume market share hit an all time high of 8.6% in the first quarter while it simultaneously stood up four new business lines, which is not the behavior of a company losing its core. Retail derivatives passed $200 million annualized. Prediction markets passed $100 million. The company shipped eighteen products in six months, a pace Rosenblatt called impressive while assigning a $240 target, and Bernstein reiterated a Street high $330 on the strength of the platform thesis. Ark Invest bought $44 million of stock into the June selloff.
The regulatory position is also stronger than the headlines imply. Coinbase’s whole institutional identity is being the compliant venue, and it enters this category as a CFTC regulated participant with an acquired specialist team, not as a crypto native platform improvising legality. If the state challenges resolve into a federal framework, the winners are the operators with the cleanest regulatory posture, which is precisely the position Coinbase has spent a decade and hundreds of millions of dollars purchasing.
And the strategic logic is sound on its own terms. Prediction markets were the most funded category in crypto in the first half of 2026, drawing $1.85 billion of $7.1 billion across the top ten categories, ahead of exchanges at $1.57 billion and artificial intelligence at $1 billion. Venture capital is rarely early and rarely wrong about direction, only about timing. Intercontinental Exchange, the owner of the New York Stock Exchange, announced a strategic investment in Polymarket at an $8 billion valuation, with reported commitments ranging up to $2 billion. Kalshi raised $1 billion from Coatue at a $22 billion valuation on $178 billion of annualized volume and over $1.5 billion of annualized revenue. When the NYSE’s parent and a $22 billion private company are both in the category, calling it a fad requires arguing that the smartest capital in two industries is confused.
Sitting out was never an option that produced a better outcome than participating. A Coinbase that watched Kalshi build a $22 billion business adjacent to its own funded accounts, and did nothing, would be facing a harder set of questions this quarter than the ones it faces now.
The case against
Now the other side, which is mostly about what happens after the World Cup ends.The category’s growth curve has already broken once. Combined Kalshi and Polymarket lifetime volume crossed $150 billion in April, and the same month ended a seven month streak of monthly growth. Polymarket’s active traders fell from more than 733,000 in March to roughly 643,000 in April. The June record was not organic reacceleration. It was a global tournament that occurs every four years, and it concludes this month. A business whose volume rises 75% on a World Cup will discover what its baseline is in August, and there is no version of that discovery that flatters the annualized figures currently being quoted.
The competitive position is also weaker than the growth rate suggests. Coinbase is third at best in a category where liquidity compounds: Kalshi took roughly 80% of June volumes, Polymarket holds 97% of political markets and about half of non-sports open interest. Deeper books attract larger traders, which deepen the books. Coinbase brings distribution, and distribution wins customers, but it does not on its own win the flow that makes a venue the price. Meanwhile Kalshi and Polymarket are both pushing into perpetual futures, which is to say they are attacking Coinbase’s business while Coinbase attacks theirs, and Coinbase’s derivatives business is far more valuable than its event contracts business.
Then the numbers underneath. Coinbase lost $394.1 million in the first quarter. Revenue fell 30% year over year. The price to earnings ratio sits near 69, price to sales near 7.6, and Barclays maintains an Underweight with a $107 target on the argument that new products cannot offset muted crypto volumes. The stock is down 53% over twelve months and 31% year to date, and the Coinbase Premium, the spread between bitcoin’s price on Coinbase and Binance, has been negative for fifty consecutive days, the market’s plainest statement that American demand is not returning soon. Against a $1.43 billion quarter and a $394 million loss, $100 million annualized from event contracts does not close a gap. It decorates one. Even quadrupled, it would not return the company to profitability on its own, and quadrupling assumes the World Cup was a floor.
And the deepest objection is definitional. Coinbase’s mission statement concerns economic freedom and updating a century old financial system. Its fastest scaling product lets people bet on Love Island. There is no rule requiring a company’s growth engine to match its stated purpose, and plenty of firms have quietly funded their mission with something less noble. But a company arguing to Congress that digital assets deserve their own market structure, while deriving its best growth from event contracts that four state attorneys general call gambling, is carrying a contradiction that its opponents in that argument will not be too polite to name.
The bet underneath the bet
What Coinbase actually did in December was not diversify. It changed what business it is in, and the prediction markets number is the first evidence the change is real.For a decade the company was a bet on crypto adoption. Volumes up, revenue up; volumes down, revenue down; the stock traded as a levered proxy and everyone understood the deal. The Everything Exchange rejects that identity. It says Coinbase is a distribution business that happens to have been founded on crypto, that a funded account with a trading interface is the asset, and that whatever the account holder wants to trade is a detail. Stocks, commodity futures, perps, event contracts, and tokenized real world assets are not five strategies. They are one strategy with five surfaces.
Prediction markets validate that thesis harder than any of the others, because the company had no advantage there except distribution. No technology edge, no first mover position, no liquidity, no brand association with event contracts at all. It shipped a tab and cleared $100 million annualized in seven weeks. If distribution alone can do that in a category with entrenched incumbents, the thesis is not marketing.
One more thing the quarter proved, quietly. Coinbase shipped stocks, commodity futures, perps, and event contracts in a single month and none of them broke. For a company whose operational reputation was built entirely on custody and spot trading, executing a four product launch without an incident is a competence signal that no analyst target captures. The Everything Exchange was always plausible as a slide. The first quarter is the first evidence it is plausible as an engineering organization.
The unresolved question is whether the surface Coinbase chose to prove it on survives contact with American law. That is not a question the company can engineer its way out of, and it will be answered in courtrooms in Wisconsin, Nevada, and Arizona instead of in a shareholder letter. The fastest growing product in Coinbase’s history is also the one whose existence a growing list of state governments disputes, and the company is discovering, again, that being right about where the demand is has never been the same as being allowed to serve it.August will settle the first half of it. The World Cup ends, the volume normalizes, and the market finds out whether $100 million annualized was a business or a tournament. The courts will take longer.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Revenue figures cited are annualized run rates disclosed by Coinbase, not realized revenue. Sector volume, valuation, and market share data derive from third party sources including The Block, Pew Research Center, CryptoRank, and company disclosures, and some reported figures vary between sources. Litigation described is ongoing and no outcome should be inferred. Details reflect information current as of July 14, 2026, and are subject to change. Always do your own research.
Base creator Jesse Pollak says he is stepping back from leading the Base App after admitting he made a “wrong bet” on social, leaving the chain to fall behind on prediction markets and perpetual futures.
In a post to X on Wednesday, Pollak said he had bet that creator, content and messaging apps would drive adoption, but instead the market “disintegrated completely.”
“We realized how our focus on social had meant that base had fallen behind in key areas that were now increasingly critical — we had perps (shoutout avantis!) and prediction markets (shoutout limitless!), but both were well behind scaled competitors.”
Pollak’s comments give further insight into the reversal of Base’s growth strategy earlier this year. While Base initially focused on social products such as Farcaster, Zora and miniapps to bring crypto to “a billion people,” Pollak said financial applications are the way forward for the network, with a focus on trading, payments and AI agents.
Limitless Exchange’s monthly notional volume is only a fraction of its larger competitors. Source: Dune Analytics
Pollak added he will be returning leadership of the Base App to Coinbase, under Jordan Fish, known on X as “Cobie,” while he focuses on the Base blockchain.
Coinbase CEO: “We messed up” on content coins
Pollak’s post came just days after Coinbase CEO Brian Armstrong acknowledged content coins “didn’t work,” prompting the company to pivot earlier this year.
“We messed up, time to turn the page,” Armstrong said on Monday.
In February, Base sunset its Creator Rewards program and Farcaster-powered social feed as part of a strategic shift to tradable assets.
Related: Moonbeam to pivot from Polkadot to Base, unveils AI agent framework
The Creator Rewards program launched in July 2025 and was intended to make the Ethereum layer-2 Base a more social ecosystem, where activity and engagement translate into earnings. Meanwhile, Pollak admitted the Base App was an “imperfect Farcaster client.”
Base’s work on stablecoins, AI agents
Last week, Base activated its B20 token standard on the mainnet, introducing a native framework for stablecoins, tokenized real-world assets (RWAs) and other fungible tokens.
In May, Base launched Base MCP (Model Context Protocol), a tool that lets users manage their crypto directly from an AI model’s chat interface and interact with crypto protocols such as Morpho, Moonwell, Uniswap, Aerodrome, Avantis, Bankr and Virtuals.
In April, Base said it was upgrading key systems in preparation for an AI agent economy as part of its 2026 roadmap. It highlighted real-world asset (RWA) tokenization, stablecoins, and prediction markets as being key growth areas in 2026.
“We’re going to build base into the blockchain for global finance and do everything we can to be the place that the world’s money settles over the next century,” Pollak said on Wednesday.
