What are the pull factors for those seeking asylum in the UK?

Ali Ahmadi, Catherine Barnard and Fiona Costello look at the reasons why asylum seekers come to the UK and to what extent UK asylum policy is a factor in the decision. 

The government’s flagship Restoring Order and Control policy is based upon the claim that tougher asylum policy will deter asylum seekers from coming to the UK. The proposals include measures such as temporary refugee status, scrapping family reunion, a longer route to settlement (up to 30 years), and limited access to benefits. These are intended, according to the Home Secretary, to reduce the ‘pull factors’ and/or the ‘generosity’ of the UK’s asylum offer. The logic is that if the UK makes the asylum system less attractive, fewer asylum seekers will come to the UK.

But what does evidence say about why (some) asylum seekers choose the UK as their destination? And to what extent does the UK’s asylum policy influence these decisions?

For asylum seekers heading to Europe and the UK, the strongest pull factor is social networks. Research consistently shows that first-time asylum applicants are more likely to apply in countries where they have family members, friends, and/or established diaspora communities. A 2023 analysis of asylum applications within the European Union (from 2008 to 2020) found that the number of previous asylum seekers and migrants from the same origin country was the biggest influence on where new asylum seekers went. The study also found that restrictive welfare policies and employment bans had only a ‘modest’ impact on the flow of asylum seekers. Similarly, the Home Office’s own research into ‘asylum seeker decision-making’ found that social networks were among the most influential factors in choosing a destination.

Family reunion seems to be a strong determinant of destination for asylum seekers. It is for this reason that the Home Office scrapped the refugee family reunion route last year. Although it is not possible to quantify its deterrent impact, it will likely discourage some asylum seekers from coming to the UK. However, the impact will likely be limited as most asylum seekers do not apply for family reunion. For instance, between 2023 and 2025, there was one arrival via family reunion for every five new grants of refugee status to adult main applicants. It is also possible that scrapping the possibility of family reunion will increase the number of ‘illegal’ arrivals via small boats, as entire family units might attempt crossing the channel rather than waiting for the main applicant to come and then apply for family reunion. Evidence from Europe and Australia shows that when reunion visas are unavailable, some families and children follow unauthorised routes.

The evidence on the effect of granting temporary rather than permanent status to asylum seekers is mixed. The probability of obtaining protection status matters a lot for asylum seekers, but there is not much research comparing temporary and permanent alternatives. When Sweden began granting permanent rather than temporary residency for Syrian refugees in 2013 this led to a ‘clear and fast, yet temporary,’ increase in Syrian asylum applications. This indicates that asylum policies can directly affect asylum flows. Yet other studies found no connection between permanent status rules and the number of asylum applications in European countries. When it comes to migration decisions more broadly, having access to permanent residence appears to be important, but not the length of time it takes to obtain it. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Home Office’s temporary status proposal will have any meaningful effect on arrivals.

Colonial and historical ties also have major influence on migration decisions. Asylum seekers from countries with past British rule, like Sudan or Pakistan, are more likely to come to the UK due to the colonial connection and established communities. This shows that language and educational content are part of making the UK a favourable destination for some asylum seekers. These factors are largely out of the UK government’s control.

It is also plausible that people refused asylum in the EU might see UK as their final chance, because it lacks access to shared asylum databases after Brexit. It is hard/impossible to know the number of arrivals motivated by this factor, but if it is at all significant, making the UK’s asylum policies more restrictive may have only a limited deterrent effect on this group who are desperate and do not have any other option available.

Evidence also suggests that ‘push factors’ from France encourage onward movements. For asylum seekers living in makeshift camps, life is often precarious and inhumane. Reports from Human Rights Watch have documented police brutality and abusive practices, limited access to water and sanitation facilities, and dependence on local associations for food distributions. In general, ‘push factors’ seem to be the main drivers of forced displacement. This is why some studies suggest that deterrence rarely works as it does not address the underlying factors such as conflict.

Ultimately, for all the government’s changes, evidence shows that asylum seekers have limited knowledge of asylum policies in destination countries. Most have vague and/or inaccurate information, particularly concerning their entitlements and requirements. Studies also suggest that the majority of asylum seekers rely on rumours, smugglers, and friends for information about destination countries and ‘very few’ are fully informed. This was also confirmed by the Home Office’s own research:

“They [asylum seekers] are guided more by agents, the presence or absence of family and friends, language, and perceived cultural affinities than by scrutiny of asylum policies or rational evaluation of the welfare benefits on offer.”

The available evidence shows that there is a far more complex relationship between asylum policy and asylum inflow than a simple ‘pull factor’ model would suggest. While the Home Office wants to manage asylum arrivals, their policy levers may be less effective than political rhetoric suggests. A more evidence-based approach might focus on addressing the factors within government control while acknowledging the limitations of policy in shaping destination choice. This would include ensuring fair and efficient decision-making and working with other European countries to address conditions that act as ‘push factors’ from transit countries like France. Simply making conditions harsher in the UK the hope it will deter arrivals appears, based on the evidence, unlikely to achieve the desired effect.

By Catherine Barnard, Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe & Professor of EU Law and Employment Law, University of Cambridge, Fiona Costello, Assistant Professor, University of Birmingham and Ali Ahmadi, Research Associate, University of Cambridge and PhD student at Anglia Ruskin University.