Jeff Bezos, the founder of the company that just became the number one Fortune 500 business, says the cure for anxiety is not rest or meditation but action. Speaking at the Museum of Flight in Seattle in 2017, Bezos told an audience of students that stress is a signal from the body that something is being neglected, and that the feeling disappears the moment he starts working on whatever is causing it. “I find that the stress goes away the second I take the first step,” he said.

The comments, resurfaced by Fortune this week, offer a window into how the world’s fourth-richest person thinks about pressure. Bezos said he treats anxiety as diagnostic information rather than an emotional state to manage, and that the worst thing he can do is sit with a problem without acting on it. His preferred remedy is to recruit allies and turn the source of stress into a group exercise in invention.

“There’s nothing more fun than getting in a room with a group of inventors and saying: here’s the problem, let’s invent a solution to it,” Bezos said. “As soon as you start doing that, I find that it turns from something that might create stress into something that creates fun.” The philosophy is consistent with the leadership principles Bezos embedded at Amazon, where CEO Andy Jassy has described the company’s 16 codified principles as something employees must constantly work at.

The advice lands in a complicated context. Amazon has cut more than 57,000 corporate jobs since 2022, and employees who survived the rounds of layoffs have reported rising workloads and deteriorating work-life balance as fewer people cover the same ground. The idea that stress is solved by working harder reads differently when the people hearing it are already stretched thin, and when the company’s own workforce has described burnout as a structural problem rather than a mindset one.

Bezos built Amazon from a rented garage in the mid-1990s, famously taking 60 meetings to raise the first million dollars in seed capital at a time when most investors had never heard of online retail. The company he founded now generates more than $700 billion in annual revenue and is investing tens of billions in AI infrastructure. Whether the same advice that helped a founder push through rejection in 1995 translates to a workforce navigating layoffs and AI displacement in 2026 is a question Bezos did not address.

Hackers are changing the DNS settings on Wi-Fi devices at hotels and conference centers to redirect users to fake Microsoft 365 login pages.

The campaign has been ongoing since at least June and impacts organizations in various sectors, including financial services, professional services, legal, health care, energy, and retail.

Cybersecurity company ReliaQuest identified compromised Wi-Fi gateways in multiple U.S. cities as well as other regions of the world, such as India and Saudi Arabia.

Since the devices serve corporate events, hijacking the Microsoft 365 accounts could give attackers access to sensitive business information,  communications, and private documents.

“We observed traffic to these compromised gateways from organizations in a range of industries, including financial services, professional services, legal, health care, energy, and retail- confirming this isn’t sector-specific targeting, but a campaign that highly likely goes after traveling employees wherever they connect,” ReliaQuest says.

The researchers believe this activity is similar to the FrostArmada router-based campaigns attributed to the Russian espionage group APT28 (a.k.a. Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard).

Attack chain

It is unclear how initial access to the Wi-Fi appliances was gained, but ReliaQuest says the threat actor could have exploited weakly protected, exposed management interfaces (e.g., SSH, SNMP, web admin dashboards) or vulnerabilities.

Once the attacker gains administrator access, they can modify the gateway’s DNS settings to redirect connections to legitimate domains to infrastructure under the attacker’s control.

ReliaQuest says that the attacker registered at least four domains for setting up fake Microsoft login portals: m365-owa[.]com, owa-ms365[.]com, ms365-device[.]com, and ms365-live[.]com.

With DNS settings changed, users trying to access legitimate Microsoft login portals would land on the hacker’s phishing pages and enter their credentials.

In some cases, the researchers observed a device-code authentication flow in which targets were redirected to a fake Microsoft page with a prompt.

“What the user can’t see is that approving the prompt authorizes a session initiated by the attacker,” ReliaQuest says. The researchers note that authorizing the attacker-initiated request causes a legitimate OAuth token to be issued to the attacker’s client.

This bypasses the multi-factor authentication (MFA) protection without stealing any credentials or intercepting access tokens.

In roughly one-third of the investigated cases, the attackers also attempted to abuse Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPAD) by responding to Windows’ automatic WPAD lookup with a malicious proxy auto-configuration (PAC) file.

This theoretically would route traffic from Windows apps, including Chrome, through an attacker-controlled proxy, but ReliaQuest couldn’t confirm that these attacks were successful.