Magazine: Is Robinhood Chain’s success bullish or bearish for ETH the asset?
Ethereum-backed EthSystems has launched with support from Bitmine, SharpLink and Consensys CEO Joe Lubin, adding another independent organization to Ethereum’s institutional development network after the Foundation cut 54 roles.
Summary
- EthSystems has launched with backing from Bitmine, SharpLink and Consensys CEO Joe Lubin to build confidential infrastructure for institutional Ethereum.
- The company was spun out of the Ethereum Foundation by former members of its Institutional Privacy Task Force.
- The launch follows the Ethereum Foundation’s recent restructuring as independent organizations take on more ecosystem development roles.
According to an announcement from EthSystems on Tuesday, the for-profit company will build confidential infrastructure for banks, asset managers, and other regulated institutions using Ethereum.
Bitmine and SharpLink, two major Ethereum treasury companies, have backed the venture alongside Lubin, who co-founded Ethereum and later founded Consensys.
EthSystems was spun out of the Ethereum Foundation and was established by former Foundation employees Mo Jalil, Oskar Thorén, and Aaryamann Challani. The three founders previously worked on the Foundation’s Institutional Privacy Task Force.
EthSystems targets confidential institutional finance
The company said it will help financial institutions use public Ethereum without exposing sensitive information such as trading positions, transaction details, or client identities to the full network.
Its work is expected to include privacy systems based on zero-knowledge cryptography, which can verify transactions without revealing the underlying data.
“The business model is simple: bespoke consulting, focused on solving the hardest blockers for institutional adoption,” the team wrote.
“In practice, this means continuing a lot of the work we have been doing, only charging money for it,” it added. “Commercial engagements often require a commercial counterparty.”
Alongside paid consulting, EthSystems said it will continue publishing protocol specifications and contributing to open-source projects.
While working within the Institutional Privacy Task Force, the founders held hundreds of discussions with central banks, regulators, and financial institutions, according to the company.
Their previous work included private bonds using zero-knowledge proofs, confidential stablecoin transfers, private cross-chain settlements and the Ethereum Privacy Map.
“Our mission: help institutions build confidential systems on public Ethereum without giving up what makes Ethereum worth using,” the team wrote.
EthSystems has emerged during a major reorganization of the Ethereum Foundation and its technical teams.
On June 23, the Foundation cut 54 jobs, equal to about 20% of its workforce, after a months-long review of its spending, staffing and long-term responsibilities.
The organization reorganized its work into five divisions covering protocol, access, users, community, and institutional activity. Separate groups continue to manage operations and administration.
The Foundation said the restructuring would allow it to direct staff and resources towards responsibilities that it believes only the organization can perform.
“These decisions were hard, but they are necessary,” the Foundation said in June. “We must be resourced and organized in a way that allows us to focus on the critical work that only EF can, and therefore must, do in the coming years.”
In July, the Foundation also dissolved its Protocol Support team, which had coordinated All Core Developers meetings, network upgrade tracking, Ethereum Improvement Proposal support, Forkcast, and the Ethereum Protocol Fellowship.
Mario Havel, who worked with Protocol Support for more than five years, said he remained at the Foundation but confirmed that the rest of the team had been dissolved.
“I am still part of EF, continuing my work and figuring out what’s most needed in the future,” Havel wrote on X. “However, all of my team, Protocol Support, that I have been part of for 5+ years, has been dissolved.”
Independent Ethereum groups take on new roles
EthSystems joins Ethereum Institutional and EthLabs, two other independent organizations backed by Bitmine, SharpLink, and Lubin.
EthLabs is expected to take on major Ethereum protocol research and development work, while Ethereum Institutional has been positioned as a neutral contact point for financial companies building on the network.
Lubin previously told The Block that he expected at least three organizations to emerge from the Foundation as it concentrated on censorship resistance, open-source development, privacy, and security under its CROPS framework.
“As EF continues doubling down on cypherpunk fundamentals, especially with a focus on individuals, there’s room for an independent for-profit entity that can make different choices in the trade-off space,” EthSystems wrote.
Despite the restructuring, the Foundation’s protocol division remains responsible for Ethereum’s core technology, including privacy, security, decentralization and censorship resistance.
Ethereum developers are also continuing work on the Glamsterdam upgrade, which includes proposed changes to block construction, data access, and network performance.
Hyperliquid has added a pre-IPO perpetual market linked to ChangXin Memory Technologies, or CXMT, giving traders synthetic exposure to the Chinese chipmaker before its Shanghai debut.
Summary
- Hyperliquid listed a CXMT pre-IPO perpetual as the chipmaker prepares its July 27 Shanghai debut.
- CXMT’s contract price near $8 implied a $535 billion valuation, 526% above its IPO price.
- The market offers synthetic exposure, not ownership of CXMT shares listed on Shanghai’s STAR Market.
The contract, listed as xyz, traded near $8 on July 15, according to on-chain market data cited by Hyperinsight. Applied to CXMT’s expected post-IPO share count of 66.881 billion shares, that price implies a valuation near $535 billion, about 6.3 times its official IPO valuation.
Hyperliquid opens a synthetic route to CXMT
The CXMT contract operates through Hyperliquid’s HIP-3 framework, which allows outside deployers to create perpetual markets linked to assets beyond cryptocurrencies. These markets trade as derivatives rather than spot securities, so the CXMT contract does not provide ownership, dividends or voting rights in the Shanghai-listed company.
Individual investors on China’s STAR Market generally face a RMB 500,000 asset threshold and a two-year trading-experience requirement. Hyperliquid offers a separate synthetic market that can give eligible users price exposure without access to the underlying A-share. The distinction also means the contract price can differ sharply from CXMT’s official share price.
CXMT contract trades far above IPO valuation
CXMT priced its IPO at RMB 8.66 per share and expects to raise about RMB 57.9 billion, or $8.55 billion, before any over-allotment option. Reuters reported that the deal will be Asia’s largest IPO of 2026 so far and China’s biggest A-share semiconductor offering, surpassing SMIC’s 2020 share sale.
At the offer price, CXMT’s expected post-listing value is about RMB 579.2 billion, or roughly $85.5 billion. A synthetic price near $8 implies about $535 billion, placing the Hyperliquid contract around 526% above the dollar equivalent of the IPO price. The gap reflects pricing in a separate derivatives market and does not set CXMT’s official equity valuation.
China’s largest DRAM maker prepares for listing
CXMT is China’s largest DRAM producer and ranks fourth globally, behind Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix and Micron. Recent market estimates place its global DRAM share near 8%. The company has expanded as China invests heavily in domestic semiconductor production and demand for memory chips grows alongside artificial intelligence infrastructure.
Reuters also reported that CXMT secured a long-term memory supply agreement with Tencent worth more than RMB 20 billion, or about $2.94 billion. Investor subscriptions for the STAR Market offering begin on July 16, while the shares are scheduled to start trading in Shanghai on July 27. CXMT plans to use the IPO proceeds for production and technology investment.
Hyperliquid widens its real-world asset markets
Hyperliquid’s HIP-3 framework allows builders to launch perpetual markets linked to stocks, commodities and other real-world assets. A pre-IPO SpaceX contract also traded through the framework, showing how on-chain derivatives can create markets around companies before their public shares become available.
Hyperliquid has also expanded its connection to tokenized securities. As reported by crypto.news, Ondo Finance brought 35 tokenized U.S. stocks and ETFs to HyperEVM in June. Those products differ from the CXMT perpetual because tokenized securities can use structures backed by assets held through custodians, while perpetuals provide synthetic price exposure.
The CXMT market gives traders another route to speculate on a major public offering before its debut. Attention will now turn to whether the 526% premium narrows before subscriptions start and after the underlying shares begin trading on the STAR Market.
CFTC has ordered Kalshi to keep operating in Michigan despite the platform already unwinding sports event trades to comply with a state court order, deepening the dispute over who regulates prediction markets in the U.S.
Summary
- The CFTC ordered Kalshi to continue operating in Michigan despite a state court order requiring the platform to unwind sports event trades.
- Kalshi said it is caught between conflicting federal and state directives after complying with the Michigan court’s ruling.
- The dispute adds to a growing legal battle as states challenge Kalshi’s sports contracts while the CFTC asserts exclusive regulatory authority.
According to a July 14 order from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Kalshi must not comply with Michigan’s directive to stop offering sports event contracts and should continue operating, even after the company said it had already reversed trades to satisfy the state court’s requirements.
The conflicting instructions have left the CFTC-regulated prediction market platform caught between state and federal authorities. In a statement posted on X, Kalshi’s head of enforcement and legal counsel, Robert DeNault, said the company had already unwound the affected trades because the Michigan court required it to do so.
