Turkey’s embrace of a political process—instead of simply pursuing a decisive military path—to end the conflict made it more acceptable to the PKK leadership and the Kurdish movement. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, had to persuade his comrades to dissolve their organization, abandon the armed struggle, and choose political struggle. Unfavorable broader regional trends against armed militancy may have helped convince Ocalan and his comrades to make that consequential choice.

The legitimacy of the political solution, in the eyes of the Kurds, determines its sustainability and transformative impact. The current peace process seeks to end the insurgency and transform the struggle for Kurdish rights and aspirations into a nonviolent political one. It could transform Turkey’s relations with its own Kurdish community and the Kurdish communities in Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Leaders of the Kurdish movement believe that they can achieve more through politics than through armed struggle, and that it isn’t only they who are transforming, but that the state, political, and legal systems in Turkey can also change. The promise of the future, rather than being beholden to the grievances of the past, is the way forward. 

Former Silvergate Bank CEO Alan Lane said political and regulatory pressure from the Biden administration drove the crypto-focused lender’s voluntary wind-down in 2023, arguing that the bank remained solvent after weathering a deposit run.

In an inaugural Substack post on Tuesday, Lane said Silvergate could have continued operating after satisfying withdrawals equivalent to 70% of its demand deposits during the fourth quarter of 2022. He argued that a “coordinated attack by the Biden Administration” ultimately led to the wind-down, saying the bank chose liquidation “in the face of political pressure.”

Lane said Silvergate had held liquid assets that could be sold or pledged as collateral during periods of heavy withdrawals. In a January 2023 business update, the bank reported that digital asset deposits fell 68% from $11.9 billion to $3.8 billion during the quarter. Silvergate sold $5.2 billion of debt securities, recording a $718 million loss. The bank said it had $4.6 billion in cash and equivalents at year-end. 

Lane’s account adds a firsthand claim to the debate over whether US agencies sought to restrict crypto companies’ access to banking. However, it differs from federal findings that attributed the bank’s liquidation to its concentrated deposit base, funding risks and weaknesses in governance and compliance. 

Regulators cited risk management, compliance failures

A September 2023 review by the Federal Reserve Board’s Office of Inspector General said Silvergate’s dependence on crypto depositors, rapid growth and multilayered funding risks led to its liquidation. It also cited significant weaknesses in corporate governance and risk management and said examiners could have acted more aggressively and decisively.

Lane said no regulator had proven that Silvergate’s anti-money laundering (AML) controls failed. In July 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Silvergate Capital, Lane and former chief risk officer Kathleen Fraher with misleading investors about the bank’s AML program and monitoring of crypto customers. 

The regulator alleged that Silvergate’s automated system failed to monitor more than $1 trillion in transactions and that the bank failed to detect nearly $9 billion in suspicious transfers among FTX entities.

Related: Silvergate’s Fraher breaks silence on settlement with Gensler’s SEC

Lane settled the SEC’s charges without admitting or denying the allegations, agreeing to a $1 million penalty and a five-year officer-and-director bar. Separately, the Federal Reserve fined Silvergate $43 million over transaction-monitoring deficiencies. 

Lane also cited interagency crypto-risk statements issued in early 2023 as evidence of pressure against the industry. The statements urged banks to take a cautious approach to crypto-related activities, although the Fed said institutions were neither prohibited nor discouraged from serving any specific customer class. In April 2025, government agencies withdrew the statements.

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Traditional companies in the space like French defense electronics maker Thales (no. 22; up from no. 224 in 2025) and Italian defense and aerospace company Leonardo (no. 25; up from a no. 126 in 2025) are seeing uptick in orders. At the same time, “non-traditional players are entering into the field, especially as suppliers,” Lavandier says. “In particular, a number of automotive players have entered into the fray…sometimes even selling plants, making capacity available.” Thales, for example, recently announced a sovereign drone partnership with French carmaker Renault (no. 42). A number of new startups are also taking this opportunity to translate the investment into innovations, sometimes as standalone products or in partnership with other companies, similar to Anduril’s ventures in the U.S. For example, German drone-maker Quantum Systems, which is currently supplying armed forces in Ukraine, announced significant investment from German telecomm giant Deutsche Telekom (no. 7), which owns the T-mobile brand, and also announced a new partnership with Rheinmetall (no. 287) to co-create an anti-drone shield.  

