Beijing’s modernization of its amphibious capabilities has taken a significant step forward with the development of new special barges. Built by Guangzhou Shipyard International on Longxue Island, these specialized barges aim to enhance the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s beach-landing and logistics operations. Integrating civilian roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) technology, the special barges reflect China’s evolving civil-military fusion strategy. Designed to deploy heavy equipment directly onto coastal roads, these vessels improve the PLA’s maritime transport capacity and enable flexible multi-point landings that bypass traditional coastal defenses.
The traditional assumption has been that China would need to seize a few well-known beaches on Taiwan’s western coast. The special barges could upend that calculus. By allowing landings at multiple less-defended points – including rocky coastlines or river estuaries – these barges complicate Taiwan’s defensive planning and increase the likelihood of a successful amphibious incursion.
China’s doctrine of civil-military fusion is evident in its dual-use fleet. Ro-Ro ferries, though built for commercial purposes, can also carry tanks, heavy equipment, and other supplies enabling rapid military conversion. Analysis points out that China has issued technical standards for civilian vessels to ensure they meet national defense needs. Combined with special barges, these dual-use platforms blur the line between civilian and military operations, creating a significant “gray zone” challenge.
China’s Expanding Amphibious Fleet
China’s amphibious fleet has grown substantially, most notably with the Type 075 and Type 076 amphibious assault ships. At least three Type 075s – the Hainan (commissioned April 2021), the Guangxi (commissioned December 2021), and the Anhui (commissioned October 2022) – are already in service, with a fourth reportedly launched in December 2023. Their rapid construction, beginning in 2018 and continuing at a steady pace, demonstrates China’s high-efficiency shipbuilding program. Meanwhile, the Type 076 remains in an early stage of development, although one vessel was reportedly launched in December 2024.
Precise production numbers and timelines for the Type 076 remain undisclosed, but defense analysts anticipate additional hulls over the next few years, reflecting China’s intent to field advanced drone and aviation capabilities for expanded amphibious reach.
Complementing these assault ships are Type 726 hovercraft, also referred to as Yuyi-class vehicles, which enable high-speed troop and equipment transport across shallow-water regions. Open-source estimates indicate at least a dozen hovercraft currently in service, with new units entering the fleet at a deliberate but steady rate.
This multi-pronged modernization strategy – a mix of large amphibious assault ships and smaller craft – equips the PLA with the ability to stage multi-point landings and project force beyond conventional beachheads.
By pairing these vessels with the new special barges and civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries, the PLA can deliver large numbers of vehicles and troops from offshore directly onto inland roads, circumventing hardened coastal defenses. Such flexibility not only heightens pressure on Taiwan’s existing security posture but also underscores the urgency for regional actors to reassess their contingency planning for amphibious threats.
The Special Barges’ Key Technical Features
The special barges feature a deployable bridge over 120 meters long, allowing direct offloading onto previously inaccessible shorelines such as rocky coasts, river estuaries, and shallow beaches. Inspired by World War II Mulberry Harbors, this innovation will enable the PLA to bypass Taiwan’s well-defended Red Beaches, providing alternative landing zones that were previously unsuitable for large-scale amphibious operations.
In operational terms, the extendable bridge technology substantially expands PLA amphibious landing options beyond conventional ports and beachheads to include alternative, less fortified coastal zones. Moreover, the potential to rapidly transition from sea to inland roads accelerates mechanized force projection, ensuring swift mobilization. Additionally, the capacity for multi-axis assaults will force Taiwanese defenses to spread thinly across dispersed targets, complicating tactical responses. These specific advantages enhance the PLA’s strategic reach and present significant challenges to adversary planning.
The special barges also have “jack-up pillars,” which allow the platform to stabilize in rough sea conditions, transforming it into a temporary pier for tanks and heavy vehicles. This capability enhances unloading efficiency and reduces dependence on fixed ports, aligning with the PLA’s emphasis on rapid deployment. The open deck design further facilitates quick loading and unloading, optimizing logistics for high-tempo amphibious operations.
To improve combat reliability, the special barges integrate dual pilothouses and redundant propulsion systems, ensuring continued operation in case of mechanical failure or damage. Satellite imagery analysis by Tom Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, suggests that these design features prioritize high-intensity amphibious operations rather than civilian applications.
Despite these enhancements, special barges remain vulnerable without adequate escort protection or onboard defenses. Their slow transit speed and limited maneuverability increase their exposure to enemy interdiction, raising concerns about their ability to execute seamless cross-strait landings under contested conditions. Adverse weather or strong opposition could significantly disrupt deployment, underscoring the reality that special barges-based amphibious assaults are not invincible.