“We are disappointed by this decision and believe it is unfair to Kalshi,” DeNault said.
“We already acted and unwound the trades, as the Michigan court order required us to do. We are being put in an impossible position, looking to follow state court orders that may contradict our federal regulatory obligations. We did not have a choice.”
A Kalshi spokesperson told Reuters the company is reviewing the CFTC’s order and weighing its next steps.
The regulator said Michigan became the first state to attempt to interfere with derivatives contracts after they had already been executed, describing the move as a challenge to the federal framework governing designated contract markets.
CFTC Chair Michael Selig said canceling completed trades could create uncertainty across financial markets.
“Canceling trades that have already been executed is an unprecedented step that risks a cascading effect on the entire marketplace and undermines the certainty in contracting that is a necessary component of a functioning market,” Selig said.
“The Commission will not allow states or state courts to bully registered entities into violating the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations,” he added.
Speaking on Fox Business last week, Selig also said it was “critical” that the CFTC preserve its authority over prediction markets.
He added that the agency had already sued nine states and would continue taking legal action against any state seeking to impose civil or criminal penalties on CFTC-registered exchanges.
Michigan case adds to national legal fight
The latest order follows a June 29 ruling by Ingham County Circuit Court Judge Rosemarie Aquilina, who temporarily barred Kalshi from offering sports event contracts to Michigan residents while the state’s lawsuit proceeds. The court warned the company it could face fines of up to $120,000 per day if it failed to meet geolocation requirements.
Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel has argued that Kalshi’s sports event contracts operate as unlicensed gambling products under the state’s Lawful Sports Betting Act. Kalshi has maintained that its event contracts fall under the Commodity Exchange Act and therefore remain subject to the CFTC rather than state gaming regulators.
Michigan is one of several states challenging Kalshi’s sports contracts. Massachusetts has secured a preliminary injunction blocking the platform from offering similar products while litigation continues, and a court recently allowed state authorities to expand their complaint with new allegations, including claims that Kalshi targets users under 21.
New York has also handed Kalshi an early setback. Earlier this month, Judge Analisa Torres denied the company’s request for a preliminary injunction, allowing the state’s lawsuit to continue after finding Kalshi had not shown it was likely to succeed on its argument that federal commodities law preempts New York’s gambling laws.
As the legal disputes expand, the CFTC continues to argue that Congress granted it exclusive authority over federally regulated prediction markets, while several states maintain that sports event contracts function as sports betting and should remain subject to state gaming laws.
The whole operation took less than an hour, and the most valuable thing the attacker stole was not money. It was credibility. On Sunday, July 12, the verified X accounts of SpaceX and Starlink, with two million and 1.6 million followers between them, reposted promotional content for a memecoin called SCATMAN.
Summary
- Hijacked SpaceX and Starlink X accounts promoted SCATMAN, turning brand credibility into a temporary liquidity source.
- The attacker reportedly sold ten trillion SCATMAN across two wallets for about $135,000.
- The incident shows that social media logins can be a cheaper crypto attack surface than smart contracts.
- Robinhood Chain’s permissionless design enabled rapid token deployment, but also exposed retail users to brand-token scams.
- The core risk is not only stolen funds, but the erosion of trust in verified institutional accounts.
The repost sat in the normal flow of the accounts’ output, alongside routine posts about Grok model updates, with no defacement, no changed banner, none of the usual tells of a takeover. It simply looked like SpaceX had something to say about a token.Buyers responded the way buyers respond. In the first twenty minutes the token rose 575%. By the time the posts came down on Sunday evening and the accounts were restored, the attacker had minted ten trillion SCATMAN, sold the supply across two wallets for roughly 73.7 ether, and walked away with about $135,000. Everyone who bought on the strength of a SpaceX repost held a worthless token.
The dollar figure is almost embarrassing. A hundred and thirty five thousand dollars is a rounding error next to the eight figure hacks that define crypto’s security discourse, and it is nothing at all next to the $1.16 billion in bitcoin sitting on SpaceX’s own balance sheet. That gap between the scale of the brand exploited and the size of the payday is the actual story, and it points at something the industry has not solved: the cheapest attack surface in crypto is not a smart contract or a bridge. It is a login.
Every serious defense crypto has built assumes the attacker must beat cryptography, economics, or code. The July 12 attacker beat none of those. They beat a password, borrowed a decade of accumulated public trust for roughly forty minutes, and converted it directly into ether at the expense of anyone who believed what a verified account told them.
What happened, in order
The sequence, reconstructed from onchain analytics and screenshots circulated before the posts were deleted, is short enough to fit in a paragraph and repeatable enough to fit in a playbook.An account calling itself Sam Catman appeared, displaying an affiliation badge that falsely tied it to SpaceX’s artificial intelligence work. The name was a pun on Sam Altman, timed to the ongoing public feud between Elon Musk and the OpenAI chief executive, a feud that had produced a $150 billion lawsuit and had Musk himself posting about scamming the day before the breach. The joke did work that the token itself could not: it made the promotion feel like something SpaceX might plausibly amplify. Musk’s companies post irreverently. A crude swipe at a rival chief executive, delivered as a memecoin, sits within the observed behavior of the brand, and that plausibility was engineered rather than lucky.
The SCATMAN token was deployed on Robinhood Chain, the trading platform’s layer 2 network that had gone live eleven days earlier and permits anyone to deploy a token without approval. The SpaceX and Starlink accounts then reposted the Sam Catman promotion, complete with the contract address and ticker.
Trading exploded. Reported peak market capitalization varies sharply by source and by measurement window, from roughly $800,000 in the first twenty minutes to $2 million on some trackers to $32 million at the high water mark reported by onchain analysts, with twenty four hour volume around $5.7 million. The spread itself tells you something about the quality of the market: on a token this thin, market capitalization is a number generated by the last trade, not a measure of anything real.The attacker sold. Onchain analytics firm Lookonchain traced ten trillion tokens dumped for 59 ether, worth about $108,000, from one wallet, and a further 59.28 million tokens sold for 14.7 ether, about $27,000, from a second wallet controlled by the same actor. Liquidity drained. The price collapsed. The posts were removed, the Sam Catman account was suspended, and control of the SpaceX and Starlink handles was restored the same evening.
As of publication, neither SpaceX nor X has explained how the accounts were compromised. Robinhood has not commented on its chain hosting the token. Every figure in the paragraphs above comes from third party onchain analysis, not from any company disclosure, which is itself worth noticing: the only institution that produced a public account of what happened was the blockchain.
Credibility arbitrage is the business model
Strip away the specifics and the attack has one moving part. Attackers are not building audiences. They are borrowing them, for the length of a single post, and converting borrowed trust into ether before the loan comes due.The economics are brutal in their simplicity. A memecoin launched by an anonymous wallet reaches nobody. The same token, reposted by an account with two million followers that has spent a decade earning the right to be believed, reaches a market instantly. The attacker does not need the trust to last. They need it to survive for the length of a candle.
This is why the payday size is misleading as a measure of severity. The constraint on the attacker’s profit was not the audience or the credibility. Those were enormous. The constraint was market depth: there simply were not enough buyers with enough capital in the pool to absorb ten trillion tokens at a higher price. The attacker extracted essentially all the liquidity that existed. On a deeper chain, or with a slower response from Musk’s security team, the same attack with the same inputs produces a much larger number. The record supports that reading. When attackers seized the dormant account of Keith Gill, better known as Roaring Kitty, in May, they launched a token on Solana and cleared more than $600,000 in half an hour. When the Pump.fun account was compromised in February 2025, one wallet made over $135,000 in under a minute. A hijacked account belonging to former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad produced $1.7 million in losses.
The pattern list is long and its membership is indiscriminate. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s own account announced a fake bitcoin ETF approval in January 2024, moving the entire market. Scroll co-founder Ye Chen’s account was taken over in January 2026. Pepe creator Matt Furie’s account pushed a scam token months later. World Liberty Financial co-founder Zach Witkoff, the leader of Myanmar’s junta, and a BBC presenter have all been used as unwitting distribution. What unites them is not an industry, a chain, or a security posture. It is a follower count.
The defense industry has no product for this. There is no audit that certifies a chief executive’s password manager. There is no bug bounty covering a social media platform’s session token handling. The security spend that protects a protocol treasury, multisig thresholds, hardware wallets, timelocks, all of it terminates at the edge of the chain, and the attack originates one layer above, in a consumer product operated by a company with no stake in crypto’s outcomes. The industry has outsourced its most important trust primitive to a social network and has no contractual relationship with it whatsoever.
Why the defenses that exist do not cover this
Crypto has spent years building defenses against a different threat model. Audits check contract code. Bug bounties surface protocol flaws. Formal verification proves that a program does what its specification says. Timelocks and multisigs guard treasuries, a lesson the industry learned expensively when a single vote drained a DAO, which crypto.news examined in its explainer on what a governance attack is. All of that machinery assumes the attack comes through the chain.
