U.S. President Donald Trump’s negotiations with Russia are not only occurring at Ukraine’s expense but also carry broader implications for China. Historically, the opposite was true – Henry Kissinger’s strategic opening to China contributed to the Soviet Union’s eventual collapse. Now, the Trump administration is playing a calculated game with Russia, aiming to secure economic benefits such as cheaper raw materials while attempting to reshape Sino-Russian relations. The goal appears to be to pull Moscow away from Beijing and weaken their growing alignment.
However, a repeat of the Sino-Russian split seems unlikely in today’s geopolitical landscape, as both Russia and China remain skeptical of Trump’s erratic foreign policy and question the reliability of U.S. commitments.
Trump’s confrontational stance toward Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been a political shock for both Ukraine and Europe. Notably, the Trump administration, whether intentionally or not, has adopted China’s rhetoric over the past three years, referring to the Russia-Ukraine War merely as a “conflict” and promoting peace through negotiations with Russia. This approach was first put forward by China in February 2023 and has since been aggressively pushed through state-controlled media and diplomatic channels, including special envoy Li Hui. Now the Trump administration has repackaged this strategy in a more unilateral manner, with a key difference – amid Russia-U.S. talks, Ukraine and Europe are largely excluded from the decision-making process. The fate of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is being discussed behind closed doors, without its participation.
A historical parallel can be drawn to the Yalta Conference of February 11, 1945, when Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin determined the post-war order without consulting China, then weakened by civil war. The Soviet Union’s demands were met in the Yalta Agreement, granting it control over Outer Mongolia, access to Manchurian harbors, and influence over the Chinese Changchun Railroad. At the time, Chiang Kai-shek lamented that “China had really been sold out at Yalta.” Today, Ukraine faces a similar predicament, as its future is being debated without its direct involvement. While Chinese officials have not openly criticized this exclusion, they have welcomed increased Russia-U.S. dialogue, signaling Beijing’s preference for strategic patience.
By labeling Zelenskyy a dictator, attacking him on social media, portraying Russia as a victim, and demanding a $500 billion repayment for U.S. aid, Trump and his circle have signaled a dramatic shift in Washington’s stance. Rather than reinforcing Ukraine’s resilience, the administration appears to be prioritizing stronger ties with autocratic regimes like Russia while undermining Ukraine’s democratic aspirations. This shift disregards the sacrifices of Ukraine’s defenders and the values the U.S. has long championed. In this new alignment, both the U.S. and China are effectively pushing Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence, devaluing its European ambitions and sending a dangerous message: Ukraine’s sovereignty is negotiable.
A similar dynamic is unfolding in the Gaza Strip. China’s proposed “two-state solution” and efforts to mediate between rival Palestinian factions have been sidelined by the Trump administration, which has instead pledged to “take over” Gaza. This stance is likely to provoke Beijing, as indicated by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian, who publicly voiced opposition to the U.S. approach. In both Ukraine and Gaza, Chinese peacebuilding efforts have been largely undermined, and it remains unlikely that the Trump administration will invite Chinese mediators to the negotiating table.
The Strategic Realignment: China, Russia, and the U.S.
If Trump succeeds in forging positive relations with Russia, what would that mean for China?
Professor Feng Yujun, a leading Russia studies scholar at Peking University, described Trump’s foreign policy as a chaotic mix of mercantilism, populism, anarchism, conservatism, gangster-style diplomacy, and opportunism – driven largely by ego and transactional deal-making. Regarding Russia-U.S. relations, Feng argued that fears of a genuine reconciliation are overstated, citing structural contradictions and deep historical mistrust. However, he warned that Russia has historically posed the greatest threat to China precisely when it claimed to be China’s closest partner. This historical pattern suggests Beijing should remain cautious of any Russia-U.S. rapprochement.
Professor Sisheng Zhao of the University of Denver echoed these concerns, noting that a Russia-U.S. détente under a second Trump administration could disrupt Beijing’s “Anti-Hegemonic United Front” strategy. Should Washington succeed in pulling Moscow away from Beijing, China could find itself increasingly isolated in its geopolitical rivalry with the United States.
