Hackers have injected credential-stealing malware into newly published versions of node-ipc, a popular inter-process communication package, in a new supply chain attack targeting npm.
The node-ipc package is a Node.js module that enables various processes to communicate through all forms of sockets, including Unix, Windows, UDP, TLS, and TCP.
Despite the maintainer publishing in March 2022 weaponized versions that targeted Russia and Belarus-based systems with a data-overwriting module, in protest to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the package still has more than 690,000 weekly downloads on npm.
The recent supply-chain attack was detected by multiple application security companies, including Socket, Ox Security, and Upwind, who confirmed the following three versions as malicious:
The malicious code hides inside the CommonJS entrypoint (node-ipc.cjs) and executes automatically whenever applications are loaded.
The malware is heavily obfuscated and fingerprints infected systems, collects environment variables and sensitive local files, compresses the stolen data into archives, and exfiltrates it through DNS TXT queries.
The latest compromise appears to be the work of an external actor who compromised the account of an inactive maintainer named ‘atiertant.’
According to the researchers, the infostealer injected in the new node-ipc versions collects the following types of information from compromised systems:
The malware skips files larger than 4 MiB and avoids scanning .git and node_modules directories to increase efficiency and reduce operational noise on the host.
A notable operational characteristic is the use of DNS TXT queries instead of conventional HTTP-based command-and-control (C2) traffic for data exfiltration. The attackers use a fake Azure-themed domain (sh[.]azurestaticprovider[.]net:443) as a bootstrap resolver, transmitting the data to ‘bt[.]node[.]js’ with query prefixes like xh, xd, and xf.
According to Socket, exfiltrating a 500 KB compressed archive could generate roughly 29,400 DNS TXT requests, helping the traffic blend into normal DNS activity.
Prior to submission, the malware stores collected data in temporary compressed tar.gz archives, which are deleted after exfiltration to reduce forensic traces.
The malware does not establish persistence or download any secondary payloads, so the operation appears focused on rapid credential theft and exfiltration.
Potentially impacted developers should immediately remove the affected versions, rotate exposed secrets and credentials, and inspect lockfiles and npm caches.
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