The SCATMAN attack came through a social media account. There was no contract to audit, because the contract did exactly what it was written to do. There was no protocol to exploit, because no protocol was exploited. Robinhood Chain worked as designed: it let someone deploy a token permissionlessly, and it let that token trade. Every component behaved correctly, and buyers still lost their money, because the failure happened in the layer nobody in crypto controls and everybody depends on, the layer where reputation is stored.
Consider what a diligent buyer could actually have done in the twenty minute window. Check the contract? It was a standard token; the exploit was the promotion, not the code. Check holder concentration? The attacker held everything, which describes most tokens in their first minutes and is not by itself proof of fraud. Check the liquidity lock? There was liquidity, briefly. Check the source? The source was SpaceX. That was the whole point.
The honest conclusion is that the standard retail checklist offers close to zero protection against this specific attack, because the checklist assumes the promotion is the least trustworthy input and the chain data is the most trustworthy. Here the chain data looked ordinary and the promotion looked impeccable. The only defense that works is a rule rather than an inspection: no verified account’s post, from any brand, is a reason to buy a token minted minutes earlier. That rule costs its holder every genuine celebrity token launch, which is a price most people should be delighted to pay.
The Robinhood Chain problem
The venue is not incidental. SCATMAN landed on a chain in its second week of life, and the chain’s condition shaped the outcome.Robinhood Chain launched on July 1 as a permissionless layer 2 aimed at onchain finance and real world asset tokenization. What arrived instead, at least first, was memecoins: more than 75% of trading volume in the opening week, with the network’s memecoin market capitalization briefly topping $244 million, more than $3 billion in cumulative decentralized exchange volume, and 19,586 new tokens created in a single day by July 13, second only to Solana. Cross chain interoperability provider Relay Protocol publicly warned about honeypot tokens proliferating on the network, coins hardcoded so buyers cannot sell or whose transfers route funds to an attacker, and said it was blocking them as they appeared.
That is the environment SCATMAN exploited: a young chain with real retail attention, minimal mature tooling, and an inflow of tokens far exceeding anyone’s ability to screen them. It is not a Robinhood specific failure. It is what permissionless launch infrastructure looks like at week two, and Solana’s own history through the rise of memecoin launchpads documents the same arc. The difference is the brand on the door. A chain carrying the name of a mainstream retail brokerage, whose users skew toward people who have never evaluated a token contract in their lives, inherits a duty of care that a purely crypto native chain never had, and the network’s design offers no obvious way to discharge it.
Robinhood’s silence on the incident is therefore the most interesting non-event of the week. The company did not deploy the token, did not promote it, and cannot in any technical sense prevent the next one. It also cannot escape the fact that a scam bearing SpaceX’s stolen credibility used its chain to reach its users. The gap between what a chain operator controls and what a chain operator is blamed for is about to become a live commercial question, not a philosophical one.
The tell that was there, and why it did not help
There was one genuine signal available in real time, and almost nobody could use it.The Sam Catman account was new. Its affiliation badge, the marker that ties an account to a parent organization on the platform, was fraudulent, claiming a link to SpaceX’s artificial intelligence work that did not exist. Someone who knew how badge inheritance works, who checked the account’s age, and who understood that a legitimate SpaceX subsidiary would not announce itself through a pun account, could have identified the fraud before buying.
That describes a vanishingly small population, and it describes them under conditions that made the knowledge useless. The window was twenty minutes. The signal required domain expertise in social media platform mechanics, not crypto. And the accounts amplifying the fraud were the exact accounts a user would check to verify it. The verification path led straight back to the attack.
This is what makes brand token crime structurally different from the failure modes retail has been trained on. A rug pull on a random token asks a buyer to evaluate a stranger and get it wrong. A hijacked account asks a buyer to evaluate an institution and get it right, then punishes them for the institution’s operational security failure. The buyer’s diligence was not insufficient. It was aimed at the wrong entity, because the entity that failed was never one they could inspect. The generic advice to check holder distribution and creator history, sound guidance across the meme coins landscape, simply does not reach a case where the creator’s history is a forged badge and the distribution looked normal for sixty seconds.
The case that this does not matter much
There is a serious argument that the industry should be relaxed about all of this, and it deserves a fair hearing.Start with the numbers. The total damage was $135,000, spread across an unknown number of buyers who chose to purchase a token named after a joke about a lawsuit, minted an hour earlier, on a chain eleven days old. Compare that to the $11 billion in crypto related losses the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center reported in 2025, or the industrial scale of romance and investment fraud operations. Account takeover memecoin scams are, in aggregate, a rounding error against the frauds that destroy people’s lives.
Continue with responsibility. Nobody was tricked into revealing a private key. No wallet was drained. Buyers made a voluntary purchase of a speculative asset in an unregulated market on the basis of a social media post, which is a decision the market is entitled to price. The permissionless systems performed exactly as advertised: anyone can create a token, anyone can buy it, nobody is protected. That is the deal, and it is disclosed in every interface.
Add that the response worked. The accounts were recovered within hours. The posts were deleted. The fake account was suspended. Lookonchain published both wallet addresses, meaning the proceeds are now permanently marked and traceable, an outcome that traditional financial fraud rarely delivers. Exchanges can flag those addresses. Investigators have a starting point. Compare the transparency of that aftermath to a wire fraud of equivalent size, where the money simply disappears into correspondent banking. Upbit’s freeze of proceeds after a recent onchain treasury attack shows that marked funds are not merely symbolic, and exchanges do act on published addresses when the trail is clean enough.
Finish with proportion. The attack is self limiting. Its profit is capped by the depth of the pool it dumps into, and thin pools are thin precisely because the market has correctly assessed these tokens as worthless. The scam succeeds only against buyers who ignore every rule the industry has spent a decade writing down.None of that is wrong. It is also, taken together, an argument for doing nothing, which is why the counterargument matters more.
The case that it matters a great deal
The dismissive reading treats $135,000 as the measure of the harm. It is the measure of the attacker’s revenue, which is a different quantity entirely.The harm is the erosion of the only verification mechanism retail actually uses. Ordinary people do not read contracts. They read who is saying it. That heuristic, trust the verified account of a company that builds rockets, is the single most reliable signal available to a non technical person on the internet, and each successful hijacking teaches the market that the signal is unreliable. A world in which no institutional account can be believed is a world in which every genuine announcement, every legitimate product launch, every real partnership arrives pre-discounted. The industry is spending down a shared reputational asset it did not build and cannot replenish, one $135,000 withdrawal at a time.
Then consider the trajectory. This attack costs almost nothing to attempt, carries low apparent consequence, and produces a payday in minutes. The rate of attempts is a function of expected value, and expected value is rising as more mainstream brands acquire crypto surfaces. SpaceX now holds 18,712 bitcoin and trades as a Nasdaq-100 component whose price is discovered partly on crypto rails, a structural reality crypto.news examined when the stock joined the index. Every corporate account with a crypto adjacent story is now a live financial instrument, whether the company knows it or not, and the compromise of such an account is no longer a public relations incident. It is a market event.
Notice too what the attacker actually needed: no capital, no code, no confederates, and roughly one hour. Meanwhile, the defenders needed exactly what they did not have, which is a way to un-say something to millions of people faster than a bot can buy. Deletion is not a remedy when the trade has already cleared. The asymmetry is total: the attack executes at the speed of a repost, and the correction executes at the speed of a corporate security team noticing, escalating, and regaining access. In the interval, an irreversible ledger records everything.
And the regulatory exposure is asymmetric in an ugly way. Attackers face weak enforcement against pseudonymous wallets. The chains, the brokerages, and the exchanges hosting the activity face regulators who are actively deciding, this month, how much responsibility infrastructure operators bear for what runs on top of them. Every SCATMAN is evidence in that proceeding, and it is evidence that arrives conveniently packaged: a household brand, a retail brokerage’s chain, an unsophisticated victim class, and a perpetrator who will probably never be identified. The industry’s argument for permissionless infrastructure gets harder to make each time permissionless infrastructure is the medium through which a stolen brand robs retail buyers, and the regulatory window in which those arguments are being weighed is measured in weeks, not years.
What would actually change the math
Nothing in the current toolkit addresses the root cause, which is that a verified account’s authority transfers instantly and totally to whoever controls the login at a given moment.
The platform side is straightforward and unattempted. Hardware key enforcement for accounts above a follower threshold. Delay windows on posts containing contract addresses from accounts that have never posted one. Loss of affiliation badge inheritance for accounts created within a defined period. None of these is technically hard. All of them are commercially unattractive to a platform that monetizes velocity, and none has been implemented despite three years of nearly identical incidents. The absence is not a technology gap. It is a revealed preference about whose losses count.
