India and Sri Lanka signed seven Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the island on April 4-6. The MoUs cover a range of sectors, including defense, energy, digital infrastructure, health, and trade. Key among these is the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Coming almost four decades after the controversial deployment and pull out of the Indian Peace Keeping Force from the island, the DCA signals the end of a bitter chapter in India-Sri Lanka defense cooperation and is a milestone in bilateral relations. Importantly, it marks a shift in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy.
Noted Sri Lankan foreign policy analyst Asanga Abeyagoonasekera, who is senior fellow at The Millennium Project in Washington D.C. and former founding director general of the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) at the Ministry of Defense in Sri Lanka, told The Diplomat’s South Asia editor, Sudha Ramachandran, that while the DCA can benefit both countries, the “limited transparency” and “lack of consultation” over its provisions could “create long-term security concerns.”
“Without a concerted effort to inform and involve the public, the strategic and economic benefits of these agreements may not be fully realized,” he warned.
The Defense Cooperation Agreement signed during Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka has been described as “historic.” What does it provide for?
The DCA has been described as “historic” with good reason. It marks the first time India and Sri Lanka have entered into a formalized framework for defense cooperation, reflecting a significant evolution in bilateral security relations. The DCA introduces a structured approach to addressing shared security threats, particularly in the realm of nontraditional security challenges.
Historically, the absence of a structured defense mechanism has had severe consequences, most notably during the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks in 2019, which claimed the lives of over 250 civilians. Despite India having prior intelligence, the lack of an institutionalized framework impeded effective communication and threat assessment, underscoring the necessity of a mechanism such as the DCA.
The groundwork for this agreement was laid from years of annual defense dialogues and during the Colombo Defense Conclave, established under the previous administration of Ranil Wickremesinghe, with India playing a key role. A trilateral framework involving India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives was also developed to advance regional defense cooperation and intelligence sharing. Both India and Sri Lanka have been working together and cooperating with extraregional powers on addressing common challenges such as terrorism, extremism, piracy, trafficking, and cyber threats in the region.
Despite being hailed as a success by the current governments in both India and Sri Lanka, the DCA has raised concerns due to its limited transparency. The lack of consultation with Sri Lankan parliamentarians and civil society actors has contributed to a perception of opacity surrounding the DCA, risking a significant erosion of public trust. This absence of transparency could fuel skepticism within Colombo’s political and civic circles. If the full text of the DCA is not made publicly available from Right to Information (RTI), it would represent a serious shortcoming — one that may create long-term security concerns and suggest that India has yet to fully learn from the missteps of past bilateral engagements.
Does the DCA signal a decisive Sri Lankan pivot to India? How could it impact Sri Lanka’s foreign policy choices?
The DCA marks a significant strategic shift, drawing Sri Lanka more firmly into India’s regional security calculus. It aligns with New Delhi’s ambition to assert itself as a “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean, enabling more cohesive responses to emerging regional threats. The remarks by India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, echoing Sri Lanka’s President Anura Kumara Dissanayake — that Sri Lankan territory will not be used in any manner inimical to India’s interests — were received by Delhi as a strategic achievement long in the making. For India, the DCA addresses long-standing concerns ranging from the docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo to Marine Scientific Research (MSR) in its near waters. This agreement thus serves as a cornerstone in India’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy, while also redefining the contours of Colombo’s balancing act among competing external powers.
Under the DCA framework, potential concerns — such as the presence of Chinese MSR vessels — can be addressed proactively through established communication channels and joint threat assessments. This mechanism allows for the de-escalation of misunderstandings and fosters transparency between strategic partners. Importantly, based on conversations with Sri Lankan defense officials, there is no current perception of these Chinese vessels posing a direct threat. Their presence, while sometimes politically sensitive, has not been assessed as a security risk by local defense authorities.
