Since February of this year, the activities of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Taiwan appear to have intensified.
First, from February 1 to March 31, the PLA conducted up to eight “joint combat readiness patrols.”
On April 1 and 2, the PLA conducted military exercises around Taiwan for two consecutive days. The exercise on April 1 was not specifically named, while the exercise on April 2 was designated the codename “Strait Thunder-2025A.” The latter name raises suspicions as to whether this represents another PLA military exercise aimed at undermining Taiwan’s jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait, in addition to the “Joint Sword” exercises.
Overview of PLA Exercises in Early April
On April 1 at 7:46 a.m., the PLA Eastern Theater Command suddenly announced the organization of joint exercises involving the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force around Taiwan.
According to statistics from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), as of April 2 at 6:00 a.m., the PLA had dispatched military aircraft on a total of 76 sorties into the airspace surrounding Taiwan, with 37 of these entering Taiwan’s “response area.” The surface forces deployed included 15 naval vessels and four China Coast Guard ships, of which at least 13 naval vessels and two coast guard ships entered Taiwan’s “response area” and advanced toward the 24-nautical-mile adjacent zone. Additionally, a PLA Navy (PLAN) carrier battle group centered around the Shandong aircraft carrier maneuvered to a tactical position 440 kilometers south of Japan’s Yonaguni Island to conduct relevant exercises.
On the morning of April 2, the PLA Eastern Theater Command suddenly announced at 8:30 a.m. that it would organize the “Strait Thunder-2025A” exercises in the central and southern waters of the Taiwan Strait. They claimed that the focus would be on implementing verification and identification, warning and expulsion, interception and seizure, all aimed at testing the troops’ regional control, joint containment, and precision strike capabilities.
Again, according to statistics from the MND, from 6:00 a.m. on April 2 to 6:00 a.m. on April 3, the PLA dispatched a total of 59 sorties of military aircraft into the airspace surrounding Taiwan, with 31 of these entering Taiwan’s “response area.” Surface forces included a total of 23 naval vessels and eight Coast Guard ships, including the Shandong aircraft carrier battle group, of which at least 13 naval vessels and eight Coast Guard ships entered Taiwan’s “response area.” Additionally, the Shandong aircraft carrier battle group moved to a location 330 kilometers south of Yonaguni Island to conduct related exercises.
Four Key Characteristics of PLA Exercises in Early April
During the PLA exercises on April 1 and 2, four noteworthy points emerged.
First, during these two days, Chinese state media released numerous images that were difficult to verify in terms of timing, coinciding with the PLA exercises. Among the most striking was on April 2, when the PLA conducted live-fire exercises with long-range rockets from Zhejiang Province, located hundreds of kilometers from Taiwan. This was accompanied by a meticulously produced video that created the impression that the PLA was simulating the destruction of the Yong’an natural gas receiving station in Taiwan.
Additionally, on April 1, China released images of H-6K bombers participating in the exercises while carrying air-launched YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship missiles. If the footage of the H-6K taking off with munitions indeed originated from the April 1 exercises, it would represent China’s first public disclosure of the use of air-launched YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship missiles in exercises around Taiwan.
This not only indicates the PLA’s preparation to counter U.S. “anti-access/area denial” operations but also suggests a scenario where bombers could operate from the edge or even beyond the operational radius of Taiwanese aircraft, utilizing air-launched hypersonic anti-ship missiles to target fleets of the Taiwanese navy engaged in “combat power preservation” or maintaining maritime supply lines in the eastern waters of Taiwan.
Second, the composition and distribution of the PLA aircraft formations on April 1 seem to indicate that the PLA simultaneously deployed a “systematic strike formation” in the northern region of Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait, and the southwestern to southeastern airspace around Taiwan. Each formation consisted of a mixed group of fighter jets, bombers, support aircraft, and drones.
These three “systematic strike formations,” along with the Shandong aircraft carrier battle group and other naval vessels in the surrounding waters, jointly executed rehearsals of a “joint air and sea blockade operation” and “joint fire strike operations” against Taiwan.
Third, the focus of the PLA’s “Strait Thunder-2025A” exercises on April 2 appears to be the actions of China Coast Guard vessels in the waters surrounding Taiwan.
On that day, among the eight China Coast Guard ships operating near Taiwan, two formations consisting of four vessels were suspected of directly crossing the median line of the Strait to approach the northern and central waters of Taiwan, encroaching upon Taiwan’s contiguous zone. Additionally, at least one China Coast Guard vessel was reported to have entered within the 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone off Taiwan’s eastern coast.
If verified, this would mark a continuation of China’s actions following the “Joint Sword-2024B” exercises on October 14 of last year, setting a precedent for China Coast Guard vessels directly crossing the median line of the Strait and intruding into Taiwan’s eastern contiguous zone.
Fourth, the movements of the Shandong aircraft carrier battle group are significant.