The chain side is more interesting because it cuts against the ideology. A permissionless chain cannot vet tokens, but the interfaces on top of it can, and increasingly do: Relay Protocol’s honeypot blocking is exactly that, a voluntary screening layer occupying the gap between what the protocol permits and what users can survive. Expect more of it, and expect the resulting fight over whether interface level screening is prudent stewardship or the reintroduction of the gatekeepers the entire architecture was built to remove.
The user side is the only one available today, and it is a single sentence: the credibility of the messenger tells you nothing about the token, because the messenger’s credibility is exactly what is being stolen. A verified account promoting a token minted minutes ago is not evidence of legitimacy. Under current conditions it is closer to evidence of the opposite.
The ledger nobody wants to read
Here is the uncomfortable arithmetic of July 12. A brand worth over a trillion dollars in public market value was used, without consent, to sell a worthless asset. The theft netted about the price of a modest car. The proceeds are permanently visible on a public ledger. The victims have no recourse. The platform has said nothing. The chain has said nothing. The brand has said nothing. And the mechanism that made it all possible remains completely intact, available to anyone who compromises the next account.
The scam economy has discovered that the most valuable asset in crypto is not any token. It is a moment of unearned belief, and belief is the one thing on this market with no smart contract protecting it, no audit verifying it, and no liquidity lock keeping it in place. Until that changes, $135,000 is not a measure of the damage. It is a receipt for the trial run.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Figures on wallet activity, token supply, and market capitalization derive from third party onchain analytics reported by Lookonchain, GeckoTerminal, and DEX Screener, not from official company disclosures, and reported peaks vary between sources. No company involved has confirmed the breach mechanism. Details reflect information current as of July 14, 2026, and are subject to change. Always do your own research.
Fast-settling prediction markets can change how traders behave in the underlying market. A new research paper by scholars at Stanford University and Singapore Management University argues that Polymarket’s five-minute Bitcoin prediction contracts created incentives for some participants to manipulate spot prices shortly before settlement—transferring value from less sophisticated traders to those able to exploit the timing.
The study examines short-horizon contracts that settle based on Bitcoin’s price relative to a fixed threshold at the end of each five-minute trading window. Because settlement relies on Chainlink price feeds tied to the end-of-window spot price, the paper concludes that traders have a window of opportunity to influence the reference price immediately before contracts expire.
Key takeaways
- The paper links Polymarket’s five-minute Bitcoin contracts to unusual spot-market order-flow spikes immediately before settlement.
- Researchers observed rapid spot-price reversals consistent with manipulation around the settlement reference point.
- The study estimates roughly $1.28 million shifted from ordinary traders to manipulators over the sample period.
- Extending the contract duration from five minutes to 15 minutes “largely eliminated” the effect, suggesting design choices matter.
- Settlement mechanics—not prediction markets themselves—appear to be the key risk factor, with solutions including longer settlement windows and alternative pricing methods.
Short settlement windows can reward “price chasing”
Polymarket’s five-minute Bitcoin prediction markets allow traders to bet whether BTC will finish above or below a predetermined level after five minutes. The contracts settle using Chainlink price feeds that reference Bitcoin’s price at the end of each trading window.
According to the paper, this settlement approach can distort incentives: when the reference price is determined at a specific moment, sophisticated traders may find it profitable to push the spot market in the minutes—and sometimes seconds—leading up to that timestamp. In other words, the act of trading the prediction contract can become coupled to short-term spot-market execution just before settlement.
What the researchers found in order flow and price behavior
To test the claim, the researchers analyzed trading activity around the period when Polymarket introduced these contracts in July 2024. Their focus was on how spot-market dynamics changed before and after the contracts launched.
The study reports sharp increases in Bitcoin spot-market order flow shortly before settlement, followed by rapid price reversals after the five-minute windows closed. The authors interpret the combination of pre-settlement buying/selling pressure and post-settlement reversal patterns as consistent with settlement-price manipulation rather than normal price discovery.
While manipulation cannot be directly proven from order flow alone, the paper’s reasoning is grounded in the timing: when contracts settle to a price snapshot at the end of a short window, traders can potentially profit by targeting that snapshot rather than forecasting longer-term movement.
How much value may have been transferred—and what reduces the risk
The paper estimates that, during the sample period, the behavior transferred about $1.28 million from “ordinary traders” to “manipulators.” The precise mechanism appears tied to who can influence market prices effectively at the moment of settlement, leaving others exposed to outcomes they did not cause.
Importantly, the authors also report that extending contract durations from five minutes to 15 minutes largely eliminated the effect. That result points to a practical mitigation: the shorter the time between trading and settlement—especially when settlement depends on a single end-of-window price—the more likely it is that incentives align around momentary spot-market tactics.
The study emphasizes that its findings do not mean prediction markets are inherently vulnerable to manipulation. Instead, the risk seems to stem from settlement design. The researchers highlight potential fixes such as longer settlement windows and alternative pricing methods—for example, time-weighted average prices (TWAP)—which reduce how profitable it is to “hit” a single reference timestamp.
Why this matters beyond crypto regulation
The implications are not limited to decentralized or crypto-native venues. The paper notes that traditional exchanges, including Nasdaq and Cboe, have proposed event contracts tied to asset prices. As prediction markets expand into more regulated financial settings, contract engineering could become a central question for regulators and market designers.
From an investor or trader standpoint, the study suggests that the safest products are not simply those with better liquidity or reputations, but those with settlement logic that limits the link between contract settlement and immediate underlying-market price moves. Readers should therefore watch for how venues specify reference prices—whether they use end-of-window snapshots, TWAP-style measures, or other anti-gaming mechanisms—especially for short-dated contracts.
Meanwhile, legal scrutiny around prediction markets continues to intensify in the US. Earlier this year, multiple states challenged platforms including Kalshi and Polymarket. Separately, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has argued that federally regulated event contracts fall under its “exclusive jurisdiction” rather than state gambling laws. The dispute is now moving through the federal courts, and observers have said conflicting appellate rulings could ultimately require the US Supreme Court to determine whether states or the CFTC have primary authority.
World Cup momentum lifts prediction market volumes
While the new research focuses on settlement mechanics, the wider sector continues to grow in terms of activity. Prediction markets posted record trading volumes in June as the 2026 FIFA World Cup drove interest across platforms.
According to DefiLlama data cited in the article, Kalshi processed about $9.4 billion in trading volume during June, while Polymarket International handled roughly $4.3 billion. The World Cup winner markets generated more than $5.4 billion in combined trading volume, with Polymarket accounting for about $4.25 billion and Kalshi about $1.2 billion, based on platform-reported figures at the time of writing.
This surge underscores why contract design issues are likely to remain prominent: when volumes rise and markets move from niche speculation to mainstream attention, the economic incentives to exploit structural weaknesses can grow alongside participation.
Going forward, the key question for traders, builders, and regulators is whether venues can scale prediction markets without creating exploitable settlement dynamics—especially for very short-dated contracts. The Stanford and Singapore Management University findings suggest that changing the settlement window length and using price-averaging methods could meaningfully reduce manipulation risk, but market participants will want to see how widely these design changes are adopted and how quickly they translate into cleaner spot-market behavior.
South Korea has unveiled plans for a new law that will bring cryptocurrencies and other digital assets into the country’s state asset management framework, expanding rules that have remained largely unchanged for more than seven decades.
Summary
- South Korea plans a new law that will bring cryptocurrencies and other digital assets into the country’s state asset management framework.
- The proposal expands government asset rules beyond real estate to include virtual assets and intellectual property.
- The move comes as South Korea continues work on digital asset legislation, stablecoin rules, and blockchain infrastructure projects.
South Korea’s Ministry of Economy and Finance said during a July 15 policy briefing at the President’s Blue House that it will introduce the National Asset Basic Act, replacing an approach built around the existing State Property Act enacted in 1950.
The ministry said the current law was designed for an economy where government assets were largely limited to real estate. The proposed framework will instead cover newer categories, including intellectual property and virtual assets, while introducing specialized management and development standards for different types of state-owned assets.
Under the proposal, authorities plan to move away from treating public assets mainly as property to preserve, sell, or develop. Instead, the ministry said the new framework will focus on creating more value from government-owned assets through modern management practices.
Crypto legislation remains part of wider blockchain strategy
The latest proposal follows another digital asset policy update released earlier this week. After Monday’s State Council meeting, the Ministry of Economy and Finance confirmed that blockchain development will remain part of South Korea’s economic growth strategy for the second half of 2026, even as artificial intelligence receives a larger share of government investment.
