Politics
Starmer’s fall guy says No 10 pressured decision on Mandelson
On 17 April, we learned that Peter Mandelson had failed his vetting for the ambassador to the US position. Keir Starmer would blame the senior civil servant Olly Robbins for this, sacking him as a consequence.
Now, the sacked Foreign Office chief has hit back:
"[The due diligence document] resulted in a dismissive approach to Developed Vetting from No 10" pic.twitter.com/RLdGOl4UXq — Politics UK (@PolitlcsUK) April 21, 2026
Starmer and his fall guy
Robbins’ letter is addressed to Emily Thornberry MP, the chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.
In it, he notes he is seeking “advice” on his dismissal. He also attempts to clarify a situation that he describes as being “mired in confusion”, noting:
1. In November 2024, the then Cabinet Secretary recommended that security clearance be obtained before announcing a political appointee for Washington. It was not. After the announcement, I believe the Cabinet Office (CO) raised whether Developed Vetting (DV) was actually necessary. I understand the FCDO insisted that DV was a requirement before Mandelson took up his post in Washington.
2. I took over as PUS on 20 January 2025. Developed Vetting (DV) for Mandelson was underway, but already:
a. Due diligence (which assesses reputational suitability and checks if a candidate is fit to serve) had been completed by the Cabinet Office
b. Approval of the appointment had been given by HM The King
c. Mandelson’s appointment had been announced
d. Agrément had been given from our US partners
e. Mandelson had access to the FCDO building and basic IT access
f. Mandelson was being granted access to highly classified briefing on a case-by-case basis
Clearly, the point Robbins is making is that No 10 seemed determined to put Mandelson in the position regardless. Indeed, Mandelson was already operating as the ambassador to the US before the vetting was completed.
“Atmosphere of pressure”
Robbins continued:
3. Cumulatively, 2a to 2f resulted in a dismissive approach to DV from Number 10 Downing Street (No 10) for the remainder of the process. Nonetheless, despite this atmosphere of pressure, the department completed DV to the normal high standard.
4. DV is a clearance process designed to assess a candidate’s national security risk. It relies on the applicant and contacted third parties being entirely candid. To be effective, this requires a highly confidential environment, which applicants trust to protect their personal information. DV achieves this by minimising access to this information. Without trust, DV is less effective and national security is weakened.
5. UKSV did not ‘fail’ Mandelson and FCDO did not ‘overrule’ their decision. Like several other departments eg MOD, FCDO is the DV decision-maker, not UKSV. It is FCDO that makes the risk judgement and then does or does not grant clearance. This is particularly important at the FCDO, as an area of focus for the DV process is a candidate’s foreign relationships. FCDO has thousands of staff with DV and the security team has extensive experience to call upon when making these judgements.
6. Within FCDO, the Estates Security and Network Directorate (ESND) liaise with UKSV to discuss the risks they have identified and whether the FCDO is confident these can be managed. I have not seen any UKSV documentation and would not normally expect to.
The idea that Mandelson didn’t ‘fail’ his vetting is at odds with the narrative we’ve all come to understand since 17 April.
As Robbins explains, however, there’s a reason for this confusion.
Pass/Fail
According to point 7 in Robbins’ document, while Mandelson may not have ‘failed’ his vetting, it seems equally clear he didn’t really ‘pass’ either:
7. On 29 January 2025, I met with Director ESND and we discussed the DV for Mandelson. It was an oral briefing and no documents were presented to me. I was briefed that:
a. UKSV considered Mandelson a ‘borderline’ case, leaning towards recommending that clearance be denied;
b. ESND assessed that the risks identified as of highest concern by UKSV could be managed and mitigated eg via management actions and the need to obtain STRAP clearance from the intelligence agencies;
c. The risks did not relate to Jeffrey Epstein; and
d. UKSV acknowledged that FCDO may wish to grant clearance, with appropriate risk management.
DV clearance is a risk judgement. This is especially true the more senior a candidate is and the longer their career. Managing these risks as part of the clearance process is not unusual. I therefore agreed that the ESND approach was appropriate and ESND granted clearance. When the Prime Minister informed the House that the proper process had been followed in respect of NSV, he was correct.
Even before the vetting, people were saying Mandelson was too big a risk. We now know Ed Miliband was one of them.
In other words, the vetting scandal is a distraction from the real issue – that Starmer saw fit to hire the twice-disgraced Epstein associate in the first place.
“Deeply worrying”
Robbins provided further details on what he did and did not have access to:
8. As I and the Foreign Secretary wrote to this Committee on 16 September 2025 and as outlined to the House of Commons by Minister Doughty on the same day, “Ministers… are not informed of any findings other than the final outcome.” These statements were agreed with CO and No 10. This position reflected long-standing practice and guidance, and correctly constrained our ability to share information beyond the vetting process then or later.
9. In September, after Mandelson’s withdrawal, I considered the possibility of taking the unusual step of asking to see the UKSV documentation. My team consulted the Cabinet Office and were told that I required a national security justification. Subsequent discussions between FCDO and CO reflected different views on this matter, but I decided to adhere to normal practice and did not pursue this further.
We understand not everyone should have access to all the information that materialises in the vetting process. The problem is it seems like no one with the power to make decisions seems to have gained any understanding of what the vetting said about Mandelson.
This is not a functional system.
Whistle blowing around Starmer and his government
Robbins closes out by expressing his concerns over how the story came to be publicly known:
10. Finally, it is deeply worrying that within days of CO officials briefing No 10 on the issues they perceived with Mandelson’s vetting the story had leaked to The Guardian.
In executing my national security responsibilities as PUS, I have drawn on many years in national security roles and applied guidance and commonly understood practice. My guiding principle has been to defend the integrity of a system designed to protect UK national security.
I thank the Committee in advance for its consideration of this note, for its invitation today and for its vital work scrutinising the department I have been enormously proud to lead.
Robbins may be worried, but we’re not.
Clearly, the public needed to know what an absolute shambles the government’s vetting process is.
And if a creature like Peter Mandelson can slip through, the process may as well not exist in the first place.
Featured image via Pexels (via Canva)
By Willem Moore
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