What products will be impacted by the U.S. and Canadian tariffs?

Former Silvergate Bank CEO Alan Lane says the lender’s 2023 voluntary wind-down was driven less by solvency concerns and more by political pressure tied to the Biden administration. In an inaugural Substack post published Tuesday, Lane argues that Silvergate could have continued operating after meeting large withdrawal demands in late 2022—contradicting the thrust of multiple regulator reviews that pointed to funding, governance, and compliance failures.

The dispute matters beyond Silvergate’s collapse because it sits at the center of a broader, ongoing debate: whether US regulators effectively squeezed crypto-focused banks through risk management scrutiny and supervisory actions, or whether the failures were primarily internal. Lane’s account adds a firsthand perspective to a record that includes Federal Reserve and SEC enforcement actions, as well as official reviews highlighting weaknesses in how the bank managed its concentrated deposit base and compliance obligations.

Key takeaways

• Alan Lane claims Silvergate remained solvent through periods of heavy withdrawals, citing liquid assets that could be sold or pledged.
• Lane attributes the 2023 liquidation decision to “political pressure,” while Federal Reserve-related reviews emphasize funding risks and governance and compliance shortcomings.
• A Federal Reserve Office of Inspector General review in 2023 linked Silvergate’s collapse to its dependence on crypto depositors and multilayered funding risks.
• The SEC charged Silvergate Capital, Lane, and former risk officer Kathleen Fraher in July 2024 over alleged deficiencies in AML-related monitoring and investor disclosures.
• Government agencies later withdrew early-2023 crypto-risk supervisory statements, but regulators’ enforcement actions continued to shape the post-mortem.

Lane argues Silvergate could withstand the withdrawal wave

Lane’s central claim is that Silvergate did not collapse because it lacked liquidity or capital to operate. He wrote that the bank had the capacity to keep running after it satisfied withdrawals equivalent to 70% of its demand deposits during the fourth quarter of 2022.

In the post, Lane argued that liquidation became the path of least resistance only after political pressure intensified. He described a “coordinated attack by the Biden Administration” as the reason Silvergate chose liquidation “in the face of political pressure.”

Lane also pointed to the bank’s reserves and balance sheet actions during the period. In a January 2023 business update, Silvergate reported that digital asset deposits declined 68% from $11.9 billion to $3.8 billion over the quarter. The bank said it sold $5.2 billion in debt securities and recorded a $718 million loss, while reporting $4.6 billion in cash and equivalents at year-end. Lane’s post leans on this picture—liquid assets were available, and funding outflows did not automatically imply insolvency.

Even if Lane’s liquidity framing is accepted, regulators’ accounts differ sharply on what ultimately caused the wind-down. Lane presents a solvency-and-strategy argument; multiple supervisory findings emphasize risk concentration, rapid funding dynamics, and compliance and governance problems.

Regulators’ assessments focus on concentration, governance, and risk controls

A September 2023 review by the Federal Reserve Board’s Office of Inspector General examined Silvergate’s failure, citing the bank’s heavy reliance on crypto depositors, rapid growth, and multilayered funding risks as key drivers behind the decision to liquidate. The review also highlighted weaknesses in corporate governance and risk management, and suggested examiners could have acted more aggressively and decisively.

Lane’s Substack post pushes back on the compliance narrative. He said no regulator had proven that Silvergate’s anti-money laundering (AML) controls failed. That assertion sits in tension with the SEC’s later enforcement actions, which specifically targeted AML monitoring practices and related disclosures.

For investors, this difference is not just rhetorical. If regulators’ conclusions primarily reflect internal control failures, then industry access to banking may be constrained mainly by compliance performance. If, instead, supervisory pressure was the decisive factor, the risk lens for lenders and crypto businesses could shift toward how regulators manage institution-level risk tolerance rather than how firms execute monitoring and governance.

SEC enforcement and the AML-monitoring allegations

Lane’s account also intersects with the SEC’s July 2024 charges. According to the SEC’s press release from that time, the agency charged Silvergate Capital, Alan Lane, and former chief risk officer Kathleen Fraher with misleading investors regarding the bank’s AML program and monitoring of crypto customers.

In the SEC’s allegations, Silvergate’s automated system failed to monitor transactions worth more than $1 trillion, and the bank allegedly failed to detect nearly $9 billion in suspicious transfers involving FTX entities.