As part of that roadmap, the ministry said it will continue work on the Digital Asset Basic Act, legislation intended to establish rules for the country’s digital asset industry, including business conduct standards and a legal framework for Korean won-pegged stablecoins. Authorities also said they plan to create legal foundations for cross-border stablecoin transactions and support amendments that would allow spot cryptocurrency exchange-traded funds.
Plans for blockchain infrastructure also continue to expand. The ministry previously announced that a pilot program linking tokenized government bonds with an institutional central bank digital currency project will begin in 2027, while the Bank of Korea will study how its CBDC can interact with other blockchain networks.
At the provincial level, Gyeonggi Province is preparing to launch an eight-month blockchain stablecoin pilot in August.
According to blockchain media outlet NexBlock, blockchain security company ZKrypto will lead the trial, which will test stablecoin issuance, circulation, settlement, fraud prevention, privacy protections, and public benefit payments through February 2027. The system will use zero-knowledge proofs to prevent double-spending and proof-of-reserves technology to verify backing assets throughout the pilot.
In June 2025, a week before the XRP Ledger’s EVM sidechain went live, the team building it published the arithmetic of what was coming. Polygon had contributed somewhere between $2 billion and $6 billion in total value locked to Ethereum, up to a tenth of the whole.
Summary
- The XRPL EVM sidechain promised a $600 million to $12 billion TVL uplift but holds only $25,741 after one year.
- The chain is technically live, audited, and maintained, but almost no users or capital have arrived.
- Moai Finance has recorded just $95,008 in cumulative spot volume across the sidechain’s entire existence.
- XRPL’s institutional mainnet activity grew while permissionless EVM DeFi failed to gain traction.
- The result suggests EVM compatibility alone does not create demand without users already waiting for cheaper or better execution.
If the XRPL EVM sidechain matched that trajectory, the post argued, the uplift to the XRP Ledger would run from $600 million to $12 billion, and it would fundamentally change the demand curve for XRP. Ninety entities were already building. Sixty days of testnet had pulled in developers who had never touched the XRP ecosystem. The technology was ready. The builders were here.The sidechain launched on June 30, 2025. The anniversary passed two weeks ago.
As of July 14, 2026, total value locked on the XRPL EVM sidechain is $25,741, according to DefiLlama. Chain fees over the past 24 hours: zero. Chain revenue: zero. Decentralized exchange volume over 24 hours: zero. Over seven days: also zero. The largest protocol on the chain, a decentralized exchange called XRiSE33 Network, holds $11,909. The second largest, a launchpad named Riddle, holds $8,831. Moai Finance, the only protocol on the chain that has ever recorded meaningful trading, has done $95,008 in cumulative spot volume across its entire existence and currently holds $1,117.
The low end of the projection was $600 million. The delivery is $25,741. That is not a shortfall. It is a rounding error against a rounding error, and it is the most instructive number in the XRP ecosystem right now, because of what else the same ledger accomplished during the same twelve months.
What was actually built
The technical work was not the problem, and it is worth stating that clearly before the autopsy.The XRPL EVM sidechain is a Cosmos SDK chain running Ethereum Virtual Machine compatibility, connected to the XRP Ledger mainnet through the Axelar bridge, which links more than eighty networks. XRP is the native gas token. Bridged XRP locks on mainnet and mints a synthetic version on the sidechain, so the design preserves mainnet supply integrity while freeing the asset for smart contract use. Consensus is proof of authority, targeting up to 1,000 transactions per second at fees far below Ethereum’s. Squid handles cross-chain transfers as the official interface. Band Protocol supplies oracles, Grove supplies public RPC endpoints. Wormhole integration was slated to follow, extending reach to more than 200 applications across 35 ecosystems.
Ripple built it with Peersyst and contributors from the Cosmos community. crypto.news covered the mainnet launch on June 30, 2025, where Ripple’s David Schwartz framed the sidechain as extending the ecosystem without altering what makes the XRP Ledger reliable. The launch roster included Strobe, a money market for lending and overcollateralized borrowing; Securd, a lending protocol for financing collateralized leverage; Vertex, a derivatives venue; plus Moai, Elys, XRise, and Hammy. The infrastructure was audited end to end. Subsequent releases hardened it further, with a v11 upgrade focused on economic security, IBC transfer hardening, and proof of authority validator management, and an upgrade to Cosmos EVM v0.4.1 adding ERC-20 mint and burn plus current Ethereum improvement proposals.
None of that is vaporware. Every component works. Someone can bridge XRP to the sidechain right now, deploy a Solidity contract, and trade on a decentralized exchange. The chain is live, secure, and functionally complete.It is also empty.That is the part worth sitting with, because it inverts the usual crypto post-mortem. The standard failure story is a project that promised more than it could build: the whitepaper outran the engineers, the deadlines slipped, the product never shipped or shipped broken. XRPL EVM shipped, on schedule, working, audited, and maintained through multiple upgrades over the following year. Every promise about the technology was kept. The only promise that failed was the one about people.
The decline, measured
The most damning fact is not the small number. It is the direction.In August 2025, roughly six weeks after launch, DefiLlama showed the sidechain hosting three decentralized exchanges and a single launchpad, with combined total value locked of $100,818. Twenty four hour volume across the entire chain was $3,238, every dollar of it from Moai Finance. Riddle, XRiSE33 Network, and SurgeDefi recorded no trading activity whatsoever. Developer data at the time counted 168 developers on XRPL EVM against 8,448 on Ethereum, a gap of roughly 98%.
That was the bad news at six weeks. Today, eleven months later, total value locked is $25,741. The chain lost roughly three quarters of the little it had. The protocol count is nominally higher, with Midas RWA, Hyperithm, Portal, Axelar, and an NFT marketplace called Mintiq now listed, but every one of those additions reports zero total value locked on this chain. They are multi-chain protocols that support XRPL EVM the way a restaurant supports a dietary restriction: the option exists on the menu and nobody orders it.
The volume figures are what turn an underperformance into something stranger. Zero over 24 hours. Zero over seven days. Moai Finance, the chain’s only functioning exchange by any historical measure, shows $95,008 in cumulative volume since inception. Not per day. Total, across a year of operation, on the flagship DeFi venue of a chain built for a token with a market capitalization near $68 billion.
A chain with $25,741 of capital and no trading is not a slow start. It is a chain nobody is using, and the trend line says that fewer people are using it every month.For scale, the entire TVL of the sidechain is currently less than the value of roughly 24,000 XRP. Ripple releases a billion tokens from escrow on the first of every month. The whole DeFi economy built on top of the XRP Ledger, through the official sidechain, could be funded out of forty thousandths of a single monthly escrow tranche.
Who was supposed to show up
Reading the launch roster a year later is the clearest way to see what went wrong, because the roster was not thin. It was specific.Strobe was announced as a money market for lending and overcollateralized borrowing on XRPL. Securd was to provide passive income by financing collateralized leverage across DeFi positions. Vertex was a derivatives platform optimizing capital efficiency. Between them, those three cover the load-bearing categories of any DeFi economy: lending, leverage, and derivatives. Add a decentralized exchange for spot, an oracle from Band, RPC infrastructure from Grove, and a cross-chain interface from Squid, and the stack on paper was complete. Nothing essential was missing.
Today none of those three names appears among the protocols holding capital on the chain. The entire TVL sits in two decentralized exchanges and a launchpad. The lending market that would have made bridged XRP productive, the derivatives venue that would have given traders a reason to keep collateral there, the leverage layer that generates the recursive deposits which inflate every chain’s TVL figure: none of it materialized in a form anyone funded.
That absence explains the volume better than any macro argument. A chain with only spot DEXs and no credit has no reason to hold capital between trades. Money arrives, swaps, and leaves. On chains where TVL compounds, it compounds because deposits are collateral, collateral is borrowed against, and the borrowings are redeposited. Without a lending market, TVL is just the float sitting in a few pools, and $25,741 is what that float looks like when almost nobody is swapping.
The irony is precise. The lending layer the sidechain needed and never got is now being built on the mainnet instead, in a permissioned, institutionally underwritten form that has nothing to do with the EVM. The sidechain was the place DeFi was supposed to happen. Credit went somewhere else, and the sidechain was left holding the part of DeFi that cannot sustain itself alone.
Why the projection was never plausible
The Polygon comparison that produced the $600 million to $12 billion range deserves scrutiny, because in retrospect it was comparing two things that share almost no structural features.
Polygon captured Ethereum overflow. It existed because Ethereum’s fees became unbearable during periods of intense demand, and there was a vast population of users and developers already transacting on Ethereum who wanted the same applications for less money. The demand preceded the chain. Polygon did not create appetite for DeFi; it captured appetite that already existed and had nowhere cheaper to go. Add hundreds of millions of dollars in liquidity incentives and a mature Ethereum tooling ecosystem that ported over with a config change, and the TVL followed the demand.
