After Dublin: What the EU’s new asylum pact means for Britain?

Ali Ahmadi, Catherine Barnard and Fiona Costello look at the impact of changes to the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum that enters into force on 12 June.

The European Union’s (EU) Pact on Migration and Asylum (consisting of ten legislative measures) will apply from 12 June 2026. What changes will the Pact make and what impact (if any) will the changes have on UK asylum claims and irregular arrivals?

We shall focus on the replacement of the most well-known rule, the Dublin Regulation (in its most recent form, Dublin III), that has governed asylum responsibility in EU since 1990. The general rule under the Dublin Regulation was that the EU country where an asylum seeker first arrived was responsible for processing their asylum claim (although family reunion was given priority over the first country of entry principle). The Dublin system relied on Eurodac, a biometric database that stored fingerprints of asylum seekers and irregular arrivals across Europe, allowing EU states to identify whether someone had previously entered the EU irregularly or had claimed asylum elsewhere. They could then be transferred back to the responsible state.

While Dublin appeared to place disproportionate pressure on frontline states like Greece and Italy, transfers were slow and sometimes didn’t happen. For instance, between 2013 and 2022 only 11% of transfer requests (35,000 out of 310,000) were received back by Italy. As a result, some countries (e.g. Germany and France) received far more asylum claims via secondary movements (when asylum seekers move from the country in which they first arrive, to seek protection elsewhere).

To address this, the new Pact keeps the first-country-of-entry principle but introduces broader reforms including:

• Mandatory solidarity mechanism: Each year, at least 30,000 asylum seekers will be placed in a shared EU ‘Solidarity Pool’ and redistributed from countries under greater pressure to those receiving fewer asylum applications. Member states can either accept their allocated share of asylum seekers, pay €20,000 for each person they decline to relocate, or provide equivalent operational support.
• Mandatory border screening: All irregular arrivals at EU external borders must undergo identity, health, security, and vulnerability checks within seven days.
• Asylum border procedure: Some asylum seekers will have their claims processed through a fast-track border procedure under a ‘legal fiction of non-entry’ (i.e. they are treated as though they have not formally entered the EU, even while physically present). This allows authorities to restrict certain rights and detain individuals for up to 12 weeks while their claims are assessed. The procedure may be applied to any unauthorised arrival, but is mandatory for those unlikely to qualify for protection and/or pose a security risk.
• Border return procedure: Those who have been refused protection at the border procedure will be detained for an additional 12 weeks pending return.
• Expanded Eurodac: Eurodac will be expanded to include more people such as children aged 6 to 14, unauthorised migrants, those on temporary protection (except Ukrainians), and resettled refugees. It will also collect more data points such as facial images, IDs, and personal data, allowing it to track individual applicants rather than just applications.

Researchers argue that the Pact prioritises deterrence and border control over protection rights, particularly the asylum border procedure that involves detention (including families and children). Accelerated procedures in asylum are often associated with inaccurate decision making with consequences for asylum seekers, and potential knock-on effects on the appeal process. Crucially, the border procedure operates under a ‘legal fiction of non-entry’ that further limits asylum seekers’ rights. They may also struggle to access legal advice or gather evidence within short timeframes.

The impact of the Pact on irregular arrivals in EU remains contested. The new measures may discourage some irregular migrants and reduce secondary movement across Europe. However, deterrence-based asylum policies have historically produced mixed results. Research consistently suggests that the push of escaping conflict and persecution, and the pull of social networks, and historical/colonial ties are far stronger drivers of migration.

How might the Pact affect the UK?

Following Brexit, the UK ceased to be a party to the Dublin system and lost access to Eurodac, meaning that it can no longer check whether an asylum seeker has previously applied for asylum (or been refused) in another EU country. Under Dublin, the UK was able to transfer some asylum seekers back to EU states responsible for their claims while also receiving some asylum seekers from EU. Some asylum seekers have cited the UK’s non-participation in Dublin as a reason for attempting the Channel crossing in small boats.

Home Office officials want to have access back to Eurodac, describing it as a potential ‘gamechanger’. In 2020 (the final year that UK had access to the database), half of the 8,466 people who arrived by small boats had been flagged on Eurodac for irregular entry into the EU.

There is uncertainty as to how the new Pact may indirectly affect the UK. If asylum claims are rejected more quickly in Europe, some rejected applicants may attempt onward movement toward the UK. Conversely, stronger registration systems and increased border enforcement may reduce movement towards the north. The impact is likely to be uneven and shaped by external factors. At present, there is little evidence that the Pact will significantly reduce migratory pressures across Europe or at Calais.

The UK has signed some bilateral deals with France to reduce and return irregular arrivals. The ‘one in, one out’ (2025) pilot allows the return of some small boat arrivals to France in exchange for the UK accepting a similar number of pre-vetted individuals from France via a legal route. As of February 2026, 305 people were returned to France and 367 people arrived in the UK under the scheme.

A new agreement (2026) focuses on enhanced patrols, intelligence, and resources to prevent crossings. According to the Home Office, the UK-France joint cooperation has prevented 42,000 crossing attempts and facilitated some returns since 2024. However, these agreements are limited in scope and scale, and unable to manage rising irregular arrivals. In 2025, a total of 52,452 people arrived irregularly.

So, the new Pact is unlikely to significantly reduce irregular arrivals in Europe and the UK. Access to Eurodac would reduce the UK’s attractiveness for those seeking to avoid the EU’s asylum system. This, combined with safe legal routes, and enforcement against smugglers, would offer a better path to managing irregular migration while upholding international obligations.

By Ali Ahmadi, Research Associate, University of Cambridge and PhD student at Anglia Ruskin University, Catherine Barnard, Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe & Professor of EU Law and Employment Law, University of Cambridge and Fiona Costello, Assistant Professor, University of Birmingham.