Can the National Rally’s Jordan Bardella become the next French president?

Looking ahead to France’s 2027 presidential election, John Ryan explores what the prospect of a Rassemblement National win under Jordan Bardella could mean politically for both France and the EU. 

A Jordan Bardella presidency would represent the most significant reconfiguration of executive power since the Fifth Republic’s founding. Even without a radical policy rupture, the symbolic impact on democratic norms and institutional trust would be profound. For the EU, the risk lies less in immediate withdrawal or obstruction than in gradual divergence.

France’s 2027 presidential election could mark a decisive break in the country’s post-war political settlement. In March 2025, Marine Le Pen was convicted for misuse of EU funds — resulting in a five-year ban from standing for office. This has accelerated a succession process within the far-right Rassemblement National (RN), or National Rally. The party’s president, Jordan Bardella, has positioned himself as her successor. In first-round voting intentions, he currently polls at levels comparable to Le Pen herself.

The prospect of a Bardella candidacy raises urgent questions for French democracy and European politics. While the so-called ‘republican front’ has historically prevented the far right from winning national office, its durability is increasingly in doubt. Public distrust of mainstream parties, the erosion of traditional coalition norms, and the normalisation of RN’s leadership and discourse suggest that 2027 could become a watershed election.

Since the early 2000s, French politics has relied on an informal cordon sanitaire to block the far right from power. This ‘republican front’ has functioned through tactical voting and cross-party alliances, particularly in second-round presidential and legislative contests. However, successive elections since 2017 indicate that this mechanism is weakening.

President Emmanuel Macron’s failure to secure a parliamentary majority in 2022 marked a turning point. That election confirmed the RN as a permanent force rather than a protest movement after the National Rally party went from 8 seats to 89. The European Parliament and National Assembly elections of 2024 reinforced this trend.

Public perceptions of Macron have played a significant role in this realignment. Critics increasingly associate his presidency with technocratic arrogance, limited empathy, and an inability to deliver on core voter concerns such as public order, immigration, and social cohesion. Over seven years, repeated episodes of unrest and persistent concerns about illegal immigration have fuelled dissatisfaction, strengthening the RN’s appeal as an anti-system alternative.

As trust in mainstream politics erodes, the ‘republican front’ appears less capable of mobilising voters against the RN. While it remains operational for now, its future effectiveness — particularly in a highly polarised second-round contest — can no longer be taken for granted. 

Marine Le Pen’s disqualification from office has had further political effects. On 31 March 2025, Le Pen was convicted for large-scale embezzlement of European Parliament funds. This represents a structural shock to French politics. The sentence — four years in prison (two suspended), a €100,000 fine, and an immediate five-year ban from standing for public office — effectively removes her from the 2027 race unless overturned on appeal.

Jordan Bardella represents both continuity and rupture. Closely associated with Le Pen’s leadership, he has demonstrated loyalty to her during the legal proceedings, denouncing the verdict as a ‘democratic scandal’. At the same time, his profile differs markedly from that of the Le Pen dynasty that has dominated the far right for five decades.

Bardella is telegenic, media-savvy, and popular among younger voters. His recent autobiography has become a bestseller; and he has invested heavily in cultivating relationships with business leaders and international actors. Elements of the conservative establishment increasingly view him as a figure capable of unifying the fragmented right. This, of course, has drawn explicit comparisons with Giorgia Meloni in Italy.

For voters historically repelled by Marine Le Pen’s confrontational style, Bardella appears more palatable. In February 2025, Steve Bannon allegedly performing a Nazi salute, Bardella cancelled an appearance at the US Conservative Political Action Conference. His decision reinforces attempts to distance himself from overt extremism and transatlantic illiberal networks.

However, Bardella’s lack of executive experience remains a significant vulnerability. He has never held ministerial office, and his authority within the party is not uncontested. The RN’s old guard continues to wield influence, and internal competition may yet emerge from within the Le Pen family. The likeliest candidate is Marion Maréchal (Le Pen’s niece), who could seek to reclaim her political inheritance after the collapse of Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête movement. Marion Maréchal may take some right-wing votes from Bardella but will not be able to proceed to the second round of the Presidential election in 2027.

So, Bardella appears well positioned to reach the second round of the presidential election. But can he win it? French presidential elections are structurally different from parliamentary contests: personality, perceived competence, and coalition-building capacity matter disproportionately. Historically, the RN has struggled to broaden its appeal beyond its core electorate in second-round run-offs. Even at the height of Le Pen’s popularity in 2022, the ‘republican front’ proved sufficient to block her path to the Elysée. Whether Bardella can overcome this barrier remains uncertain.

Two factors work in his favour. First, the weakening legitimacy of anti-RN coalitions may reduce second-round mobilisation against him. Second, his generational and stylistic break from the Le Pen name could attract centrist or conservative voters seeking change without disruption. For European policymakers, this raises a dilemma: a Bardella presidency might pursue strategic discretion rather than outright confrontation with EU partners. This would risk complicating collective foreign policy coordination rather than openly undermining it.

Whether Bardella ultimately wins or loses, his candidacy signals the end of the National Rally’s political quarantine in France. For policymakers in Paris, Brussels, and beyond, the priority must now be to understand — and respond to — the structural conditions enabling this shift, rather than assuming or hoping that inherited safeguards will continue to hold.

By John Ryan, Network Research Fellow at CESifo, Munich and former Fellow at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics and Political Science.