Four years ago, on February 24 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced that his forces had begun a full-scale invasion of Ukraine – the reasons for which we have explored here. Within minutes, explosions were heard in major Ukrainian cities as Russian troops flooded across the border.
Russian forces made swift gains, capturing key areas near the capital of Kyiv. But the offensive soon stalled and, by December, Russia had been forced to withdraw its forces and consolidate in the east where the war has ground on ever since.
We asked Stefan Wolff, Tetyana Malyarenko, Scott Lucas and Mark Webber, four regular contributors to the Conversation UK’s coverage of Ukraine, for their take on the most surprising development of the war so far and its likely trajectory from here.
A very traditional war – with added drones
Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham; Tetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Security, and Jean Monnet, Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy
For us, the most surprising development remains Moscow’s decision to launch a large-scale ground invasion of Ukraine in the first place. Even though many Russian and western analysts expected a swift Ukrainian defeat, this always seemed unlikely from the perspective of Ukraine.
The mobilisation of Ukrainian society early on in the war testified to this and underlined that there was no realistic scenario under which the Kremlin could swiftly achieve its goals – to oust President Volodymyr Zelensky and “demilitarise” and “denazify” Ukraine.
Much less surprising was Russia’s transition to a war economy and a traditional war of attrition, which became a foregone conclusion as soon as Moscow’s plan for a victory parade in Kyiv within weeks of the full-scale invasion turned out to be a pipe dream.
Combat methods have evolved over the past four years, especially regarding the integration of drones. Russia has exploited drone technology to attack the whole range of critical infrastructure in Ukraine, not just military targets. But the foundation of Russian and then Soviet military doctrine – the use of mass armies and tactics of mass destruction – has remained untouched.
Moving forward, both sides have sufficient resources and external support to maintain the status quo. They will continue to fight each other in the hope of exhausting their opponent. But neither side is likely to reach this point of exhaustion soon. And until it does happen, political, economic and social stagnation in both Russia and Ukraine will continue to take its toll on their citizens.
Stringer / EPA
Putin’s hopes are pinned on Trump
Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University College Dublin
On the day the war broke out, I was in a discussion group of political and military analysts. When we got the news that Russian special forces had landed at the Hostomel airbase near Kyiv, each of us thought the capital would fall within a few weeks.
However, four years have passed and Ukraine now controls more territory than it did in June 2022. This is despite facing the second-most powerful military in the world, Russia’s disinformation assault and political warfare trying to split Europe, and abandonment by the Trump camp.
The Russian president’s unwillingness to give up his quest for Ukraine as part of a “Greater Russia” and the Trump camp’s willingness to sacrifice Ukrainian and European security are less of a surprise.
Putin made clear in an essay in 2021 that this would be his legacy project. So any soundbites about “peace around the corner” – particularly from Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – are cynical declarations or wishful thinking.
The Kremlin will not accept less than the seizure of all of the strategic Donetsk region, the rest of the country without effective security guarantees, and the fall of the Zelensky government. Putin cannot accept less because this would be the failure of his project at the cost of 1.3 million casualties and counting.
His hope is that Trump’s envoys will enable him to achieve what he cannot on the battlefield. The Trumpists do not believe in alliance but in transactional relationships, which is why the Kremlin is now dangling joint economic projects in front of the US government.
But, irrespective of this, I see no change in the war’s trajectory in the near future. A negotiated end to the invasion is close to impossible because of the Kremlin’s quest for “victory” through Kyiv’s capitulation. That capitulation is unlikely.
Russia has made only marginal advances on the ground. And Zelensky is maintaining his line over sovereignty, territory and security. Although Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been seriously damaged, most Ukrainians support continued resistance.
While cumbersome in its support, which has been complicated by pro-Kremlin figures like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, the EU is also stepping up its backing of Kyiv and partially filling the gap that has been left by Trump.
The Kremlin is facing a tightening of economic constraints on its quest. It is cutting social spending and increasing taxes to maintain the war. However, as there has been no widespread public pressure domestically that could curb the Kremlin’s ambitions, the invasion will grind on.
Ukraine’s 93rd Mechanized Brigade Press Service Handout / EPA
Two ways to overcome the stalemate
Mark Webber, Professor of International Politics, University of Birmingham
For me, the biggest surprise so far has been the resilience and adaptability of the Ukrainian war effort. Most observers, myself included, assumed in 2022 that the Ukrainians would buckle under the Russian onslaught.
Nato-led training programmes have undoubtedly been important for Ukrainian defenders. But seemingly more vital has been the determination provided by national identity. Putin’s 2022 claims that Ukraine had been committing genocide against Russian speakers and that its government was a neo-Nazi dictatorship were both spurious and counterproductive.
I too believe Russia’s war methods in Ukraine were grimly predictable. Waves of infantry assaults designed to overwhelm defences through sheer volume have been a recurring strategy in previous Russian military campaigns in Chechnya, Georgia and Syria.
But this strategy has resulted in a stalemate in Ukraine with the frontlines effectively frozen. There are two things that could alter this. The first is a change of approach by China, which has effectively subsidised Russia’s war effort through technology transfers and energy purchases.
Beijing could cut off some of the technology it provides Russia and exert pressure on Moscow to encourage flexibility in the peace negotiations. But, at present, it has no interest in abandoning Russia. Their alliance is a way of balancing the US and Nato in the global competition for influence.
The second possible agent of change is a massive armament effort on behalf of Ukraine. This would require Germany, France and Britain to boost already significant arms provisions and to allow their use in a manner that is not constrained by fears of escalation.
However, this scenario also seems unlikely. These three countries lack the domestic political imperative to back Ukraine to victory. And the US, which was overly cautious even under the presidency of Joe Biden, has now left the field of battle.
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