Care workers and Indefinite Leave to Remain

Alan Manning reflects on the government’s proposal to change the rules for migrants to obtain Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) and its impact, using the example of migrants working in the care sector.

On 20 November the Home Secretary published A Fairer Pathway to Settlement, proposing changes (subject to consultation) to the rules for obtaining permanent residence, known in the UK as Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). The underlying principle claimed that settlement should be earned, a privilege not a right, and too little had been asked in the past of many migrants before granting ILR. The government ruled out taking away ILR from those already with it as promised by Reform UK.

The rules for new cohorts of migrants may, for the managed part of migration, be less dramatic than claimed by the policy’s supporters and opponents. Although the starting point for settlement is increased from the current 5 to 10 years, the proposals allow for shorter and longer periods.  Most of those on the Skilled Worker and Health and Care Visas will qualify after 5 years given the recent changes to skill and salary requirements for entry, as will the partners of British citizens which is most of the Family visas. Those on the Global Talent Visa will have to wait only 3 years. There are big changes, however, for those who claim asylum, especially those who arrived in the UK without authorisation.

More controversial are the proposals to apply the new rules to migrants already in the country on a path to settlement. While not promised a path to ILR on the old terms, many migrants have come with that expectation, and it is generally a bad idea to change immigration rules mid-stream. A country that acquires a reputation for moving goalposts may find it harder to attract the migrants it wants.

The government estimates (plausibly) that under the current rules the numbers applying for ILR will almost triple current numbers to 450,000 in 2028.  And that there will be costs to giving ILR to this cohort of migrants.

Singled out are the 616,000 care workers and their dependents who came in the years 2022-2024, likely the largest group affected by the proposed changes.

I have argued elsewhere the social care visa was poorly designed and had to go. Implementation was even worse – in 2024 the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration published an excoriating report on the visa, finding that “275 certificates of sponsorship being granted to a care home that did not exist, and 1,234 certificates being granted to a company that stated it had only four employees when given a licence”. Exploitation of workers is rife.

For jobs where employers’ demand for migrants comes from the fact that pay and conditions are not attractive enough to recruit and retain enough local workers – and everyone agrees this is the case in social care – a basic principle of visa design is that, though these visas alleviate short-term problems, this comes with at the cost of longer-term problems that crystallise if large numbers of care workers get ILR.

To understand why, consider how ILR changes options for those who came on a care worker visa. They are no longer tied to the employer who sponsored their visa and they are now eligible to apply for welfare benefits.

If they remain in social care their low level of earnings (50% earn less than £25k) may mean they receive sizeable welfare benefits when eligible. How much depends on whether they have a partner, how much their partner is earning (statistics suggest they are even lower-paid) and whether there are children. We don’t have great statistics on how much these migrants would be entitled to but we can use benefits calculators to give examples. A care assistant earning about £25k a year with one dependent child but no partner and rent of £1k a month could expect to get about £12k a year in welfare benefits.  A care worker who looked cheap when they first arrived (though only if one did not factor in the cost of educating their children) now looks expensive. But if they had a partner who also earned £25k then they would only be entitled to about £3k a year in benefits. The welfare cost of ILR depends a lot on circumstances and we do not have information to know exactly what would happen.

The welfare bill would be lower if migrants’ earnings rise when they receive ILR. But, given low levels of pay progression, that would almost certainly mean leaving the care sector. The visa then only gave a short-term fix to the recruitment and retention problem in social care. Someone who came as a care worker for 5 years might have another 40 years doing something else.

And there is no requirement to work at all post-ILR. That might be a particular problem for the tens of thousands of migrants who came on care worker visas to find there was no work for them. In spite of government attempts, few seem to have found alterative employers.

By extending the period of settlement, the government will probably save money on the welfare bill and avoid workers quitting social care, but at the cost of changing rules mid-stream. There is an additional cost: child poverty. Children in low-earning migrant households with no recourse to public funds will be growing up in some of the poorest households in the UK.

So, the government finds itself in a very difficult position with no attractive option. The government seems aware of this when they say “we particularly welcome views on how the development of an earned settlement system should take account of children” – but is not sure how to handle this consequence of the ill-advised policy of Boris Johnson’s government in 2021 to open visas up to care workers (and some other jobs with earnings barely above the minimum wage). For jobs that are badly-paid you should have temporary visas (with no rights to bring dependents) or none at all (my preference in this case). As I have argued in my recent book, immigration policy is often hard.

By Alan Manning, Professor of Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science.