Besmira Manaj: Why the Western Balkans are central to Britain’s border security?

Besmira Manaj PhD is governance and geopolitics specialist, and a member of the UK Conservative Party, and Director of Conservatives Friends of Albania. 

Illegal migration is a symptom of weak governance and poor coordination, not the root cause.

The UK debate on illegal migration has become increasingly narrow. Too often, migration itself is treated as the core problem rather than the visible outcome of deeper failures in governance, security coordination and institutional weakness beyond Britain’s borders. This framing may offer political clarity, but it is not a strategy and it will not secure Britain’s borders.

Nowhere illustrates this more clearly than the Western Balkans. Too often treated as a peripheral foreign policy issue, the region has in fact become central to Britain’s long-term border security challenges. Weak institutions, fragmented coordination and entrenched organised crime networks shape migration routes long before anyone reaches the Channel.

For Conservatives serious about sovereignty, enforcement and national resilience, the Western Balkans should be understood as a frontline security issue not a distant diplomatic concern.

Britain’s border problem starts far from Britain.

Public attention understandably focuses on the final stage of irregular migration: small boats crossing the Channel. But this narrow focus obscures the upstream drivers that determine who reaches Europe in the first place and how.

The Western Balkans sit at the crossroads of key migration and trafficking routes into Western Europe. Weak border enforcement, politicised institutions, limited judicial capacity and corruption allow criminal networks to operate with relative ease. These networks facilitate irregular migration, human trafficking, drug smuggling and financial crime all of which ultimately affect the UK.

In recent years, citizens from the Western Balkans have featured prominently in UK asylum and illegal migration statistics. While economic motivations are often cited, the deeper drivers are governance-related: lack of institutional trust, limited economic opportunity and the presence of organised crime networks that profit from instability.

A Conservative migration policy that focuses solely on deterrence at the UK border without addressing these upstream conditions is incomplete by design.

Organised crime thrives where coordination fails.

The Western Balkans remain one of Europe’s most persistent hubs for organised crime. Criminal groups operating in the region are highly networked, technologically agile and deeply embedded in weak state structures. Where institutions lack capacity or independence, criminal actors step in.

This is not an abstract regional problem. Balkan based criminal networks are directly linked to illicit markets in the UK, particularly in drugs, trafficking and financial crime. Fragmented intelligence sharing, weak judicial cooperation and inconsistent enforcement across Europe make these networks harder to disrupt.

For Conservatives, this should be a warning sign. Law and order cannot stop at national borders. Border control without coordination is not control at all.

There are limits to what a technocratic EU can do.

For decades, the dominant response to instability in the Western Balkans has been EU enlargement orthodoxy: long accession processes, technical benchmarks and compliance checklists. While this approach has delivered surface level reforms, it has failed to produce deep institutional resilience or genuine political accountability.

In practice, technocratic conditionality has too often rewarded box-ticking over substance. This has fuelled public frustration, elite capture and declining trust in institutions creating fertile ground for criminality, emigration and external influence.

The UK, no longer bound by EU frameworks, has an opportunity to engage differently. A Conservative foreign policy should avoid replicating Brussels’ bureaucratic instincts and instead focus on targeted, outcome driven engagement aligned with British interests.

Geopolitical competition fills the vacuum.

Where governance is weak and Western engagement is incoherent, other actors move in. Russia, China and Turkey have all expanded their influence in the Western Balkans, exploiting political fragmentation and institutional vulnerability.

Russia leverages energy dependency and disinformation. China offers infrastructure finance with limited transparency and long-term dependency risks. Turkey projects influence through cultural and economic ties. None prioritise rule of law, accountability or institutional independence in ways that align with UK security interests.

Geopolitical competition amplifies instability. Influence gained through weak governance does not stabilise regions it entrenches dependency and undermines reform. A Conservative approach must be clear-eyed: influence is secured through sustained engagement, not declarations.

Migration is a symptom, not the disease.

Treating migration itself as the primary problem risks a serious misdiagnosis. Migration is a symptom of governance failure, economic stagnation and institutional decay. Without addressing those causes, enforcement measures will continue to chase effects rather than resolve drivers.

This does not mean abandoning firm border control. Conservatives are right to insist on enforcement, deterrence and clear rules. But enforcement alone cannot compensate for weak coordination and upstream failure.

Blame without coordination offers political noise, not policy results.

So what should a Conservative strategy prioritise?

First, the UK should prioritise security and governance cooperation with Western Balkan states. Support for border management, judicial reform, anti-corruption bodies and intelligence-sharing delivers direct returns for UK security.

Second, the UK should pursue bilateral and flexible engagement, working with reform-minded institutions and leaders rather than relying on rigid frameworks that reward form over substance.

Third, public–private partnerships should be used more strategically. Investment in energy security, infrastructure and employment reduces the economic drivers of emigration while reinforcing accountability through market discipline.

Finally, migration policy must be integrated into foreign and security policy thinking. Border control is not just a domestic issue it is a strategic challenge that begins far beyond Britain’s coastline.

This is a test of Conservative seriousness.

The Western Balkans are not a peripheral concern. They are a test of Conservative realism in foreign and security policy: whether Britain can pursue an approach rooted in competence, coordination and national interest rather than slogans.

Blaming migration may be easy. Fixing weak governance and poor coordination is harder but it is the only route to durable border control and genuine security.

If Conservatives want to secure Britain’s borders, they must be willing to look beyond them.