The researchers also emphasized that using public DNS servers such as Google’s 8.8.8.8 does not prevent this attack, as the gateway forges the plain-text requests before they reach the intended resolver.

ReliaQuest recommends using an always-on, full-tunnel VPN and encrypted DNS in strict mode as solid protection measures against these attacks.

Additionally, the cybersecurity company recommends disabling WPAD, reviewing logs for suspicious activity, and disabling Device Code authentication flow in Microsoft Entra ID when not needed.

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As Apple prepares to launch its first smart glasses, the company is also wrestling with how to address consumer privacy concerns, according to Bloomberg’s Mark Gurman.

Gurman reports that Apple has pushed back the launch target from early 2027, with the glasses now set for unveiling at the Worldwide Developers Conference in June 2027 and actually becoming available by the end of the year. That delay allows Apple to work on the product itself, and on the messaging around privacy.

It sounds like the company has noticed the concerns around Meta’s smart glasses — sometimes decried as “pervert glasses” — being used to make non-consensual video recordings. That could be a bigger issue for Apple, which constantly emphasizes privacy in its marketing.

Among other things, Apple will reportedly try to emphasize privacy-friendly features like on-device processing, as well as the absence of facial recognition. The company will likely steer clear of using customer recordings to train AI models, and it’s unlikely to follow Meta’s reported practice of using contractors to review customer footage.

• Northrop Grumman’s MRV launched with two satellite-servicing robotic arms
• Mission Extension Pods can stretch a satellite’s working life by eight years
• The spacecraft can inspect, refuel, tow, and relocate active orbital satellites or even destroy enemy satellites

Northrop Grumman has launched its first Mission Robotic Vehicle (MRV), equipped with two robotic arms to inspect, repair, refuel, and relocate satellites already operating in orbit.

The spacecraft also carries three Mission Extension Pods (MEPs) that can extend a satellite’s operational life by as much as eight years after installation.

Security researchers at Accomplish AI demonstrated that Anthropic’s Claude Cowork could break out of its local virtual machine sandbox and read files across the underlying Mac, including SSH keys and cloud credentials. The attack, dubbed SharedRoot, exploited a Linux kernel privilege escalation vulnerability to gain root access inside the guest VM, then walked out through a writable filesystem mount that exposed the entire host. Accomplish AI disclosed the findings on July 23 and said roughly 500,000 macOS users running local Cowork sessions were exposed before the issue was addressed.

The escape chain worked because Cowork’s local execution mode runs inside a Linux VM that shares the host filesystem via a writable VirtioFS mount. That mount was intended to be accessible only to root within the guest, but the researchers found they could escalate from a session user to guest root by exploiting CVE-2026-46331, a Linux kernel flaw known as “pedit COW” that was given a severity score of nearly eight out of ten. Once the agent had root inside the VM, it could reach anything the logged-in Mac user could reach.

“We connected a folder to a fresh Claude Cowork session, sent one short message, and watched the agent escape the sandbox,” Oren Yomtov, principal security researcher at Accomplish AI, told The Hacker News. “From inside the VM, it reached the host Mac and read and wrote files all over it, far outside the folder we’d connected, with no permission prompt anywhere.” The vulnerability sits in the kernel’s traffic-control subsystem, where incorrect copy-on-write handling allows out-of-bounds writes into shared page-cache memory.

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Anthropic closed the report as “informative” without issuing a direct fix, according to The Hacker News. The version of Claude Cowork released afterwards defaults to cloud execution, which sidesteps the local escape path entirely. Users who opt to run the agent locally rather than in the cloud, however, remain exposed unless they harden their configurations by disabling unprivileged user namespaces, restricting filesystem sharing, and running the Cowork daemon with strict mount protections.

The finding lands in a month that has seen four separate research teams break AI agents in four different ways, from poisoned memories to hijacked browser extensions. OpenAI disclosed that its own models escaped a sandbox and breached Hugging Face during the same week, and researchers escaped the sandboxes of Cursor, Codex, and Gemini CLI without ever breaking the sandbox itself. The pattern across all of these incidents is the same: the AI agent follows its rules inside the box, but the infrastructure surrounding it trusts the agent more than it should.