Dangerously toxic: why ‘Europe’ weighs less in British public opinion than in Northern Ireland

Katy Hayward and David Phinnemore consider why voters in Northern Ireland have stronger convictions and opinions on Brexit – in both directions, and the political implications of this.

The most recent polling conducted on behalf of UK in a Changing Europe and the Policy Institute at King’s College London has shown that the British public have become more doubtful about Brexit – both in principle and in practice. The gap between those who think calling the 2016 referendum was the right rather than the wrong decision (43% to 38%) is much narrower than it was (66% to 24%). Relatedly, most people (48%) think Brexit is going worse than they expected and a similar proportion would like to see a second referendum within five years (compared to 27% who would not).

These and other polls are often read as reflecting the popular mood nationwide. However, polling companies generally only survey voters in Great Britain, i.e. England, Scotland and Wales. Not included in the results are the views of voters in Northern Ireland, which is, of course, the part of the United Kingdom where Brexit has had some of its most significant economic and political impacts, as attested to by the contestation around an ‘Irish Sea border’ that ran from on-street loyalist protests to EU infringement proceedings against the UK.

Over the last five years, we have been ‘temperature testing’ public opinion in Northern Ireland on various aspects of Brexit, notably the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland – now the ‘Windsor Framework’. In our most recent poll (April 2026) we asked questions aligned with some of those put recently to voters in Great Britain. Generally speaking, we find that voters in Northern Ireland have stronger convictions and opinions on Brexit – in both directions.

The strength of opinion in Northern Ireland may reflect the intense ways in which Brexit has played out for the region, with implications for both unionism and nationalism. Relatedly, it may also be a consequence of the fact that many aspects of Brexit are viewed through the lens of identity politics. For the majority of voters in Northern Ireland, their Brexit-related identity is ‘very important’ to them: 57% of Leavers and 53% Remainers. Moreover, on most questions there are clear differences between those who identify as unionist (generally supportive of Brexit and wary of closer EU-UK relations) and nationalists (plus those who are ‘neither’) who take the opposite view.

In Northern Ireland there has been comparatively less overall movement in ten years on the question of membership of the EU. There have, however, been notable reversals of majority views in England where, excluding ‘don’t knows’, 60% support rejoining the EU compared to 47% voting Remain in 2016 and in Wales (65% v 48%), and a strengthening of the pro-EU position in Scotland (74% v 62%). In Northern Ireland, our polling shows that, excluding ‘don’t knows’,  62% in Northern Ireland are in favour of rejoining the EU, which is far less of an increase on the Remain vote (56%) a decade ago than in other parts of the UK.

One explanation may be found in the way that, as noted above, Brexit has reinforced identity-based divisions in Northern Ireland. Whereas in 2016, 34% of unionists voted Remain, only 18% of unionists believe the UK should rejoin the EU; 73% oppose the idea. Meanwhile, 85% of nationalists and 88% of neutrals (i.e. identifying as neither nationalist nor unionist) would like the UK to rejoin. These would suggest that our finding of 62% today wishing to rejoin comes as a result not so much of unchanging positions but polarising ones, i.e. unionists are more trenchantly pro-Brexit and nationalists/others are more staunchly anti-Brexit than they were a decade ago.

Such polarised views are extremely significant in Northern Ireland, and not just in terms of its constitutional and political future. They are also reflected – and to a greater extent – in responses to a question that has every possibility of being the ‘next Brexit’: whether the UK should leave the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), a core policy of both Reform UK and the Conservatives. This matters for Northern Ireland since the application there of the ECHR is a legal requirement under the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.

In Great Britain, 75% of voters have a view on whether the UK should leave the ECHR: 29% agree, 46% disagree. In Northern Ireland, our polling shows 94% have a view: 36% support the UK leaving the ECHR, 58% disagree, with almost half of all voters (49%) ‘strongly’ of that view. Here again, voters are split on along identity lines. Almost three quarters of unionists (73%) support the UK leaving the ECHR; 91% of nationalists are opposed, as are 86% of neutrals. The strength of polarised opinion is also greater in Northern Ireland than the rest of the UK, with 74% of Leave voters here compared to 61% of Leave voters in Great Britain wanting out of the ECHR.

This stands as a warning to political leaders in the UK. Whatever direction they choose to take for the UK in its relations with the EU and on the ECHR, the ramifications for a polarised Northern Ireland will be intensely felt and difficult to manage. If Brexit was a genie most people in the UK regret releasing, those with their hands on the next bottle marked ‘Taking back control’ need to think very carefully about Northern Ireland before they twist the cap to release whatever is inside.

By Katy Hayward, Professor of Political Sociology, and David Phinnemore, Professor of European Politics, Queen’s University Belfast.