Lane later settled the SEC case without admitting or denying the allegations. The SEC reported that the settlement included a $1 million penalty and a five-year officer-and-director bar. Separately, the Federal Reserve fined Silvergate $43 million over transaction-monitoring deficiencies, according to a Federal Reserve enforcement press release dated July 1, 2024.

Taken together, these actions support the core of regulators’ post-mortem: even if deposit withdrawals accelerated stress, supervisory authorities argued the bank’s monitoring and governance posture contributed to its inability to stabilize.

Did the industry face supervisory “pressure”? The withdrawn statements

Lane also cited early-2023 interagency crypto-risk statements as evidence of pressure on the broader industry. The Federal Reserve’s regulatory materials described guidance urging banks to take a cautious approach to crypto-related activities. The Fed also stated that institutions were neither prohibited nor discouraged from serving specific customer classes based solely on that guidance.

However, that episode did not remain permanent. In April 2025, government agencies withdrew the earlier statements, according to a Federal Reserve press release about the withdrawal.

That timeline is important for readers trying to weigh Lane’s claims against the regulatory record. The supervisory stance of early 2023 may have influenced how banks managed crypto-related risk; the later withdrawal suggests agencies eventually reassessed how the guidance was framed. Still, the SEC and Federal Reserve actions tied to Silvergate’s own monitoring and risk controls remained part of the enforcement backdrop—suggesting that whatever broader pressure existed, regulators also found failures in how Silvergate operated.

What to watch next for the “regulation vs. solvency” question

Lane’s Substack post will likely intensify the split between those who view Silvergate’s liquidation as a response to external political and supervisory pressure and those who see it as the logical endpoint of internal risk concentration and control failures. The key question now is whether further filings or proceedings clarify which factors were decisive in the wind-down—and how regulators’ changing guidance will be interpreted going forward by crypto-focused lenders.

Japanese Bitcoin treasury company Metaplanet’s executive stock pool continues to draw shareholder backlash over stock dilution concerns. 

Multiple shareholders objected across social media to Metaplanet’s 10th Series executive option pool, which was designed as 20% of fully diluted shares and automatically expanded as the company issued new shares to fund its Bitcoin (BTC) accumulation.

Bitcoin Magazine CEO David Bailey defended Metaplanet’s executive stock model, saying that giving the team 20% of the cap table over five years “isn’t some crazy number” and that his company has been invested in Metaplanet since “day zero,” in a Tuesday X post.

Source: David Bailey

Some shareholders are now asking Metaplanet to cancel the additional 273 million shares created from the changes and to provide more transparency on future decisions. Metaplanet said it froze the pool at 319.5 million shares on Aug. 18, but critics contend this magnified dilution for existing shareholders, as the pool grew from 46 million shares to 319.5 million.

Pseudonymous Metaplanet shareholder Bitcoin Pharaoh claimed that Bailey personally benefited from Metaplanet’s stock options and received 300,000 options at a 105 Japanese yen strike price, when the stock was trading at 510 yen, as compensation for his role as a strategic board advisor at Metaplanet.

“Set the pool against what the shareholders contributed and the cut is 26% of the bitcoin: of every four coins the shareholders’ money bought, management took one,” wrote Bitcoin Pharaoh in a Wednesday X reply to Bailey.

Related: Metaplanet buys 2,823 BTC, surpasses 43,000 in Bitcoin holdings

Metaplanet CEO addresses MMXX ties 

Metaplanet CEO Simon Gerovich pledged to review the company’s governance and compensation policies and sought to distance himself from Metaplanet shareholder MMXX Ventures, explaining that he is a significant but non-majority shareholder in MMXX’s parent company and holds no executive role. 

“We are continuing to review our governance and compensation policies and will share any updates when that work is complete,” wrote Gerovich in a Sunday X post.

On Aug. 31, Metaplanet revealed that its CEO exercised 92,000 shares from the 10th Series executive options pool.

VanEck’s head of digital asset research, Matthew Sigel, said that Metaplanet should “freeze” further exercise rights from the 10th Series option pool, have holders voluntarily surrender the excess rights and weigh additional options related to the shares that have already been exercised.

“Finally, replace Series 10 with a shareholder-approved, five-year incentive plan tied primarily to BTC per fully diluted share,” wrote Sigel in a Wednesday X post. 

In an Aug. 18 notice, Metaplanet acknowledged that the decision to expand the share pool “amplifies the dilution borne by existing shareholders.” 

