As President Donald Trump and his administration set about tearing up the foundations of the international order and U.S. global leadership, and discarding decades worth of soft power, it is an understatement to say that middle powers like Australia are left in an extremely delicate position.
Trump has threatened allies with tariffs, abandoned Ukraine to the predations of Russia while attempting to strongarm Kyiv out of their mineral resources, and laid claim to other countries’ sovereign territory.
While the fundamentals of the Australia-US. alliance seemingly remain in place – for now – how would the government respond if Trump or his online attack dog and “special government employee” Elon Musk turned their ire on Australia or major bilateral and regional agreements in Asia?
Quiet, slow, and steady has been the approach from Canberra so far: bend with the breeze and adjust to speak Trump’s language.
The government and senior officials have sought to make the case for Australia as clearly and confidently as possible, while looking to articulate existing programs and commitments in a way that is compatible with Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s framing of U.S. foreign policy: Does this action make America safer, stronger, and more prosperous?
One example of this is that Australia’s Trade Minister Don Farrell has already pivoted to framing the $368 billion cost of the AUKUS program as a potential investment in the United States, rather than emphasizing the new submarines’ deterrent purpose, as was previously the norm.
However, the transactional, extractive nature of Trump’s present foreign policy has already been made obvious.
Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru has sought to shore up their alliance with a promised $1 trillion in new investment in the U.S., along with buying more American natural gas. Trump demanded $500 billion in mineral resources from Ukraine in return for the support offered to date.
Meanwhile, Australian aluminum and steel exports have been subjected to tariffs of 25 percent, as part of a blanket policy that makes no distinction between U.S. allies and others. Threats have been made against any country that seeks to impose certain forms of regulation on U.S. technology firms like Amazon and Meta, and key Trump trade officials have noted their displeasure with Australia’s GST and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.
The critical question that the government and opposition need to ask themselves at this moment – though really, they should have done so long before now – is where are Australia’s red lines? To what would Australia say “no” if it is demanded by our major ally and what costs are we willing to bear for that decision?
How much more would we be willing to pay to acquire AUKUS submarines if asked by Trump? How much distortion to our tax base would we countenance? Is the alliance worth foregoing affordable medicine and surrendering to the creeping influence of Big Tech? Even in non-economic terms, at what point would national pride and self-worth require us to take a stand?
Looking abroad, some European powers – most notably Germany since the election of new Chancellor Friedrich Merz – are talking about pursuing “real independence from the U.S.” and questioning the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in its current form. This experience is hardly instructive for Australia, though, as we cannot instead band together with continental allies and fellow members of an already-established political and economic union if we faced abandonment by our principal ally.
There is, quite simply, no ready replacement for the United States in Australia’s foreign and security policy, whether as an individual state or part of a multilateral institution.
Without U.S. support, for instance, AUKUS could not meaningfully continue. Australia would be left without a replacement submarine capability as even the United Kingdom’s vessels are reliant on U.S. nuclear reactor technology, which cannot be shared with Australia without Washington’s permission.
Similarly, the effectiveness of the Quad is dependent upon the economic and geopolitical heft of the U.S. to complement the unique advantages and contributions of Australia, India, and Japan. It, too, is unlikely to continue should the U.S. quit the field.
As important as regional bodies like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) are, they don’t serve the same purpose as Australia’s alliance with the United States. Larger Indo-Pacific partners like India, Indonesia, and Japan have neither the means or inclination to act as a security guarantor for Australia.
That is not to say that there is no role to be played by coalitions of like-minded middle powers. Immediately surrendering to a might is right, dog-eat-dog mentality only hurts Australia’s security, regional stability and that of smaller states. Australia is already demonstrating strategic intent by pursuing bilateral security agreements with Pacific states and taking on a more significant and enduring role in the provision of physical and economic security across the region.
Other initiatives like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) trade agreement – of which Australia is the chair in 2025 – were pursued without U.S. involvement, too. Locally and regionally, key norms and practices should still be upheld and protected.
However, this leadership role would come with a significant financial cost.
An Australia that was fully self-reliant for all its security needs would need to spend much more on defense than it does now. It would also require a substantial shift in our national mindset away from our historically preferred mode of operation as a secondary contributor within coalitions led by great powers. The opportunity for substantial burden-sharing would have disappeared, and we would be largely on our own.
That said, none of this is guaranteed to come to pass.
Australian diplomats are working tirelessly to seek exemptions from existing tariffs and head off any future measures. At least for now, we may need to bite our tongues in pursuit of the national interest and make the long-term play.
To revive a Trump 1.0 unit of measurement, we’re only 3.5 Scaramuccis into this term of office. A whole lot more could happen in the next month, let alone the two years until the mid-term elections, or the four years until the end of Trump’s presidency.
There’s only so much we can control, but that process starts with facing up to reality and taking an uncompromising look at what matters most to Australia, unconstrained by the norms, history, and practices that Trump has shown he is all too willing to discard, and how we can achieve that in the world as we now find it – with or without U.S. leadership.
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.
