European strategic autonomy needs much deeper EU-UK defence cooperation

Simon Sweeney looks at the new defence agreement between the UK and Norway, as well as wider UK-EU defence cooperation.

The recent UK-Norway Lunna House agreement on naval cooperation to protect sub-sea infrastructure from Russian attack is welcome news. It will assist European resilience against Russian interference. It is, however, an example of the UK’s preferred approach to security-related diplomacy, based in bilateralism and military cooperation with NATO allies. The UK is less inclined towards defence engagement with the EU, and the recent failure of the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) negotiations showed that there are obstacles on both sides. However, more cooperation between London and Brussels would benefit European security as a whole and should not become an afterthought.

Even as an EU member state, Britain was often reluctant to back the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy. After the Brexit referendum, Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson ensured that the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement excluded security and defence. His successor Liz Truss couldn’t decide if France was friend or foe, and Rishi Sunak achieved little to advance the UK’s security relationship with the EU.

Relations with France even deteriorated under Sunak. The AUKUS submarine treaty between the UK, Australia and the US ended French hopes for a lucrative submarine contract with Australia.

Nevertheless, France knows the UK is essential to European defence. London has led the European response to the Ukraine crisis, and has no alternative but to stay involved, as Russia is as much a threat to British interests as to NATO members further east. The UK-Norway agreement is testimony to this, as is British participation in NATO’s Forward Land Force in Estonia.

Britain is still hesitant about formal ties with the EU. Many argue that the point of Brexit was to escape entanglement with EU institutions and to avoid financial contributions to Brussels. But this is short-sighted and means opportunities that would benefit European NATO are being lost.

The UK has always had a strong preference for bilateralism and cooperation with small groups of countries. Its most important bilateral partnership is with France. The 2010 Lancaster House Treaties included collaboration on nuclear defence and set up the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF). This involved joint military exercises and shared French/British leadership. The treaties were upgraded in 2025 with CJEF replaced by a Combined Joint Force with full interoperability across land, air, maritime, cyber and space domains. UK-French military cooperation is stronger now than at any point since 1945.

The UK leads another Joint Expeditionary Force since 2014, set up following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. This includes nine other northern and northeastern NATO members. Also this year, the UK signed its first ever bilateral defence treaty with Germany.

In the industrial sphere too, the UK prefers projects independent from the EU. The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) is led by Britain’s BAE Systems with Japanese and Italian partners. This has reached prototype phase while a rival European initiative is mired in conflict between Dassault of France and Germany’s Airbus. The UK and Germany have agreed to develop next generation bridging equipment to serve rapid troop movement in Europe.

In the political and diplomatic sphere, the UK has welcomed a French initiative, the European Political Community, hosting its fourth biannual meeting of representatives from 47 states. This may be a talking shop, but significantly, it has nothing to do with the EU except that the European Commission President attends its meetings.

When Labour entered government in July 2024, Prime Minister Keir Starmer promised a reset in UK-EU relations. The first significant step was the EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership in May this year. But it contained little of substance beyond agreeing to regular meetings to discuss defence and opening the door to UK access to procurements under the EU’s SAFE fund. SAFE is a €150 billion pot supporting loans for defence procurement between EU member states, with eligible third states able to contribute up to 35 per cent of the hardware involved.

For several months, Britain and the EU negotiated over raising the UK component share to 50 per cent. The sticking point was money. Initially Brussels demanded €6.5 billion, eventually reduced to less than €2 billion. London meanwhile is reported to have offered €80 million. Talks ended without agreement.

Almost simultaneously, Canada gained full third country entry to SAFE, apparently paying €10 million. It is ironic, but unsurprising, that Canada succeeded where the UK failed. Canada’s military industrial sector is small compared to Britain’s, so presents little threat to European firms. France feared British competition and reportedly drove a hard bargain on UK participation. This looks suspiciously like French interests overriding European ones.

The renewal of European defence is essential given the scale of threats and reduced US commitment to European security. The UK is the leading European contributor to NATO, and the alliance remains the cornerstone of European defence. European NATO must establish European strategic autonomy independent of the United States. President Trump’s US National Security Strategy focuses on China and the Pacific and paints Europe as a rival, so Europe alone must look after itself.

However, European ambition is undermined by protectionism among EU member states, bureaucratic inertia, and national prerogatives upheld by EU treaties, so any notion of EU strategic autonomy is ‘dead on arrival’. But if European strategic autonomy is to become a reality, the UK, and other non-EU members of NATO (Norway, Türkiye, etc) must be included in EU initiatives like SAFE, the European Defence Fund (EDF), and other instruments designed to support equipment interoperability, rearmament, common procurement, and joint research.

Deeper UK engagement with EU initiatives would add critical mass to EU defence relevance and bring mutual benefits. If London and Brussels are serious about European strategic autonomy, they must ensure that the promised reset in relations delivers real security and defence capability.

By Dr Simon Sweeney, Professor of International Political Economy, University of York.