Sanctions do not, and never have, worked

Direct military force has, for centuries, been the principal means by which States have achieved ambitious foreign policy objectives, whether seizing or defending territory, altering a state’s military behaviour, or reshaping its internal political and economic structures.

Since the First World War and the rampant development and consolidation of world financial markets, a shift in attention towards non-violent economic force has developed to an extent which has forged a set of coercive measures surpassing direct military force as the principal mode of engagement.

At the apex of contemporary economic warfare, sanctions serve as our post-war world’s ‘enlightened’ alternative to open conquest and bloodshed, a humane and non-violent mechanism for the ends of global norms and the so-called ‘rule of law’, which compels rather than overtly subdues antagonists.

The mark of a civilised country, it seems, is aversion to open conflict and a commitment to quieter, more technocratic means of dominance.

Sanctions: 100 years of the ‘indispensible tool’

Over the past century international relations scholarship has championed the utility of sanctions, casting them as indispensable tools in the arsenal of statecraft and a mark of the refinement of contemporary geopolitical engagement.

This intellectual edifice has no doubt served to lend relative credence to the recent wave of punitive measures levied by the UK, US, and allied governments against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Sanctions are treated not only as necessary but as morally superior, a form of pressure that preserves the legitimacy of those who wield them. Yet their historical record suggests something closer to continuity with older forms of coercion than any genuine departure from them.

Economic warfare is indeed ancient, but our present method of sanctions traces its origins to the interwar period in Europe, when the League of Nations sought to harness economic coercion as a means of enforcing a premature form of collective security during the rise of openly militaristic European leadership.

Sanctions imposed on Italy during the 1935 invasion of Ethiopia marked one of the earliest attempts to deploy such measures in lieu of direct military engagement. While these efforts failed to halt Italian aggression, they laid the groundwork for the widespread adoption of sanctions in the post-war international order.

The US leading the charge

The United Nations further refined the art of sanction. In theory, sanctions were to be wielded collectively, targeting states that violated international law. In practice their deployment became increasingly selective and frequently unilateral, driven by the strategic interests of the United States and its closest allies.

With unrivalled command over the global financial architecture that emerged after the Bretton Woods accords, the US asserted itself as the preeminent enforcer of sanctions, capable of excluding adversaries from international markets, payment systems, and access to capital.

This role became more entrenched after the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the only meaningful counterweight to American geopolitical and financial power. The integration of Britain and Europe into this system strengthened its reach, embedding sanctions within global trade, insurance, shipping, and banking networks.

Whether the objective is regime change, policy reversal, or containment, sanctions have consistently fallen short of their most ambitious goals. Their failure stems from a recurring miscalculation: the belief that forced economic hardship will translate into political pressure sufficient to compel either the citizenry of the targeted state into open revolt, or the state itself into negotiation and compliance.

Cuba: a case in point

The decades-long embargo on Cuba remains one of the clearest examples. It has neither toppled the government nor facilitated meaningful political transformation. Instead, it has contributed to chronic shortages, restricted access to finance and trade, and periodic humanitarian crises, while reinforcing the state’s legitimacy as a defender against external pressure.

A limited diplomatic opening during the administration of Barack Obama briefly raised the possibility of gradual normalisation. This approach was reversed under Donald Trump, who expanded financial restrictions, limited remittances, and re-designated Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism shortly before leaving office. These measures have largely remained in place.

In recent years, Cuba has experienced its most severe economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Energy shortages, blackouts, declining tourism revenues, and constraints on fuel and food imports have driven mass protests and large-scale outward migration. Yet despite these pressures, the political system has endured.

The persistence of sanctions across successive US administrations illustrates the degree to which they have become embedded not only in foreign policy but in domestic political cycles. Their humanitarian impact has been significant, but their political outcomes remain limited.

Sanctions are rarely successful

In Iran, sanctions have significantly damaged the economy, contributing to inflation, unemployment, and shortages, but they have not fundamentally altered the state’s strategic posture. In North Korea, which has been subjected to one of the most extensive sanctions regimes in history, these measures have left the regime’s core military ambitions unaffected.