However, this closer alignment with India also challenges Sri Lanka’s long-standing foreign policy doctrine of non-alignment. The DCA may be perceived as a pivot towards India, which could strain relations with China and provoke a recalibration of Beijing’s strategic posture towards Sri Lanka. It is plausible that China may seek to counterbalance this development through increased economic or defense engagements of its own.
More than a bilateral DCA, Sri Lanka would have benefited from advocating for a Regional Defense Agreement (RDA) inclusive of all South Asian nations. As a traditionally nonaligned country striving to maintain equilibrium among major powers — including China — Sri Lanka’s strategic posture aligns more naturally with multilateral regional security cooperation than exclusive bilateral alignments. Unfortunately, South Asia lacks a coherent regional security architecture due to deep-rooted mistrust among states and the stagnation of platforms like SAARC. In this vacuum, with China’s rising maritime and geopolitical footprint, India is increasingly keen to anchor its periphery nations within its own security calculus. Yet Delhi is well aware that Beijing’s regional diplomatic toolkit — ranging from infrastructure investments to strategic partnerships — is currently more expansive and persuasive. I analyze this strategic imbalance across South and Southeast Asia in greater depth in my forthcoming book, “Winds of Change” (Singapore, World Scientific Publishers, August 2025).
Further complicating the situation is the contentious Katchatheevu Island issue, which has resurfaced in Indian political discourse, particularly during electoral cycles. Prime Minister Modi’s remarks on reclaiming the island have unsettled many Sri Lankans and may erode trust unless addressed by India through respecting its own historical decision, which is that Katchatheevu Island belongs to Sri Lanka.
For the DCA to succeed and avoid domestic backlash, it must be integrated into a broader strategy of trust-building between the two nations. This includes addressing long-standing bilateral irritants such as the arrest of Indian fishermen, the issue of Indian bottom trawling, and the grievances of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka — while also respecting Sri Lanka’s sovereignty on sensitive matters such as the Katchatheevu dispute.
How will the DCA address Indian fears about China’s influence in Sri Lanka?
The signing of the DCA parallels a historical moment akin to the introduction of the 13th Amendment in 1987, which also suffered from a lack of inclusive consultation. The resulting mistrust contributed to domestic instability, including armed insurrections led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) — the party that President Dissanayake currently leads, which has in recent decades adopted a reformist stance.
China’s Charge d’affaires Zhu Yanwei distributes dry rations to 2,470 flood-affected families across Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi, Jaffna, and Mannar, in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, February 10, 2025. X/Chinese Embassy in Sri Lanka
Unlike India, China does not bear the weight of historical baggage in its relations with Sri Lanka, which affords it greater flexibility in public perception. There will be actors to exploit the lack of transparency surrounding the DCA to deepen its influence, especially among constituencies concerned about Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.
Without widespread public support and parliamentary scrutiny, the DCA risks facing similar resistance as the 13th Amendment, which was only partially implemented due to nationalist fears of devolution and perceived encroachment by India. Ultra-nationalist sentiments, although reshaped over time, remain a potent force in Sri Lankan politics.
In its current preliminary form, the DCA is unlikely to curb Chinese influence decisively. Instead, its success will hinge on how well it is integrated into domestic policy frameworks, communicated to the public, and aligned with Sri Lanka’s own national interest and sovereignty. While strategic analysts in New Delhi may interpret the DCA as a significant step toward countering China’s footprint on the island, such an assessment may be premature. At this initial stage, it would be prudent to adopt a more cautious and measured evaluation of the agreement’s long-term geopolitical implications.
How does Sri Lanka benefit from the DCA?
The DCA holds potential benefits for Sri Lanka, provided it aligns with the country’s officially adopted National Defense Policy (NDP). Approved by the Sri Lankan Cabinet on November 11, 2019, the NDP — of which I was a contributing member in my capacity as director general of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) — emphasizes sovereignty, transparency, and strategic collaboration.
The DCA can be an effective mechanism to streamline defense cooperation, reducing the need for ad hoc responses to every security incident. It also opens the door to institutionalizing joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and strategic planning — especially in nontraditional domains such as cyber security, disaster response, and maritime security.
