The EU’s perspective on UK-EU relations

Jannike Wachowiak offers some insight into the EU’s perspective on UK-EU relations.

Brits spend an inordinate amount of time discussing what they want from the EU. They spend far less, however, pondering what the EU and its member states might want from them. This is perhaps understandable. Brexit has been a central fault line in British politics and has divided our political parties for more than a decade. Consequently, from the Malthouse Compromise to more recent calls for a customs union, the intended audience is often domestic. That said, this is hardly a recipe for a successful negotiation between the two sides.

So, where does the EU stand on all this? Perhaps the first thing to note is that the UK no longer features prominently on the EU’s list of priorities. European leaders simply don’t spend much time thinking about relations with the UK. The war in Ukraine, relations with the US and China, and the competitiveness of the single market have long replaced Brexit at the top of the council’s agenda.

A window of opportunity opened when Labour came to power in July 2024. There was genuine curiosity about the promised reset. However, European leaders quickly grew impatient over the perceived lack of clarity and drive from London. As ever, they felt the ball was in the UK’s court. That it was up to London to decide what it wanted and communicate this. This view still holds. As the commission’s chief spokesperson put it as recently as February, the forthcoming summit (presumably in July 2026) would be “the occasion to discuss with UK what, exactly they, have in mind, and how they propose to go about it.”

Partly, this is due to a sense that it should not be the EU’s responsibility to fix what the UK broke; partly, the EU’s institutions still remember past attempts at closer cooperation being rebuffed by the UK. Most significantly, the EU remains wary of offering a ‘privileged’ relationship to the UK which could then unravel established relationships with other third countries, such as Norway or Switzerland.

None of which is to say that the EU is not interested in closer relations with the UK. There is a recognition that times have changed since the TCA negotiations of 2020, and that the UK is an important partner in a more dangerous world. The commission’s 2024-29 political guidelines make it clear that the EU wants to strengthen relations ‘on issues of shared interest, such as energy, security, resilience and people-to-people contacts’.

The UK government might be well advised to focus on these areas. While talks are already underway on UK participation in the EU’s electricity market and youth mobility, cooperation on security and resilience remains, at present, underexplored. However, as in the case of the failed Safe negotiations, there is no guarantee of success even in areas of mutual interest. Nevertheless, both sides appreciate the need for cooperation. Importantly, the EU recently decided to leave the door ajar for UK companies to benefit from the €90bn loan for Ukraine.

Conspicuously absent from the Commission’s list of ‘shared interests’ is trade. More than five years into the application of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, its most recent assessment maintains that it is a ‘very good’ agreement for the EU. This indicates a high threshold for reviewing the economic elements of the deal. What is more, the British Prime Minister’s expressed interest in exploring alignment in certain areas of the single market comes up against the EU’s red lines: no cherry-picking, and the need to maintain the balance of rights and obligations in agreements with other third countries. While the EU’s willingness to negotiate agreements on food and drinks and electricity shows some flexibility, it is unlikely that this will extend to further areas of the single market unless there is a wider discussion around freedom of movement and significant cohesion payments.

An additional difficulty is that the EU is currently discussing ‘Made in EU’ targets which might shut out certain British products and technologies from European supply chains. It will be up to member states (and the European Parliament) to define whether ‘Made in EU’ extends to trusted partners outside the single market.

While excluding the UK would be bad news for Europe’s resilience, there is no unified EU view. Some, like Germany, advocate more permissive conditions for a partner which they deem strategically important (‘Made with Europe’ rather than ‘Made in Europe’).However, others, like France, are pushing back – wanting to favour their own industries – or are simply less concerned by how a third country like the UK may be impacted.

All of which means the UK must invest time and resources in understanding the evolving priorities in Brussels and in member states. London needs to consider what contribution the UK can usefully make to strengthening Europe’s resilience and security. This would also make it easier to test British proposals in other areas, in dialogue with the EU and member states, ultimately increasing their chances of success.

By Jannike Wachowiak, Research Associate, UK in a Changing Europe.

This piece was originally published by the Fabian Society in their report Pressing reset: our relationship with Europe.