Instead, they have reinforced domestic narratives of siege and external threat. The result has been increased internal cohesion and the consolidation of authority, rather than destabilisation. A further consequence has been the deepening of security and technological cooperation among sanctioned states, including closer alignment between Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Even in cases where sanctions are presented as successful, the costs often extend beyond their intended targets. The sanctions imposed on Russia since 2022 were expected to produce rapid economic collapse and compel a change in strategic behaviour. The early period appeared to support this assumption.

Currency instability, inflation, and the departure of Western firms generated a perception of acute crisis. However, this shock was followed by a period of adjustment. Trade flows were redirected, financial transactions shifted toward non-Western systems, and energy exports increasingly moved to Asian markets.

Russia

The departure of Western firms unfolded in ways that reshaped ownership structures inside Russia. Companies exiting the market were often compelled to sell assets at steep discounts. Factories, infrastructure, and logistical networks transferred into domestic hands, frequently supported by state financing.

This process accelerated import substitution and industrial policy in ways that would have been politically and economically difficult to impose prior to the sanctions. Rather than isolating the Russian economy, these measures contributed to a partial restructuring, increasing its insulation from Western pressure while reinforcing the state’s role in strategic sectors.

For Europe, the consequences were immediate and structural. The disruption of long-standing energy relationships exposed deep dependencies. Governments were forced to subsidise households and industry, expand liquefied natural gas infrastructure, and secure alternative supplies at higher cost.

The political effects have been visible across the continent, where parties critical of sanctions and energy policy have gained ground, reflecting broader concerns over competitiveness, industrial decline and sovereignty.

At the same time, global trade has adapted.

Trade has adapted

Commodities have continued to flow through intermediary states, with complex supply chains obscuring origins while preserving market access. Turkey, the Gulf states, and parts of Central Asia have played an expanding role in facilitating rerouted trade and financial transactions.

Parallel payment systems and local currency settlements have gained attention, particularly among emerging economies seeking insulation from Western leverage. The expansion of BRICS and related initiatives reflects a broader search for alternatives within an increasingly fragmented global economy.

Financial and logistical restrictions frequently affect broader populations rather than governing elites. Access to medicine, infrastructure, and essential goods is shaped by compliance regimes and banking constraints. In some cases, this pressure contributes to negotiation; in others, it strengthens internal cohesion and legitimises state authority.

The unintended consequences of sanctions extend beyond individual cases.

A global reshaping

They are reshaping the structure of global economic relations, encouraging diversification, regionalisation, and institutional innovation. The increasing use of export controls, tariffs, and technological restrictions has extended economic coercion into areas once associated with commercial competition. The strategic contest over semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and supply chains reflects a growing perception that interdependence can generate vulnerability as well as efficiency.

The return of Donald Trump to the presidency has reinforced this trajectory. His administration has renewed emphasis on tariffs, industrial policy, and economic leverage as central instruments of foreign policy. At the same time, this approach reflects a broader bipartisan shift within Washington, particularly in relation to competition with China and the use of economic power to shape global outcomes.

Paradoxically, sanctions have proved not to cripple the West’s antagonists but embolden them, accelerating a major renegotiation of the dynamics of world trade, revealing wrought contradictions at the centre of our global economic order. The record demonstrates a persistent pattern: sanctions frequently exacerbate humanitarian crises, inflict suffering on civilian populations, while ultimately failing to achieve the political and economic ambitions of their imposers.

Sanctions do not work

Rather than reinforcing the post-Cold War US-led order, the US, UK, and Europe have helped facilitate new alliances and a restructuring of global financial and geopolitical architecture against themselves. In the West’s failed attempt to scupper Russian ambitions, the price we ultimately pay as Westerners is with our own sovereignty and economic security.

For Western powers to save face, they first ought to realise the limits of their capacity to play hegemon; second, renegotiation must take place with Russia and the East at large while we still have a hand to play.

Britain’s place in the rising global economic and collective security architecture must remain an open question, lest we lose everything for the pursuit of another country’s lost and irrational cause.

Featured image via the Canary