Sri Lanka stands to gain significantly in the maritime domain, where Indian expertise and training opportunities could strengthen its naval and coast guard capabilities. Many Sri Lankan defense personnel already receive training in Indian defense institutions, and the DCA can formalize and expand such opportunities. Furthermore, the agreement has the potential to foster greater operational synergy in the maritime space. A pertinent example of such collaborative potential occurred when a Chinese fishing vessel capsized in the Indian Ocean: Sri Lankan Navy divers — trained in India — successfully carried out a recovery mission with the assistance of a U.S. Coast Guard vessel donated to Sri Lanka. This incident underscores the importance of building multilateral operational synergies. While the DCA may strengthen bilateral ties, it should also serve as a framework to facilitate broader regional cooperation, rather than limiting strategic engagement solely to India and Sri Lanka.
The agreements signed during Modi’s visit reflect a shift in India’s focus to the Eastern Province. What underlies the shift?
India’s renewed interest in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province is driven largely by the strategic value of Trincomalee, a deep-water harbor that served as a critical Allied naval base during World War II. India’s vision of developing an energy hub in the region — encompassing power distribution, oil storage, and bunkering facilities — reflects a shift from earlier Chinese-led development in the South, notably the Hambantota Port.
One of the seven MoUs signed during Prime Minister Modi’s visit includes energy cooperation, with provisions for electricity trade between the two nations. This reflects broader Indo-Sri Lankan ambitions to integrate energy markets and enhance regional interdependence.
However, the success of such initiatives will depend largely on transparency and public engagement. Public skepticism and the perception of backroom diplomacy continue to undermine public support for foreign agreements. Without a concerted effort to inform and involve the public, the strategic and economic benefits of these agreements may not be fully realized.
Strong and violent opposition greeted the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987. The response is muted now. Why?
The strong and often violent opposition that followed the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987 — most notably by the JVP, which launched an armed insurrection resulting in the loss of over 60,000 JVP cadres — stands in sharp contrast to the relatively muted response to the current DCA. This shift can largely be attributed to the transformation of the JVP and its current leader, President Dissanayake, who is now widely regarded as a pragmatic reformist. Dissanayake’s electoral victory was not primarily driven by the party’s traditional hardline base but by a broader reformist constituency, particularly among the youth, seeking systemic change and economic revival in a country that faced bankruptcy just a few years ago.
While some critics view his policy direction as a continuation of the previous administration’s (notably Wickremesinghe’s) orientation, there is evidence of political pragmatism in Dissanayake’s engagement with regional powers, including India. The earlier anti-India rhetoric that characterized JVP ideology appears significantly toned down in this context. However, this political latitude is conditional. The reformist voter base — especially younger constituents — remains highly sensitive to issues of transparency and accountability. If agreements such as the DCA are not clearly communicated and aligned with principles of sovereignty and public interest, there is a risk of reigniting anti-India sentiment, potentially destabilizing the very reformist mandate that brought Dissanayake to power.
How would you describe Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under the JVP-led National People’s power (NPP) government?
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under the JVP-led NPP government has taken a markedly pragmatic and balanced approach, skillfully navigating relationships with the three major powers in the region: the United States, India, and China. In a short period, President Dissanayake has demonstrated a capacity to engage diplomatically and strategically with each of these actors, securing tangible outcomes for Sri Lanka’s struggling economy.
A standout achievement was Dissanayake’s recent state visit to China, where he successfully negotiated $3.7 billion in foreign direct investment — the largest such investment secured by a Sri Lankan leader in recent memory — for the development of a major oil refinery. The signing of 15 MoUs during this visit, spanning multiple sectors, underscored the depth and breadth of cooperation with Beijing and marked a significant diplomatic victory for the new administration.