Cointelegraph has request comment from Metaplanet on whether it would consider freezing the remaining shares in the executive pool.

Metaplanet stock price, five-day chart. Source: Yahoo Finance

Metaplanet’s shares closed up in Wednesday’s Tokyo trading, trimming their five-day decline to roughly 16.3%, according to Yahoo Finance.

Magazine: Bitcoin adoption metrics say one thing, price action says another

With lawmakers in the US Senate set to consider legislation pushed by many in the cryptocurrency industry for regulatory clarity, there’s a limited window for the bill to become law, potentially delaying it into the next session of Congress with different politics in play.

The US Senate is scheduled to return to session on Monday after more than a month in which lawmakers were on state work periods. Senator John Thune, the Republican majority leader in the chamber, has scheduled a cloture vote on the Digital Asset Market Clarity (CLARITY) Act for Tuesday, in which his compatriots will need support from a handful of Democrats to meet the 60-vote threshold and overcome a filibuster.

Should the bill fail to advance with a three-fifths supermajority, the Senate will have less than 36 days of business before 2027, when a new session of Congress is scheduled to be sworn in, one where Democrats could be in control, depending on the outcome of November’s midterm elections.

Senator Cynthia Lummis, one of CLARITY’s biggest supporters, warned on Sept. 6 that the “next real opportunity” for the bill to pass might not be until 2030 if lawmakers were unable to reach an agreement and send it to the president’s desk. She is also not running for reelection in 2026.

All 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 33 in the Senate are up for grabs in the midterm elections . Event contracts on prediction market platforms currently give Democrats the odds on retaking a majority in the House, while the party’s chances in the Senate are basically a coin flip.

Related: Rushed CLARITY Act vote could set legislation back, Gallego warns

When Republicans took the Senate from Democrats following the 2024 elections, this left the party with a legislative trifecta — control of the Senate, House and the presidency — giving it exceptional influence over passing laws favorable to the crypto industry, including the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for US Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act. A reversal of this party control could likewise leave Republicans approaching bills on Democrats’ terms beginning next year.

Crypto money potentially swaying voters in 2026

Senator Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democratic lawmaker who previously chaired the Senate Banking committee, was voted out in 2024 in a race that saw cryptocurrency-backed political action committee (PAC) Fairshake and many others pouring millions of dollars into ads supporting his opponent, Republican Bernie Moreno.

Now, Brown is back, running in a special election against Republican Jon Husted to complete the term won in 2022 by now-Vice President JD Vance.

A PAC like Fairshake, backed by crypto exchange Coinbase and Ripple Labs, is just one way the industry is pushing to get what it calls more “pro-crypto” lawmakers in Congress. Although many candidates, both Democrat and Republican, supported by Fairshake-backed ads, have gone on to win their 2026 primaries, the PAC hasn’t always been successful. 

In March, Illinois Lieutenant Governor Juliana Stratton won the Democratic primary for one of the state’s US Senate seats despite being the target of industry-funded attack ads. Many incumbents who have voted in favor of bills like GENIUS or CLARITY while in office have found support from crypto PACs, while challengers or those critical of digital assets are sometimes named in negative ads.

“Rep. Auchincloss voted for the CLARITY ACT, which explains why the crypto industry is heavily supportive of his reelection,” said Jason Poulos, a Democratic candidate who ran against Massachusetts Representative Jake Auchincloss in the primary for the state’s 4th congressional district. A Fairshake-affiliated PAC spent about $189,000 on ads supporting Auchincloss. Poulos added:

“The influx of outside crypto industry cash means that these oligarchs have an outsized influence on our representation and federal policies. It is why we need to get big money out of politics […]”

Presidency, regulators unlikely to change before 2029

Whether Democrats retake both chambers of Congress in November, neither, or just one, the result will not change Republican control of the White House until January 2029 and maintaining the power to veto legislation. For example, if the president chooses to veto a Democrat-backed crypto bill, both the House and the Senate would need a two-thirds supermajority vote to override his actions.

In addition, the heads of two of the major financial agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), are unlikely to change while Trump remains in office. The president nominated Paul Atkins to chair the SEC and Michael Selig the CFTC, both of whom have signaled plans to proceed with digital asset regulation if Congress fails to advance CLARITY this year.

Magazine: Is Bitcoin too volatile to risk your retirement on?

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