Politics
emergency services let people die
An inquiry into the deaths of at least 30 people who drowned while trying to cross the English Channel in 2021 has found that emergency services could have prevented the deaths.
On November 24, 2021, the dinghy they were travelling on started to fill with water and capsized. To date, it is the deadliest small boat disaster on record in the English Channel.
Only two of the people on board survived. Emergency services found them nearly 12 hours after they called for help.
In total, authorities found 27 bodies and confirmed another four people were missing.
Channel crossing: a damning inquiry.
The inquiry found that staff numbers across the national network at HM Coastguard were “above what was required”. However, the recommended seasonal staffing at MRCC Dover is three operational staff for search and rescue. Importantly, this number “was not satisfied”. The inquiry found:
The only fully qualified staff member working in the search and rescue team at MRCC Dover that night was the Search and Rescue Mission Co-ordinator (SMC). The two others in the SMC’s team that night were trainees: one was partially qualified but deemed to be operational, and the other was non operational.
Shockingly, these staffing pressures meant that the SMC was unable to take a break. This:
unsurprisingly left him feeling overwhelmed and fatigued. The short staffing also resulted in an absence of appropriate supervision for the non-operational trainee, who was called on to undertake operational tasks.
Moreover, both Border Force Maritime and the RNLI lacked sufficient resources to deal with the situation.
Despite a seemingly healthy number of surface assets available on the night of 23 to 24 November 2021, HM Coastguard and Border Force were reluctant to deploy more than one, as this would have reduced the availability of an already insufficient number of assets on the following day.
A surveillance aircraft that should have provided “critical intelligence” also did not launch due to poor weather. Of course, there was no contingency plan.
Additionally, authorities missed calls and texts from the boat, or did not follow them up. This, combined with the widely held belief that the people on the boat were exaggerating their distress, meant that the coastguard underestimated the urgency of the situation.
To make matters worse, HM Coastguard did not inform the helicopter searching the area to look for people in the water. The report states:
There were problems with the search undertaken by the helicopter R163. Based on the drift analyses commissioned by the MAIB, it is likely that the area covered by R163’s search contained the swamped small boat. However, its search was not effective for locating a swamped small boat or people in the water. R163 was not tasked to incident ‘Charlie’ specifically and was not informed by HM Coastguard that it was to locate a sinking small boat or people in the water. The captain of R163 told the Inquiry that if he had been informed that there were people in the water, “that does change things”. Instead, R163 was tasked to look for the multiple small boats that were believed to be in a similar area.
Ultimately, authorities and emergency services could have prevented all of the deaths. The inquiry report concludes:
As the analysis makes clear, the flaws in HM Coastguard’s decision-making were systemic. In particular they are attributable to the inordinate pressure on HM Coastguard staff at MRCC Dover handling search and rescue for small boats, the absence of effective supervision of those staff, the limitations of the remote working model to assist them, and the belief which had developed among HM Coastguard personnel that callers from small boats regularly exaggerated their level of distress.