With India, the DCA and several new bilateral MoUs reflect a strengthening of India-Lanka ties. Symbolic gestures — such as conferring one of Sri Lanka’s highest civilian honors on Prime Minister Modi — further reinforce the political goodwill underpinning this relationship. Such acts are more than ceremonial; they serve as strategic signals that help manage future tensions and create space for deeper cooperation.
Meanwhile, the United States and other Western allies, including the European Union and Japan, have responded positively to the NPP government’s reform-oriented stance. The continuation of International Monetary Fund (IMF)-backed reforms, the resumption of key infrastructure projects such as Japan’s Light Rail Transit (LRT) initiative, and EU development cooperation are all signs that Dissanayake’s foreign policy has gained credibility among Western partners.
In summary, the NPP’s foreign policy is off to a strong start, characterized by balanced engagement, economic diplomacy, and strategic pragmatism. The key challenge ahead lies in maintaining this diplomatic equilibrium while ensuring that domestic economic gains are realized and sustained. The ability to institutionalize this momentum will determine the long-term success of Sri Lanka’s external relations under the new administration.
The Adani wind power project in Mannar seems poised to make a comeback. Your views?
The potential revival of the Adani wind power project in Mannar reflects the evolving nature of energy diplomacy and economic pragmatism under the current government. While the project was previously met with concerns — particularly regarding transparency in the procurement process and the high Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) rates — the present administration has signaled a willingness to reassess such initiatives, provided that terms are renegotiated with greater transparency and more favorable pricing.
Sri Lanka, as an island nation with significant untapped wind and solar potential, must diversify its renewable energy portfolio. This includes welcoming a broader range of international investors beyond Adani, from various countries, to foster competition and innovation in the sector. A transparent and competitive bidding process will not only ensure fairer pricing but also strengthen public confidence and institutional integrity.
It is also important to contextualize the geopolitical undercurrents surrounding energy projects. India’s prior security concerns over Chinese involvement in Sri Lanka’s wind energy sector contributed to strained bilateral ties. However, such issues can now be addressed more constructively through mechanisms like the DCA, which offers a platform to align strategic interests while avoiding zero-sum approaches.
In essence, while Adani’s re-entry into Sri Lanka’s renewable energy landscape is welcome under revised and transparent terms, the broader priority must be to build an inclusive, competitive, and strategically balanced energy sector that contributes to the country’s long-term energy security and economic resilience.
The concerns raised by ultra-nationalist factions — that India is seeking to dominate Sri Lanka’s energy sector to gain economic control — should be addressed not through rhetoric but through tangible improvements in process. Transparent, competitive bidding mechanisms, clear regulatory frameworks, and rigorous accountability in the selection and negotiation with investors will be the most effective way to dispel such fears and restore public trust.
The rights of Tamils used to be an important issue for India in its relations with Sri Lanka in the past. Not anymore, it seems. Your comments?
Prime Minister Modi and External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar have consistently acknowledged the grievances of the Tamil community, reaffirming India’s commitment to a just and lasting reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. Modi’s recent meeting with Tamil political party leaders was a constructive gesture, signaling continued support for long-standing issues such as post-war reconciliation, the plight of missing persons, and broader human rights concerns that have persisted since the end of the war in 2009.
The current Sri Lankan government has reiterated its preference for a domestic mechanism, distancing itself from international involvement — a position held by successive administrations. However, this approach has often resulted in delayed or stalled progress. The present government has a unique opportunity to shift the narrative. During the campaign trail, it actively engaged with the Sri Lankan diaspora, particularly Tamil diaspora communities, laying the groundwork for a diaspora re-engagement strategy. Unlike previous regimes — such as the Rajapaksa administration, which viewed the term “diaspora” with suspicion — this government appears more open to leveraging the diaspora as a positive force for reconciliation and development.
Sri Lanka’s long-term stability and development must be inclusive, with reconciliation processes that genuinely address the concerns of the Tamil community and foster unity among all ethnic and religious groups. Winning hearts and minds through trust-building, transparency, and accountability will be crucial in forging a shared national future.