XRPL EVM inverted every one of those conditions. There was no congestion to relieve, because the XRP Ledger has never been congested. There was no population of XRPL DeFi users seeking cheaper execution, because XRPL DeFi barely existed: the ledger’s total value locked has run under 0.05% of its market capitalization, against roughly 20% for Ethereum and 10% for Solana. That statistic was cited in the launch material as the size of the opportunity. It is more accurately read as the size of the demand problem.
Six million XRPL wallet holders were presented as a distribution advantage, but they were six million holders of a payments asset who had spent a decade not asking for smart contracts. The sidechain did not remove a barrier between XRP holders and DeFi. It tested whether the barrier was the reason, and the answer came back no.The Peersyst material was explicit that testnet momentum arrived organically, without incentives or paid marketing, and treated that as evidence of underlying pull. Ninety logos on a testnet is a real signal of developer curiosity. It is not a signal of user demand, and the distinction is the whole story: developers show up to explore new chains constantly, at near zero cost, and the tourism ends when nobody trades.
The comparison that hurts
Here is why this matters beyond a dead sidechain: the XRP Ledger had an extraordinary year, on the mainnet, at exactly the same time.
Tokenized real-world assets on the XRP Ledger grew from under a billion dollars at the start of 2026 to roughly $3.5 billion, and the ledger has led the market on 90-day RWA inflows, adding $1.9 billion. In May 2026, Ondo Finance executed the first cross-border, cross-bank redemption of tokenized United States Treasuries on the XRPL, clearing in seconds, with JPMorgan and Mastercard involved in the surrounding work. RLUSD grew past a $1.5 billion market capitalization. The native automated market maker and multi-purpose token amendments both passed validator votes. The XLS-65 and XLS-66 lending amendments are in validator voting now, an effort crypto.news examined in its analysis of what on-chain credit would mean for XRP.
The mainnet, in other words, went and built exactly the thing the sidechain was supposed to enable, using its own native primitives, aimed at institutions instead of Solidity developers, and it worked. Institutional tokenization found the XRP Ledger without an EVM. Permissionless DeFi did not find it with one.
That contrast reframes the sidechain from a failed product into a resolved question. The bet was that XRPL’s problem was programmability, and that giving Ethereum developers a familiar environment on top of XRP liquidity would unlock a DeFi economy. Twelve months of data says the problem was never programmability. It was that the XRP ecosystem’s actual demand is institutional settlement, and institutional settlement does not want an EVM sidechain with proof of authority consensus and a bridge. It wants permissioned pools, credentialed counterparties, and off-chain underwriting, which is precisely what the mainnet amendments deliver.
Notice also where XRP-adjacent DeFi capital actually went. VivoPower allocated $100 million through Flare, a separate network built specifically to give XRP holders DeFi access, rather than through Ripple’s own sidechain. When money did move toward XRP DeFi, it routed around the official product.
The case that this is unfair
The bearish read above deserves an honest counterweight, and there is a real one.Timing first. The sidechain launched on June 30, 2025, roughly three weeks before XRP’s cycle high near $3.65, and spent its entire first year inside the worst crypto drawdown since 2022. Bitcoin fell more than 40% from its October peak. Digital asset funds ran multi-billion dollar outflow streaks. Three consecutive losing quarters, the longest streak since the last bear market, with institutional capital rotating into artificial intelligence equities. TVL across the market compressed. Judging a new chain’s ecosystem formation against a projection written in a bull market, and measured entirely inside a bear market, stacks the comparison. Polygon’s $2 billion to $6 billion was built during a mania.
Second, no incentives. Polygon’s TVL was purchased. Hundreds of millions in liquidity mining subsidies pulled capital that largely left when the subsidies stopped. XRPL EVM launched with none, which is defensible as a matter of discipline and fatal as a matter of cold-start economics. Liquidity begets liquidity, and a chain with $25,741 cannot attract a trader who needs to move $50,000 without moving the price against themselves. Every DeFi ecosystem that reached scale bought its first users. Refusing to do so is a choice with predictable consequences, not evidence that the underlying idea is wrong.
Third, sequencing. The credit layer was always the point. RippleX’s own framing describes a deliberate progression: represent value, move value, trade value, finance value. The lending amendments now in voting are the fourth step, and they are being built on the mainnet with institutional design constraints, not on the sidechain. If the strategy is institutional DeFi rather than retail DeFi, then the sidechain was never the main line. It was an option that Ripple bought cheaply, and options that expire worthless are still rational to have purchased.
Fourth, the infrastructure persists. A chain is not a startup that folds. It runs, it gets upgraded, and it costs almost nothing to leave running. If the market turns, if incentives arrive, if a single application finds product-market fit, the environment is there, audited and connected to eighty networks. Twelve months is a short window for infrastructure that took years to build.
Fifth, and least comfortable for the bears: the metric itself is contested. Total value locked measures deposited capital, not usefulness, and it is trivially gamed by recursive lending and mercenary liquidity on chains that do buy their numbers. A chain with honest, unincentivized TVL of $25,741 and a chain with subsidized TVL of $500 million are not obviously ranked the way the figures suggest. That argument does not rescue XRPL EVM, because zero volume is not a metrics artifact, but it is a fair caution against treating one number as a verdict on an entire architecture.
The case that it is worse than it looks
Now the harder reading, which the numbers support more directly.The bear market explains compression. It does not explain zero. Solana’s memecoin economy generated tens of billions of dollars of volume through the same drawdown. Robinhood Chain launched on July 1, 2026 into the identical macro and did more than $3 billion in decentralized exchange volume in two weeks, with 19,586 tokens created on a single day. Hyperliquid, Base, and BNB Chain all sustained real activity. Capital did not stop moving in 2026. It moved somewhere else. The absence of incentives explains a smaller number; it does not explain a chain where the flagship exchange has done $95,000 in trading across its entire existence while a two-week-old competitor chain did $3 billion.The declining trend is the tell. $100,818 in August 2025 to $25,741 in July 2026 is not a chain waiting for conditions to improve. It is a chain being abandoned by the little capital that tried it. Bear markets thin the field; they do not usually take three quarters of the liquidity from a chain that started with almost none.
And the developer number from August was the leading indicator everyone skipped: 168 developers against Ethereum’s 8,448. Chains are not built by logos on a testnet. They are built by people shipping applications that someone wants to use, and the ratio said, six weeks in, that the ninety entities had not converted into an ecosystem. The launch roster is the proof. Strobe, Securd, Vertex: named as launch partners, and today the chain’s entire TVL sits in two DEXs and a launchpad nobody trades on. The applications that were supposed to give the chain a reason to exist either never shipped at scale or shipped and found nobody.
The strategic cost is subtler than the wasted engineering. For a year, “XRPfi” and the EVM sidechain functioned as an answer to the hardest question about XRP, which is how any of Ripple’s progress reaches the token. The sidechain made XRP the gas asset of a DeFi economy, which would have generated real, recurring token demand. That answer is now empirically closed, and it closes at the same moment as the structural finding that most of Ripple’s bank partners never touch XRP at all. Two of the three main value-accrual arguments for the token have now been tested against data in the same quarter. Both came back thin.
What the $25,741 is actually evidence of
Step back from XRP entirely, because the finding generalizes.The industry has spent five years treating EVM compatibility as a growth strategy. The reasoning is seductive: Ethereum has the developers, the tooling, the mental models, and the applications, so any chain that speaks Solidity inherits access to all of it at the cost of an engineering project. Dozens of chains have run this play. A few worked. Most produced exactly what XRPL EVM produced, which is a technically excellent environment with nobody in it.
The reason is that EVM compatibility removes a supply-side constraint and does nothing to the demand side. It makes building easier. It does not make anyone want the thing built. When a chain has organic demand and a technical barrier, removing the barrier unlocks enormous value, which is the Polygon story and the Arbitrum story. When a chain has a technical option and no demand, removing the barrier produces an empty room with excellent acoustics.
The diagnostic question is therefore simple and almost never asked before a chain commits to the work: is there a queue? Not a waiting list of developers, who are cheap to attract and cost nothing to lose, but users currently doing the thing somewhere worse and paying for the privilege. Polygon had a queue. Arbitrum had a queue. XRPL EVM had a hypothesis that six million payment-asset holders would become DeFi users once the tooling arrived, and hypotheses are not queues.
XRPL had the cleanest possible version of the test. Six million wallets. A top-ten asset. Twelve years of uptime. Deep liquidity. Real regulatory standing. A functioning native DEX. Every input the thesis requires, and a year later the DeFi economy built on top of it holds less capital than a used car. If EVM compatibility were the unlock, it would have worked here. The mechanics of liquidity pools and automated market makers are identical on XRPL EVM to what they are on Ethereum. The pools are simply empty, because pools are filled by people who want something, and nobody wanted this.