According to media reports, the Shandong did not enter the Western Pacific from the Bashi Channel; instead, after departing from its home port in Sanya, Hainan, it first conducted exercises in the Zhanjiang area with other accompanying vessels. It then began to head south, gradually moving out of the monitoring range of the Taiwanese military.
Subsequently, the Shandong and its accompanying vessels entered the Western Pacific via the waters off Palawan Island in the Philippines, and then proceeded northward. On March 31, they entered the contingency zone southeast of Taiwan, which may be interpreted as a deliberate show of force, before moving toward a tactical position approximately 440 kilometers south of Yonaguni Island.
If the reports are accurate, this would indicate that the PLA, following the “Joint Sword-2024B” exercises, is once again practicing fleet maneuvers outside the monitoring range of the Taiwanese military.
This strategy involves unexpectedly positioning forces around Taiwan, thereby confusing Taiwanese military assessments regarding when the PLA could complete its preparations for an attack, potentially leading to a tactical surprise against the Taiwanese government and military.
Notably, during the “Joint Sword-2024B” exercises, the Chinese naval fleet entered the Western Pacific via the Tsushima Strait and subsequently turned westward near the Okinotorishima area to rendezvous with the Liaoning aircraft carrier, which was advancing eastward from the Bashi Channel.
Three Major Motivations Behind the PLA Exercises in Early April
Following President Lai Ching-te’s convening of a national security high-level meeting on March 13, during which he personally announced 17 response strategies, the PLA conducted “joint combat readiness patrols” twice around Taiwan on March 17. However, statements from Chinese officials indicate that the primary target of the military exercises on that day was the United States, with the Lai administration – accused by China of “relying on foreign powers to seek independence” – being the secondary focus.
On March 17, China, through Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, “passively” confirmed the PLA’s military exercises around Taiwan in response to a journalist’s question, likely employing a premeditated approach. On that day, both Mao and Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua emphasized that the military actions represented a “resolute response to external forces’ persistent indulgence and support for pro-independence activities” and a “stern warning against external interference and provocations,” clearly targeting the United States.
As for why there was no simultaneous response to Lai’s 17 strategies on March 17, one possible reason is that Beijing wanted to ensure Washington received a clear message. Additionally, at that time, Beijing may not have yet decided how to respond to Lai’s move.
Regarding the PLA exercises conducted around Taiwan from April 1 to 2, three major motivations can be inferred: First, to make a clear statement in response to the multiple measures adopted by the Lai government since March 13 concerning cross-strait relations. Second, to deploy maritime law enforcement to patrol and enforce laws east of the median line, thereby supporting the legal warfare against Taiwan. Third, to create leverage for negotiations with the Trump administration by escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
Following the commencement of the exercises on April 1, both the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Eastern Theater Command, along with imagery released by Chinese officials, clearly expressed strong criticism toward the Taiwanese government and even targeted Lai personally.
Furthermore, prior to the military exercises in early April, on March 26, the Taiwan Affairs Office issued a total of nine press releases criticizing the Lai administration, two of which explicitly mentioned Lai by name in their titles. This indicates that Beijing likely made the decision to conduct a significant military demonstration specifically aimed at the Lai government shortly before March 26. The decision-making and execution process took only about a week.
As a result, the PLA’s exercises on April 1 and 2 were an expanded and modified version of the “joint combat readiness patrols.” In addition to incorporating several land exercise components and the Shandong aircraft carrier battle group, the PLA also directed its aircraft and naval vessels to deliberately approach the main island of Taiwan. This was further complemented by relevant imagery to enhance the political impact of the demonstration.
Perhaps due to the shorter preparation time, the number of exercise subjects and scenarios was limited. Furthermore, on April 1, no additional code name was assigned, beyond the now-routine designation of “joint combat readiness patrols.”
Legal Warfare and Diplomatic Considerations
Additionally, on April 1 and 2, the China Coast Guard and the Eastern Theater Command sequentially announced plans to “organize law enforcement patrols, conduct inspections and arrests, and intercept and seize” in exercises around Taiwan. The China Coast Guard further emphasized that these actions are conducted in accordance with the “One China Principle” to manage operations concerning the island of Taiwan.
The deliberate messages released by Chinese officials, coupled with the actions of the China Coast Guard around Taiwan on April 2, appear to be intended to further create the impression of the China Coast Guard exercising jurisdiction east of the median line in the Taiwan Strait. This aims to support Beijing’s legal warfare in the Taiwan Strait.
Finally, since the commencement of the exercises on April 1, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian has not mentioned the United States but has focused on criticizing Lai for “escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.” She further accused President Lai of being a “destroyer of cross-strait peace” and a “creator of crises in the Taiwan Strait.”
This may indicate that Beijing has deliberately heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait, taking advantage of the Trump administration’s concerns about the U.S. military lacking a clear advantage in the Western Pacific, which has led to a reluctance to become prematurely involved in military conflicts with China. This strategy aims to create leverage for negotiations with the Trump administration.
