Reform UK in power: what we can (and can’t) learn from Western Europe

Claire Burchett asks how can UK institutions and parties adapt to Reform UK gaining more power at a national and local level and considers what can be learned from countries in Western Europe where far-right parties have typically been more electorally successful.

On 7 May 2026, local elections will be held in the UK for over 4,850 councillors against the backdrop of increasing dissatisfaction with the Labour government, and a growing broader appeal of the Greens and of the far-right party Reform UK. The UK’s first-past-the-post (FPP) electoral system has historically prevented far-right parties from gaining substantial power at a national or local level. However, if this were to change, the UK has limited experience in monitoring and managing the far right.

Reform UK, and UKIP before it, have obtained the most substantial results for a far-right party under FPP. The more overtly racist British National Party (BNP) peaked in the 2006-2007 local elections with dozens of local councillors but never had a sitting Member of Parliament (MP). Following the 2024 general election and high-profile defections from the Conservative Party, there are now 8 Reform UK MPs. The upcoming local elections are likely to strengthen the party further. This raises the question of how UK institutions and parties will adapt to this.

Far-right parties in Western Europe have generally been more electorally successful in Proportional Representation (PR) systems on the continent. This means institutions and mainstream political parties have had to learn to adapt to a far-right presence through institutional safeguards and political strategies. Despite variation in the radicality of these far-right parties, and differences in historical context and party systems, what can the UK learn, if anything, from these experiences?

The most common strategy is that of a refusal to cooperate, known as the “Brandmauer” in Germany or the “cordon sanitaire” in France. While the PR system gives the far-right easier access to institutions, other parties refusing to cooperate with them means they are often kept away from any real power. This kept the French National Rally in third place in the 2024 elections, and largely holds in Germany. The UK has some experience with this strategy: the two BNP Members of the European Parliament were isolated by other UK parties in 2009, and in last year’s elections local councillors in Cornwall refused to work with Reform UK. It is, however, a divisive strategy: it risks boosting the ‘victimhood’ narrative of the far right and can increase voter alienation. However, without it there is the risk of normalising the far right. Another problem is one of containment. It is easy to isolate a party when it has only a few seats in parliament, but this is much harder to do as the party gains seats. Under FPP, it is even more fragile, as Reform UK could eventually win a majority. Finally, isolating the far right only works if all other parties agree to do so, and is undermined by the increasing adoption and mainstreaming of far-right discourse.

A more extreme tool is that of banning a party. This remains controversial, with sceptics pointing to the anti-democratic implications of banning a party with substantial electoral support. There is also no guarantee that a ban would remove a party. In Belgium, the Flemish Bloc was effectively forced to disband after the Belgian High Court ruled that it was racist, but was then able to rebrand as Flemish Interest. In the UK, the most common way to ban a political party would be its proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000 or de-registration by the Electoral Commission, which would prevent it from running in elections. The latter is usually used to punish parties for not following the Political Parties, Referendums and Elections Act (PPERA). The BNP was de-registered under PPERA in 2016 for not paying the annual £25 registration fee, but reinstated a month later. With much less precedent in the UK and with Reform UK currently polling at 25%, this would be highly contested and not prevent a future iteration of the party.

There is also a role to play for public sector institutions. For instance, the media can contribute to increasing the salience and acceptability of far-right issues. In Francophone Belgium, the media refuses to platform far-right politicians and this has had a significant impact on their popularity. While effective, this would not be possible in the UK due to the BBC’s impartiality. Moreover, Reform UK may now be too big to be contained in such a way, and this would not prevent its visibility on social media.

Another tool, which is unique to Germany, is that of monitoring extremist groups and parties. The domestic intelligence authority, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), can observe parties and pass surveillance and reporting to the police. The UK’s closest equivalent to the BfV is the Security Service (MI5), although the BfV specifically focuses on anti-constitutional behaviour, while MI5’s focus remains broader national security and terrorism. Individual cases can be reported to the police for, for example, inciting racial hatred, as was done for UKIP’s notorious “Breaking Point” poster in 2016. Thus, reporting is ad hoc and reactive, and there is a limited institutional framework for monitoring potential anti-democratic behaviour, which Reform UK has already demonstrated through social media posts containing support for far-right activist Tommy Robinson and overtly racist and misogynistic views, and its status as a private company with limited transparency over decision-making.

While the BNP gave the UK some experience of managing a far-right party in governmental institutions, the party never left the electoral margins, so Reform UK presents a novel challenge. The tools developed in France, Germany, and Belgium have emerged from decades of managing a far-right presence, which FPP has so far prevented in the UK. However, while these can curb the far right, they cannot remove it completely, especially in the face of deeper political trends like dissatisfaction with democracy and the mainstreaming of far-right ideas. The UK would be well advised to reflect on how to develop its own democratic resilience, for instance, through guidelines for the media on how to report on the far right, a cross-party consensus on how to respond to the far right in local councils and parliament, and an infrastructure for oversight and monitoring of anti-democratic behaviour. The local elections will be a good time to start this process.

By Claire Burchett, PhD Candidate, Department of European & International Studies, King’s College London.