The lesson costs Ripple very little and should cost the next chain a great deal. The company retained an option, learned that its DeFi demand is institutional rather than permissionless, and redirected to native amendments aimed at exactly that. That is a reasonable outcome from a cheap experiment. The problem belongs to everyone still pitching an EVM layer as a demand strategy, because the most rigorous public test of that thesis just returned $25,741 and no volume, and the DeFi industry has not noticed.
The number to remember
The projection was $600 million to $12 billion. The delivery is $25,741 and zero trading volume, twelve months later, on a chain that works perfectly.That gap is not a failure of engineering, marketing, timing, or macro, though each contributed at the margin. It is a measurement. Somebody asked, with real money and real code and a well-built product, whether the XRP ecosystem wanted permissionless DeFi. The ecosystem answered. The answer was no, and it took a year and a nine-figure projection to hear a number that fits on a single line of a spreadsheet.
XRPL’s institutional story is doing better than it has ever done. Its DeFi story is a chain with $25,741 on it and nobody trading. Both of those things are true at once, and anyone building a thesis on XRP needs to hold both, because the second one used to be an argument and is now just a data point.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Total value locked, volume, and protocol figures are drawn from DefiLlama as of July 14, 2026, and change continuously; TVL is a contested metric and methodologies differ between trackers. Historical figures are attributed to the sources that reported them at the time. Projections cited were published by the sidechain’s development team and are not forecasts by crypto.news. Details reflect information current as of July 14, 2026. Always do your own research.
Ripple CTO Emeritus David Schwartz has defended XRP advertising in college sports after critics called for tighter restrictions on crypto promotion.
Summary
- David Schwartz argues truthful XRP advertising receives First Amendment protection against broad government restrictions nationwide.
- His argument cites Supreme Court rulings that struck restrictions on lawful alcohol and gambling advertising.
- Commercial speech remains regulable, meaning the Constitution does not automatically block every potential advertising restriction.
The debate followed the University of Kansas athletics program’s decision to place XRP branding on team uniforms under a multi-year partnership with Ripple.
In a July 15 post on X, Schwartz argued that governments cannot broadly suppress truthful advertising for lawful products simply because officials believe consumers may make poor decisions. His position centers on First Amendment protections for commercial speech.
Schwartz turns XRP advertising debate into constitutional question
The discussion began after critics compared crypto promotion in college sports with advertising for gambling, tobacco and alcohol. They argued that universities should not expose students and younger sports fans to digital asset marketing.
Schwartz responded with a legal argument rather than a defense of XRP as an investment. He wrote that the government cannot suppress truthful commercial speech merely to prevent people from making “bad, but lawful, decisions.” His argument draws a distinction between regulating an activity and banning truthful speech about that activity.
Supreme Court cases support protection for lawful advertising
Schwartz cited 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, a 1996 Supreme Court case that struck down restrictions on advertising liquor prices. The Court found that Rhode Island could not broadly block truthful price information simply because the state wanted to reduce alcohol consumption.
He also pointed to Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal restriction could not block advertisements for lawful private casino gambling under the circumstances before the Court.
However, those rulings do not make every restriction on XRP advertising automatically unconstitutional. Under the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson framework, commercial speech receives protection when it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. Governments may still impose properly tailored restrictions that directly serve a substantial public interest.
Kansas deal puts XRP logo across college sports
Kansas Athletics announced the Ripple partnership on July 8. The XRP logo will appear on uniforms across the university’s athletic programs, making it the first cryptocurrency jersey patch used across a major college athletics program, according to Kansas.
The agreement also covers branding at athletic venues, digital properties and events. Ripple will fund financial and technology education programs for student-athletes and the wider campus community. The partnership also expands an existing recruitment link between Ripple and Kansas graduates.
As previously reported, the agreement runs for five years and has personal ties to Ripple CEO Brad Garlinghouse, a University of Kansas alumnus. The sponsorship has since drawn wider attention to how universities should handle digital asset advertising.
XRP legal history adds context to advertising dispute
The debate comes three years after a federal court issued its split ruling in the SEC’s case against Ripple. The court found that Ripple’s programmatic XRP sales did not qualify as securities transactions under the circumstances examined, while certain institutional sales violated securities laws. The case formally ended in 2025 with a $125 million penalty and an injunction remaining in place.
That history makes broad claims about XRP’s legal status more complex than simply calling the asset universally exempt from financial regulation. Schwartz’s First Amendment argument instead rests on a narrower point: truthful commercial speech concerning lawful activity receives constitutional protection.
A government attempt to impose a blanket ban on XRP advertising could therefore face a serious First Amendment challenge. But existing Supreme Court doctrine still allows some commercial advertising rules when regulators can satisfy the required constitutional test.
Ethereum price has reclaimed the $1,850 resistance after softer-than-expected U.S. inflation data triggered a sharp short squeeze, putting the $2,000 level back into focus for traders.
Summary
- Ethereum price broke above $1,850 after softer U.S. CPI data sparked a broad crypto rally.
- Technical charts and liquidation clusters suggest $2,000 is the next major price target.
- Analysts say holding $1,850 as support is key to sustaining the current bullish trend.
The second-largest cryptocurrency climbed nearly 5% on July 15 after June’s Consumer Price Index came in below expectations, easing concerns that Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh would resume aggressive rate hikes. Risk assets rallied across global markets, with tech stocks advancing alongside cryptocurrencies as investors priced in a more accommodative policy outlook.
Derivatives markets amplified the move. CoinGlass liquidation data shows a dense cluster of leveraged short positions between $1,800 and $1,850 was wiped out as Ethereum broke through resistance. Forced buybacks accelerated the rally toward $1,900, while the latest liquidation heatmap now shows fresh liquidity pockets concentrated around $1,900-$1,950.
A successful push through that zone could expose another wave of liquidations and open a path toward the psychological $2,000 level.
Technical breakout puts $2,000 back in play
Ethereum’s daily chart shows the recovery has developed from a series of rounded-bottom formations that formed after June’s selloff to nearly $1,500. Price has now completed a breakout above the neckline near $1,850, a level that capped several recovery attempts over recent weeks. The measured move from the pattern projects a target close to $2,190, matching a major resistance zone from earlier this year.
Momentum indicators continue to favor buyers. The Aroon Up indicator stands above 92 while Aroon Down has dropped to zero, suggesting bulls retain control of the prevailing trend. Relative Strength Index has climbed to around 63, leaving room for additional gains before reaching overbought territory.
The 4-hour chart reinforces the bullish structure. Ethereum has reclaimed the 100% Fibonacci retracement level near $1,897 after holding above the 78.6% retracement around $1,815. MACD remains in positive territory with widening bullish momentum, while the Chaikin Money Flow reading above zero suggests capital continues to enter the market rather than leave it.
Commenting on the breakout, crypto analyst Daan Crypto Trades wrote on X:
“ETH Breaking above the $1.8K level and saw some good continuation so far. The market structure has flipped back to bullish on this timeframe.”
He added that the next major high-timeframe resistance sits near the $2,100 region, while maintaining $1,800 as support remains critical for bullish momentum.
Another closely followed trader, Ted Pillows, believes the next milestone could arrive quickly if buyers defend current levels. “$ETH has fully reclaimed its key resistance level. If Ethereum manages to hold above the $1,850 level, the pump towards $2,000 will be next,” he wrote.
Outside the charts, Ethereum continues to benefit from tightening on-chain supply. A large share of circulating ETH remains locked in staking, limiting readily available exchange balances even as demand improves.
At the same time, regulatory progress surrounding U.S. crypto legislation and spot ETF adoption has kept institutional interest intact after several weeks of macro-driven volatility tied to Middle East tensions and government-linked crypto transfers.
Loss of $1,850 support would weaken the bullish case
Despite the improving setup, Ethereum still faces several hurdles before reclaiming $2,000. The liquidation heatmap shows heavy leveraged positioning between $1,900 and $1,950, where sellers may attempt to defend resistance. Failure to absorb that supply could trigger another round of profit-taking after the recent rally.
Macro risks also remain. Any resurgence in inflation, renewed geopolitical tensions that drive oil prices sharply higher, or unexpectedly hawkish comments from Federal Reserve officials could reverse sentiment across risk assets.
From a technical perspective, losing the newly reclaimed $1,850 support would invalidate the breakout and shift attention back toward $1,815, followed by the stronger demand zone around $1,750. As long as Ethereum continues to post higher highs while defending $1,850, however, the probability of a move toward $2,000 and potentially the $2,100-$2,190 resistance region remains favorable.
Disclosure: This article does not represent investment advice. The content and materials featured on this page are for educational purposes only.
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