Wang Huiyao, a prominent Chinese scholar, suggested that Trump’s transactional approach favoring economic deal-making over military intervention, creates both risks and opportunities for China. He argues that this shift could lead to a “new great triangle” involving the United States, China, and Europe. On Trump’s proposed Russia-Ukraine peace plan, Wang believes Putin is unlikely to fully accept it, particularly regarding security guarantees. However, remarks by the U.S. secretary of defense about involving European and non-European forces in Ukraine’s security framework present a potential opening for China to engage through the United Nations peacekeeping mechanism.
China, as the largest provider of U.N. peacekeepers among the Security Council’s permanent members, could play a role in post-war stabilization alongside India and Brazil. This possibility has been explored by Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy. However, Ukraine is unlikely to accept the presence of Chinese troops on its territory due to widespread political distrust among both Ukrainian elites and the public, as well as Beijing’s close ties with Moscow.
China’s European Opportunity?
As Trump embraces Russia, China is also working to strengthen its position in Europe. At this year’s Munich Security Conference, the Chinese delegation, once viewed with skepticism, performed more effectively than their U.S. counterparts. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s advocacy for a multipolar world and his call for a negotiated peace in Ukraine, which explicitly included Europe in the discussions, helped bridge gaps between Beijing and European policymakers.
This moment could present an opportunity for China to rebuild relations with the EU, particularly as transatlantic unity faces new strains. At the very least, China is expected to launch a renewed charm offensive. Unlike Trump’s unilateralism, China’s conflict resolution format, the “Friends of Peace” group, which includes participation from the Global South, may now gain greater traction.
Observers at the Munich Security Conference also noted that European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s speech took a softer tone on China this year. She acknowledged Europe’s need to adapt to shifting global power dynamics and emphasized the importance of strengthening the continent’s strategic autonomy – aligning, to some degree, with China’s long-standing call for a more independent European foreign policy.
The Ukraine Factor
Meanwhile, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiga met with Wang in Munich, where both sides reaffirmed their “strategic-level” relationship dating back to 2011. Sibiga extended an invitation for Wang to visit Kyiv to discuss a just and lasting peace. However, this invitation was absent from the official Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement. Instead, Beijing’s readout of the meeting highlighted Ukraine’s reaffirmation of its support for the One China policy. The silence on the invitation was a notable omission that raises questions about China’s actual willingness to engage on Ukraine’s terms.
“We require your support,” Sibiga told Wang.
Will China step up to offer real political backing for Ukraine? A 2023 public opinion poll showed that 64 percent of Ukrainians disapproved of Xi Jinping. However, if a poll were conducted today, it might reveal greater Ukrainian sympathy for Xi than for the current U.S. president.
Feng maintained that China must focus on a long-term strategy rather than reacting impulsively to external events. He argued that Trump’s return makes it even more difficult for Beijing to define its core national interests in an increasingly unstable world. Wang Huiyao, in contrast, suggested that Trump’s policies could, paradoxically, de-escalate geopolitical tensions. If Trump continues prioritizing economic self-interest over ideological confrontation, China may be able to leverage this trend to stabilize relations with Washington and explore new diplomatic agreements.
But will these agreements contribute to a sustainable peace in Ukraine?
Conclusion
The evolving power dynamics between the United States, China, and Russia are reshaping Ukraine’s geopolitical reality. While Trump’s transactional diplomacy seeks to weaken Sino-Russian ties, a true split remains unlikely given deep-rooted mutual distrust. For Ukraine, its resilience remains its strongest asset despite being sidelined in key decisions about its future. Ukrainian national unity continues to strengthen, along with Zelenskyy’s domestic standing. Meanwhile, Europe has come to terms with the reality that this war is, above all, a European issue – not a global one, as much of the world remains insulated by “a big, beautiful ocean.”