Policy Options for Taiwan and Its Partners
Despite their ability to bypass traditional defenses, the special barges remain highly vulnerable due to slow speed, lack of onboard defenses, and exposure during unloading. Taiwan’s layered defenses provide multiple opportunities to interdict these vessels before and during landfall.
With no air or missile defenses, Hsiung Feng III supersonic missiles and AGM-84 Harpoons – launched from land, sea, air, and submarines – can easily target China’s special barges. Tuo Chiang-class corvettes, equipped with Hsiung Feng II and III missiles, can execute hit-and-run strikes on slow-moving convoys. Hai Lung-class submarines can ambush special barges before they reach shore, while naval mines in shallow waters can disrupt or destroy approaching vessels.
Once a special barge deploys its bridge, it becomes a stationary target for artillery, precision rockets, and indirect fire. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), loitering munitions, and ground-based drones could disable the bridge mid-operation, stalling troop movement. M136 Volcano mines could block inland roads, disrupting mechanized forces post-landing. These vulnerabilities make special barge-based landings high-risk operations, susceptible to multi-layered interdiction from missiles, submarines, mines, and land-based strikes.
Taiwan’s ability to rapidly detect and respond to movements of special barges hinges on a robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) framework. First, satellite imagery can offer near-real-time visual data on troop buildup, barge deployment, and the assembly of related civilian-military resources – such as Ro-Ro vessels – allowing Taiwan’s defense apparatus to anticipate potential amphibious actions. Second, signals intelligence is crucial for intercepting and analyzing PLA communications, which can highlight shifts in operational schedules, routes, or objectives. When integrated into a joint maritime domain awareness system, these ISR streams yield a comprehensive view of maritime activity around Taiwan’s coastline.
To further enhance this awareness, Taiwan should pursue deeper cooperation with allied partners that maintain robust ISR platforms in the Western Pacific. By forging intelligence-sharing agreements and conducting regular data exchanges, Taiwan can enrich its early-warning mechanisms. Developing a Common Operational Picture (COP) with such allies – potentially including the United States and key regional powers – would facilitate joint or coordinated responses in the event of suspicious mobilizations, including of special barges, on China’s coast. This level of multinational coordination broadens Taiwan’s situational scope while sending a deterrent message to any would-be aggressors.
Crucially, intelligence alone is insufficient without the means to act. Once ISR indicates incoming threats, Taiwan’s military can interdict them. Unmanned systems, whether airborne or sea-based, could provide rapid initial engagement, while long-range anti-ship missiles ensure that special barges remain at significant risk before reaching Taiwanese shores. Such kinetic and non-kinetic assets, guided by timely intelligence, would allow Taiwan to shape the battlespace in its favor, slowing or halting amphibious operations before they consolidate a beachhead. Ultimately, enhancing intelligence and interdiction stands as a linchpin in Taiwan’s strategy to preserve freedom of action and deter PLA aggression in an increasingly contested maritime environment.
Historically, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has identified several priority “Red Beaches” for potential amphibious assaults. However, China’s new special barges can circumvent standard coastal defenses, rendering previously overlooked shorelines vulnerable. In response, Taiwan’s Ministry’s intelligence agencies must reassess and expand the definitions of a Red Beach.
Beyond its Red Beaches, Taiwan should bolster security at less conventional landing sites such as rocky shores and river outlets. Stationing mobile anti-armor units and mid-range missiles in these regions, supported by rapid-reaction forces, would help slow any PLA attempt to establish a foothold. Integrating new reconnaissance data and conducting thorough coastal vulnerability studies will ensure Taiwan’s situational awareness remains robust. Updating defensive frameworks to account for these emerging threats is critical for sustaining rapid-response capabilities and preserving overall coastal security.
Conclusion
China’s special barges are transforming amphibious operations in both the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. In the South China Sea, they could enable rapid deployment and resupply on disputed islands like the Spratlys and Paracels, bolstering the PLA’s military presence. With their capacity to transport heavy equipment and establish temporary docking facilities, these platforms strengthen China’s control over contested areas, complicating regional countermeasures.
Furthermore, it is vital to monitor ongoing PLA amphibious exercises for indications of special barges deployment. Future training may reveal how these platforms are integrated with Type 076 amphibious assault ships and UAV operations to conduct joint air-sea-land maneuvers. Observing the coordination of these multi-domain assets will offer critical insights into the PLA’s evolving strategy.
By strengthening early warning systems, refining rapid-response protocols, and engaging in regional security cooperation, Taiwan can adapt its defense posture to counter these emerging amphibious threats and preserve its strategic edge in an increasingly complex security environment.
