Can Greenland join the EU?

Catherine Barnard and Denzil Davidson look at the legal process Greenland would have to follow if it were to decide to try and rejoin the EU, as well as the potential political obstacles.

On 13 January 2026, Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen stood beside his Danish counterpart and told the world: ‘We choose the Kingdom of Denmark, we choose the EU, we choose NATO.’ It is not clear that Mr Nielsen meant that by choosing the EU he wanted Greenland to become part of the EU again, but if he did, what would it mean and how would it happen?

Greenland is a self-governing territory of Denmark; Denmark remains responsible for Greenland’s security and defence. In the 1951 Defence of Greenland Agreement with Denmark, the US unambiguously recognises ‘the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark’ over Greenland.

When Greenland was still part of Denmark, it, like the rest of Denmark, was subject to all EU law following Danish accession to the EU in 1973. However, after gaining home rule in 1979, and following a consultative referendum, Greenland left the EU in 1985. The Greenland Treaty of 1985 made it one of the EU’s overseas countries and territories (OCTs), now covered by Article 355 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

For our purposes, Article 355 identifies two groups of countries.

The first, described as Outer Regions (ORs), consist of the French overseas territories, such as Guadeloupe and Martinique, but also the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands. As the Commission says ‘Despite the thousands of kilometres separating them from the European continent, these regions are an integral part of the EU. Therefore, EU law and all the rights and duties associated with EU membership apply to the outermost regions.’ In addition, Article 349 provides for ‘specific measures’ to be taken by the EU to address their ‘structural social and economic situation’ which is ‘compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, economic dependence on a few products’.

The second, the OCTs, which includes Greenland (but also some of the Dutch territories), are subject to ‘special arrangements’ set out in Part Four TFEU and the Overseas Association Decision. According to Article 198 TFEU, the purpose of association is ‘to promote the economic and social development’ of the territories and ‘to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole’. This is done by conferring advantages on the OCTs, which consist mainly of customs exemptions on imports into the EU of products originating in the OCTs. Greenlanders also continue to be Union citizens by virtue of being Danish citizens.

There is an additional provision in respect of Greenland on fish (Article 204 TFEU and Protocol 34), which has been used to maintain EU quotas in Greenland’s waters in return for a financial contribution. Tariff-free access for Greenlandic fisheries products to the internal market is subject to an agreement between the two parties. There is a separate Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the EU and Denmark and the Home Rule Government of Greenland.

Can Greenland join the EU? Since it is not a ‘state’ it cannot formally join under the general accession process under Article 49 TEU. However, it can move from OCT to OR status, meaning that it would again become part of the EU. As an OR, Greenland would become subject to provisions of the EU Treaties and may benefit from Article 349 ‘specific measures’, but it would not have the independent voting rights of a full member state.

The shift from OCT to OR is done via the simplified process in Article 355(6) TFEU, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty where the European Council may, on the initiative of, in this case, Denmark, and acting unanimously after consulting the Commission, ‘adopt a decision’ amending Greenland’s OCT status. Mayotte, a French island between Madagascar and the African continent, most recently changed from OCT to OR status.

That’s the law. What about the politics?

There are two potential obstacles to Greenland becoming an OR: opposition from President Trump’s European allies and access to fisheries. Because Article 355(6) TFEU requires unanimity, just one government seeking to curry favour with President Trump, such as Hungary’s, could block the process. Hungary did, after all, block a joint EU statement on Greenland. Hungary would pay a high political price for a veto, which would translate into potential costs for its access to EU funds, but it is a price it has been willing to pay in the past.

Access to fisheries would be the bigger problem. A leading reason why Greenland left the then EEC in 1985 was to gain control over its fisheries resources. Becoming an OR would reopen the fisheries question, and one of Brexit’s many lessons is the political importance of fisheries is out of all proportion to its economic weight. Once it became known that there was an opportunity to win greater access to rich fishing grounds, some might demand this as the price of admission.

But fisheries remains by far Greenland’s most important industry, providing over 90% of its exports and 15% of employment, making it the largest private sector industry. It may be imagined that Greenland would want to maintain autonomy over its fishing policy under Article 204 TFEU and Protocol 34 and keep the current requirement for Greenlandic operators to be wholly Greenlandic-owned. There is the further complication that because the EU-Greenland and EU-Norway fisheries agreements are interrelated, a change to the status of one could affect the other. This would all be the subject of negotiations.

Other issues are not likely to cause problems. Greenland’s Inuit population is already covered by an EU exemption permitting them to place seal products on the market. It would be expected that Greenlanders could continue to hunt and consume whales as Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling under the International Whaling Commission’s regulations and, since Greenland does not export whale products commercially, this should not be a negotiating problem for Greenland’s re-entry.

Denmark could address other matters unilaterally: following Spain v United Kingdom (Case C-145/04) Denmark could enfranchise Greenlanders to vote in European parliamentary elections. Denmark could also follow the British precedent from its time as a member state of letting ministers from Scotland’s devolved government attend Fisheries councils.

So, although the legal process for Greenland to rejoin the EU would be relatively straightforward, the policy questions at stake mean that the re-entry would not be guaranteed or without difficulty. Whether Greenlanders decide that it should be attempted, and how such an attempt would be received in Washington, will be an important question for the geopolitics of the High North and the EU’s role in it.

By Catherine Barnard, Professor in European Union Law and Employment Law, University of Cambridge and Denzil Davidson, Director, Global Counsel.