Anne-Marie Trevelyan: Securing the arteries of trade and alliance

Anne-Marie Trevelyan is a former MP, Secretary of State for International Development, for Business and a former Foreign Office Minister.

The certainties in recent decades of unrestricted trade flows can no longer be assumed. Systems that have underpinned economic stability and collective security – open trade routes and predictable alliances – are under increasing strain. And, as ever, when systems are tested, the question becomes not only how resilient they are, but how prepared we are to adapt.

There are two key concerns – the growing vulnerability of global maritime chokepoints, and the sharpened debate around defence spending within our alliances.  I have just returned from the 2026 Shangri‑La Dialogue in Singapore, where Defence Ministers from the Indo-Pacific region and NATO allies got chastised by the US Secretary of War Hegseth bluntly – if they are spending 3.5 per cent on defence, he considers them free-loaders. He’s not wrong – defence capability to assure deterrent effect doesn’t come cheap, and unless we keep up with investment our enemies will outsmart, outdesign and outbuild us.

Security and prosperity are more tightly interwoven than at any point in recent history – we cannot hope for economic growth unless we protect our present economic activity, our critical national infrastructure and our citizens.

Global trade remains overwhelmingly maritime. 80 per cent of trade by volume moves by sea, carried across waterways with a number of narrow passages. These chokepoints – Hormuz, Suez, Malacca, Bab el‑Mandeb – are the critical arteries of the global economy.

And those arteries are increasingly exposed. The most world’s most important energy chokepoint is the Strait of Hormuz, carrying one-fifth of the global oil supply. The Suez Canal accounts for 12 per cent of global trade flows, efficiently linking Asia and Europe. The Strait of Malacca sees 30 per cent of global trade pass through its narrow waters. This concentration of maritime traffic through narrow geography has delivered efficiency – but at a price. Disruption at any one of these points has immediate and disproportionate consequences.

The implication is stark: the global economy is not only interconnected – it is exposed.  This exposure is the product of decades of optimisation: faster routes, lower costs, just‑in‑time supply chains. But optimisation without redundancy creates fragility. When disruption comes, alternatives that exist come with significant cost, delay, and strategic consequence. A determined disrupter, whether Iranian drones attacking oil tankers, or Chinese coercive control and limiting of critical minerals can crash markets or closes businesses. Our stable economies are not resilient, our national assets are not secure, our children’s future security is not assured.

So what must we do to provide the global leadership the world expects of a responsible Britain?

Economic growth can only be our central priority if economic security is assured. Our economy must have strong foundations: businesses that can thrive and the right skills for our kids’ futures. But none of that matters if we can’t protect our critical infrastructure, undersea cables, our hospitals, energy and water supplies, and our trade routes.

Trade is critical. The UK is an outward-looking island nation, and we should focus on the opportunities that Brexit gave us to celebrate and strengthen ‘Global Britain’ – our future prosperity depends on our ability to trade with the rest of the world. What are the key elements of this security? It is about the three Fs – food on the shelves, fuel in the tank, and the phones in our hands.

The UK relies significantly on imports – from meat to fresh produce, medicines and consumer goods. When chokepoints are disrupted, the first effect is delay. Ships arriving late mean reduced stock in distribution centres. That translates quickly into empty shelves or reduced choice in supermarkets. COVID made that evident for the first time (remember pasta and loo roll stockpiling); and then chokepoint disruption or blockage adds time, fuel, and insurance costs, all of which are passed through the supply chain. The Ukraine war starkly reminded the world that 40 per cent of its fertiliser came from the Ukrainian shores – and farms in the poorest nations were hardest hit. The impact on inputs has a longer tail of cost than the direct first hit of price spikes or shortage.

Where food shortages emerge gradually, fuel impacts are almost immediate. Global energy markets are highly sensitive to chokepoint risk. Around 20 per cent of global oil and significant volumes of LNG pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Disruption triggers a rapid market response. Prices rise not only because of actual shortages, but because of perceived risk. So, regardless of real or imagined shortages, the price hikes. And the UK is hugely vulnerable because we import so much of our oil and gas. Not just for filling up the car, but for every business which needs energy to function. UK households, public and freight transport, manufacturing, and food production all become more expensive.

In short, when chokepoints fail, the cost of keeping homes warm, jobs secure and cars moving rises within days, not months. Those global impacts translate directly into domestic pressure – particularly in a country as trade-dependent as the UK. For UK citizens, the lesson is simple but sobering: chokepoints are not distant geopolitical concerns – they are critical enablers of everyday life.

In a world where narrow waterways carry the essentials of modern living, the risks associated with chokepoints can no longer be treated as peripheral. For British households, the consequences are immediate and tangible.  That is the reality – from resilience planning to defence spending – securing our trade routes is not only about safeguarding trade – it is about safeguarding the everyday stability on which all our citizens rely.