Politics Home Article | Readiness requires biodefence: making Nato’s 1.5 per cent target count

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A broader definition of security

With the London Defence Conference taking place in April, attention is turning to how the United Kingdom and its allies can strengthen “readiness” for threats in an increasingly dangerous world. Much of the focus is on military spending, set against a backdrop of new Nato targets, with Allies now aiming to spend 3.5 per cent of GDP on military capability and operations.

But of equal importance, Nato Allies have also agreed that up to 1.5 per cent of GDP should go on defence – and security-related spending, including resilience and preparedness – so countries can better withstand and recover from shocks that can disrupt everyday life. Cyber-attacks, pandemics, infrastructure sabotage, and supply chain disruption, among other threats, can all destabilise a country without a shot being fired. The 1.5 per cent target reflects a simple shift – that security today extends far beyond military strength and requires preparing for disruption across society.

Biological threats and national risk

Biological threats are perhaps the clearest example of this. Covid-19 caused profound loss of life, shut down economies and overwhelmed health systems, leaving impacts on societies and public services still felt today.

That experience has fundamentally shaped how the government now assesses risk. The UK’s National Risk Register continues to rank pandemics among the most serious threats facing the country, with up to a one in four chance of another within the next five years.

Biological threats are also not limited to naturally occurring outbreaks. Advances in biotechnology – combined with rapid progress in artificial intelligence and wider access to scientific knowledge – are making it easier to manipulate pathogens. This raises the stakes, increasing the risk of both deliberate misuse by hostile actors and accidental incidents. The Risk Register also ranks large-scale chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks among those with the highest potential impact.

Biological threat preparedness is no longer only a health issue – it is a national security concern with significant societal and economic implications. Nato’s resilience benchmark offers a real opportunity to act on that shift in thinking. But whether it delivers will depend on how it is implemented.

Making the 1.5 per cent target count

There is an obvious risk. At a time of tight public finances, the easiest way to meet the 1.5 per cent target would be to re-label existing spending. While investment in healthcare, infrastructure and energy is vital, it is not the same as building resilience in the way Nato intends. Without a clear, shared definition of what qualifies as resilience spending – and without mechanisms to track new versus existing investment – the target risks becoming an exercise in accounting rather than a catalyst for capability.

Preparing for biological threats requires sustained, targeted investment – stockpiling vaccines and treatments, maintaining manufacturing capacity, strengthening disease surveillance and prioritising research and development. In many countries, these capabilities remain spread across government without clear coordination or a long-term structure, making it harder to respond quickly and effectively when the next crisis hits.

The UK has taken important steps. The government’s Biological Security Strategy and the work of the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) have strengthened understanding of the threat and improved capability, with UKHSA playing a central role in preparedness and response. The next step is to build on that progress with a clearer view of what is being invested – and whether it matches the scale of the risk.

Other countries offer useful examples. In the United States, long-term investment in medical countermeasures is coordinated through a cross-government framework, supported by regular congressional scrutiny and multi-year planning. The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE), for example, sets out a multi-year strategy covering everything from R&D through to procurement and stockpiling – identifying priorities and capability gaps over time. Canada also has an effective model: government makes committed annual investments in advanced strategic stockpiling of medical countermeasures that are closely coordinated across the country’s public health and defence authorities.

This provides clearer demand signals, supports manufacturing capacity, and allows policymakers to track progress. Across Nato, approaches remain varied, although efforts such as the European Union’s Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority are beginning to introduce more structure.

In the UK, Parliament has a clearer view of the risks, but there is an opportunity to provide greater visibility on what is being spent to address them. Regular and more detailed cross-government reporting could provide a clearer picture of investment, capability gaps and progress over time. This would not only strengthen scrutiny, but help ensure that funding decisions are aligned with the highest-impact risks.

Nato’s 1.5 per cent benchmark is a step forward. But on its own, it is unlikely to shift approaches to resilience spending. Without clearer definitions, stronger accountability, and a focus on building tangible capabilities, it risks reinforcing existing patterns rather than changing them.

If it is implemented well, however, it could mark the beginning of a more strategic approach to national resilience – one that recognises biological threats as central to security in the 21^st century.

The risks are well understood. The challenge now is to ensure that policy and investment keep pace. Because while the 3.5 per ecnt prepares us for war, the 1.5 per cent must prepare us for everything else.

For further material on strengthening biosecurity and national resilience, visit

www.emergentbiosolutions.com or contact Ask Eirik Storsve, Senior Director, International Government Affairs, Emergent BioSolutions on [email protected].

Ask Eirik Storsve

Ask Eirik Storsve is the Sr. Director, Head of International Government Affairs at Emergent, a global life sciences company that develops and manufactures medical countermeasures for some of society’s most pressing biological threats. Ask Eirik is a member of the EU HERA Industry Cooperation Forum and the European Confederation of Pharmaceutical Entrepreneurs’ Health Crisis Management & Preparedness Steering Group. Ask Eirik brings years of international policy development experience from the European and Norwegian Parliaments and work with Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Afghanistan to his international work at Emergent.