Deri Hughes: International law won’t keep us safe

Deri Hughes is a private investor and former parliamentary assistant.

The recent expiry of the New START treaty has generated a flurry of headlines and commentary. Granted, there is much else to ponder in the world at this time, but the treaty’s expiry is certainly worthy of some attention. 

 The more neurotic Western commentary has focussed on the apparent dangers of a “new arms race”. This is an echo of concerns that were expressed loudly during the Cold War, particularly in the 1980s. In truth, the arms race concept has been thoroughly over-egged for decades. Nevertheless, it lives on.  

 As was the case for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Russians are quite happy to stoke Western neurosis. The primary benefit, from their perspective, is that there is a Western tendency for fear of nuclear weapons to be channelled into advocacy for disarmament, and for a less robust stance against Russian interests. The secondary benefit, which is more recent, is that it gives the Russians something with which to bargain at Ukraine’s expense. That is not to say that such a gambit or opportunism will necessarily succeed; merely that the Russians are mindful of the potential benefits. 

 New START was the latest in a series of strategic weapons agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, and later Russia. For decades, they covered two states whose number of nuclear weapons greatly exceeded that of any other country. Accordingly, the treaties’ bilateral status was not much of a limitation. However, that has changed. 

 China has embarked upon a very ambitious nuclear weapons development and deployment programme, with particular emphasis upon the type of weapons covered by New START (not all nuclear weapons were included within its scope). China’s aim is not difficult to discern. It likely intends to achieve approximate strategic parity with the United States, thereby leaving it better placed to act upon its designs in the Pacific, should it choose to do so.  

 This explains the American reticence to replace New START on a like-for-like basis. The lack of limits on Chinese weapons numbers has left the United States in an unhappy position. The Americans must take into account the obvious risk that China and Russia might wage war against it in league. Keeping American and Russian weapons numbers static while the Chinese force grows briskly has weakened America’s position, and could ultimately have posed a serious threat.  

The stated American position is that only a multilateral treaty, particularly one covering China, would be an acceptable replacement for New START. Rather predictably, the Russians have reacted by insisting that any multilateral treaty should cover Britain and France. They appear not to be so keen to insist upon Chinese inclusion, although their private views are probably rather different; one of the few blessings of the current geopolitical position is that the Russian and Chinese regimes are mutually suspicious and xenophobic.  

 As it is, China appears to have no intention of placing itself under such restrictions. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a multilateral treaty will materialise in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the prospect is worthy of consideration in Britain. 

 The Russian reference to British and French nuclear weapons capabilities points to an obvious risk. The Soviets had form for proposing arms control agreements once they deemed that their own position had been strengthened relative to the Western one. The Russians are no different. They would seek to ensure that native British and French nuclear weapons capabilities are capped at a level markedly inferior to the Russian one.  

 For as long as the American commitment to European security is maintained, such a result would not necessarily be problematic. It would be little different from the current situation. It would also echo the position in the late 1970s and 1980s, when improved Soviet and Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons capabilities below the “strategic” level prompted the United States to strengthen Western Europe’s position in that respect.       

 However, it ought to be painfully apparent that the American commitment cannot be taken for granted. This applies at the grand strategic level, i.e. a formal alliance and strong shared interests, but also at a lower level, particularly the continued American deployment of “tactical” nuclear weapons in Europe. This includes the effective loan of American-made weapons to certain other NATO members. Neither element can necessarily be relied upon indefinitely, and both could be abandoned.  

 The most obvious risk is that an “America First” flavoured administration would do so, but a future left wing administration might act similarly. Both types could do so for various reasons, including a desire to make concessions on Europe’s behalf in pursuit of an agreement with Russia. Such an agreement could be in the context of multilateral arms control negotiations, but could equally be shaped by other motives, e.g. reaching a settlement following a war of conquest waged by the Russians.  

 With that in mind, the Starmer government’s policy on the RAF’s future nuclear weapons capability ought to raise eyebrows. They have opted to join the American weapons lending arrangement, rather than returning to the condition whereby the RAF operated British-made nuclear gravity bombs. It is possible that capacity constraints at the AWE have made the development of a new British weapon unfeasible for the time being. If so, borrowing American weapons is a reasonable step, but it is not desirable in the long term; and if there are indeed capacity constraints at the AWE, they should be resolved at something better than a glacial pace. 

 A multilateral arms control process ought to be regarded with wariness in Britain. It is highly unlikely that an agreement that would satisfy Russia would be in Britain’s interests (or Europe’s, for that matter). British nuclear weapons capabilities are too modest as it is. A “minimum credible deterrent” is not appropriate under current conditions, and is likely to become even less appropriate in the coming years. Russia’s fondness for nuclear weapons is as strong as ever, and China is manifestly keen to start catching up with both America and Russia. 

 However, the British political class as a whole could not be relied upon to resist an adverse multilateral agreement. As usual, the CND tendency is alive and well in Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and in the newer gang of useful idiots, namely the Greens. Nevertheless, the greater danger likely lies in adoration of the totems of whatever qualifies as “international law”. That tendency is obviously very strong in the Starmer government, starting with the man himself. The Chagos Islands debacle is a standing reminder of that. 

 In contrast, the Conservatives have a strong track record on these matters, notwithstanding some unwise decisions made during the Coalition era (beware Lib Dems bearing influence). Conservatives ought to be vigilant, and should be mindful of the need to establish policy whilst in opposition. They might also teach Reform a few things as to how a natural party of government ought to think about such matters.