What will Andy Burnham mean for EU relations?

Based on what we know so far, Joël Reland considers how an incoming Andy Burnham government might approach its relationship to the European Union.

For all the ink which has been spilled previewing Andy Burnham’s government, precious little has discussed his approach to EU relations. This is largely because his narrative has been relentlessly domestic, but his op-ed in the Times last week provided some hints as to what his foreign policy might look like.

With the heavy caveat that Burnham has not yet taken power – or announced who his Foreign Secretary or EU Minister will be – it was possible to detect some important shifts in approach. The paradox is that Burnham sounds less pro-European than Starmer, but is formulating an economic and security agenda which could in fact bring London into closer line with Brussels.

Clearly, EU relations are less central to Burnham’s growth agenda than to Starmer’s. Both Starmer and Rachel Reeves have been stressing with increasing urgency the economic damage caused by Brexit and the need to get closer to the EU single market, calling it the “biggest prize” on offer to the UK economy. Burnham, on the other hand, has centred his growth agenda on devolution within the UK – not building ties beyond it – meaning EU relations are likely to drop down the list of priorities.

It is telling that, in his Times piece, Burnham says he wants to ‘consolidate the progress made on the existing UK-EU negotiations’ – an ambiguous construction which does not commit to finalising agreements by a specific date. In contrast, Starmer’s administration clearly wanted a package of agreements sorted by this summer’s UK-EU summit (which has been postponed since Starmer’s resignation).

Negotiations which are already stuttering could stall altogether if Burnham deems that a youth mobility scheme, where EU students pay UK tuition fee rates and add to net migration figures, does not pass his ‘Makerfield test’.  And even if agreements are finalised, the implementation of the necessary ‘dynamic alignment’, which is a significant bureaucratic task, may be slow given how much of Whitehall’s capacity will presumably be focused on delivering a radical devolution agenda.

Yet a Burnham administration could still bring fresh impetus to discussions on the future relationship. After all, Burnham says he wants to ‘make further progress quickly’, with his areas of focus being ‘strengthening our co-operation on illegal migration, economic security and the broader resilience of our societies to external threats’. Notably lacking is any talk of further economic agreements.

This may go down well in Brussels. The EU has more interest in the UK as a security partner than as an economic one. And, as is now well established, the Labour government is boxed in by its ‘red lines’ (no customs union, single market or free movement), which mean the Commission is unwilling to countenance deeper economic integration in many, if any, more areas.

The UK’s springtime proposal to join the EU single market for goods was rapidly dismissed – and it was not clear what else the Starmer administration could hope to achieve on the trade front. A UK which stops trying to ‘cherry pick’ its access to the single market would come as a welcome relief to the EU.

Moreover, there is plenty of unfinished business when it comes to closer security cooperation. A non-binding Security and Defence Partnership was signed before last year’s UK-EU summit but is yet to yield much fruit. Talks could be reanimated on UK participation in SAFE (an EU instrument for common defence borrowing) as well as other EU-led missions and projects, while Stamer is set this week to formalise UK participation in the Ukraine loan scheme.

There is also one important way in which Burnham does appear more European than Starmer. His ambition for greater ‘sovereign capabilities in areas… from shipbuilding and energetics to AI and quantum’ is strikingly similar to EU plans for greater ‘strategic autonomy’, i.e. reducing reliance on foreign suppliers in critical sectors.

A recent story about the Burnham team’s plan to make UK AI policy less ‘US-centric’ and ensure that “100 per cent of data centres aren’t owned by foreign companies” sounds like it could have been briefed by an Elysée official.

Yet 100% national ownership of critical tech infrastructure is an evidently unrealistic objective – meaning a less US-centric agenda will rely on greater ‘friendshoring’ of supply chains. This might quickly lead the Burnham government to look to the EU as a partner in, for instance, procuring critical minerals or developing pan-European sovereign capabilities in areas like cloud storage and payment systems – or to see what it can learn from the EU’s experience with its new Tech Sovereignty package.

This is the kind of economic and regulatory cooperation which is not necessarily precluded by Labour’s red lines. UK participation in a ‘Made in Europe’ scheme (subsidising European production of electric vehicles) and ‘Scaleup Europe’ fund for breakthrough technologies are both plausible; as are strategic dialogues on economic security and digital infrastructure.

Moreover, the Starmer administration’s overt attempts to court US tech and AI investment through lighter-touch regulation has been noticed in EU capitals, creating doubts about inviting the UK into new projects like ‘Made in Europe’ – out of fear it might operate as a US trojan horse. Burnham’s more Gaullist agenda may calm some of those nerves.

For all EU relations have improved under Starmer, certain Atlanticist instincts and a lack of realism about his red lines remained two marks against him. If Burnham can address those issues, he could prove a popular man in Brussels.

By Joël Reland, Senior Researcher, UK in a Changing Europe.