College graduation in China once meant a steady job and a path upward. Now, for many young people, it marks the beginning of a long wait. Official data revealed that the urban unemployment rate climbed to 5.4 percent in February, the highest in two years. For young people aged 16 to 24, the situation was even bleaker: joblessness hit 16.9 percent, more than triple the national average.
In late March, Chinese state media trumpeted a new employment action plan, promising to boost job creation in strategic sectors and encouraging entrepreneurship. The announcement brimmed with optimism, yet the details were frustratingly vague – especially for the millions of college graduates desperate for a foothold in a sputtering economy.
For a country that prides itself on meticulous planning, this mismatch between rhetoric and reality feels like a missed opportunity. China’s youth are not just numbers on a spreadsheet; they are the backbone of its future growth, and Beijing can – and must – do more to harness their potential.
This isn’t a typical unemployment crisis. China’s young people face pressures unlike those of any generation before them. Most are only children, products of the decades-long one-child policy, now tasked with supporting aging parents in a society where the elderly population is swelling rapidly. By 2035, nearly a third of China’s citizens will be over 60, and the burden of care – financial, emotional, and physical – will fall squarely on today’s youth.
At the same time, the job market they’re entering is unforgiving. The tech sector, once a beacon for ambitious graduates, has been battered by regulatory crackdowns. Real estate, another economic pillar, is mired in a debt crisis that’s stifled hiring. Meanwhile, the number of college graduates keeps rising – expected to hit a record 12.22 million this summer. For these young people, the promise of education as a ticket to stability is starting to ring hollow.
Yet the prevailing narrative about China’s youth often misses the reality of their resilience. Popular discourse, both domestically and abroad, fixates on the “lying flat” phenomenon – young people supposedly checking out of the rat race, content to idle away their days. That caricature, though convenient, fails to capture what’s happening on the ground.
Look closer, and you’ll see a generation scrambling to adapt. In rural counties, young entrepreneurs have turned to short-video platforms to hawk local goods – think handmade crafts or farm-fresh produce – eking out a modest few hundred yuan daily through sheer ingenuity. In cities, others are testing the waters with weekend market stalls, pooling meager savings to start small ventures. These aren’t the moves of a generation giving up; they’re the scrappy, creative efforts of people determined to make do in a system that’s failing them.
Their resourcefulness doesn’t stop there. Young people are quietly reshaping their spending habits, swapping imported luxury brands for affordable domestic alternatives. Starbucks runs are replaced by home-brewed tea, and fancy dinners out give way to shared meals at home.
But here’s the twist: even as they pinch pennies on daily expenses, many of China’s youth are pouring money into skill development – online courses in coding, design, or English, anything that might give them an edge. This blend of frugality and ambition reveals a generation not defined by apathy but by a pragmatic determination to forge their own paths.
The question is whether Beijing will match that resolve with policies bold enough to create lasting opportunities.
The government’s current strategies, however, fall short of the mark. Past employment drives – job fairs, subsidies for small businesses, and campaigns to funnel youth into rural roles – have yielded mixed results at best. Guangdong’s 2023 plan to send 300,000 young people to the countryside sounded ambitious, but many graduates balked at the idea of leaving cities for low-paying, low-prospect gigs. March’s hyped-up action plan promises jobs in “key sectors” like advanced manufacturing and AI, but it’s light on how it will bridge the gap for college-educated youth who dominate the unemployment rolls.
Incremental tweaks won’t suffice when the scale of a challenge this vast. China needs a game-changer – a state-led initiative that doesn’t just plug holes but reimagines how young people fit into the economy.
History provides a compelling model for such a shift. In the 1930s, the United States faced its own youth employment crisis amid the Great Depression. President Franklin Roosevelt responded with the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), a radical yet practical program that put millions of young men to work on public projects – planting forests, building roads, and conserving land. They earned modest wages, gained skills, and left with credentials that later fueled the United States’ postwar boom.
The CCC didn’t just tide people over; it turned a restless generation into an economic asset, priming the nation for decades of prosperity. China could adapt this model to its own needs, crafting a modern equivalent that channels the energy of its youth into projects aligned with today’s priorities.
Envision a Chinese CCC for the 21st century. Millions of young people could be mobilized for state-backed projects – building green infrastructure like solar farms or wind turbines, digitizing rural healthcare with telemedicine networks, or rehabilitating ecosystems strained by decades of rapid industrialization. They’d earn a living wage, far steadier than the gig economy’s ups and downs, while picking up technical skills and professional certifications. In rural areas, they could train locals in e-commerce or renewable energy maintenance, sparking grassroots growth. In cities, they could bolster public services strained by rapid urbanization.
This isn’t charity – it’s an investment. Young workers with income and purpose would spend more, boosting consumption at a time when China’s economy desperately needs it. The ripple effects could stabilize a workforce increasingly disillusioned by dead-end prospects.
The parallels to Roosevelt’s CCC aren’t perfect, of course. China’s economy is more intricate, its youth more educated, and its challenges intertwined with the global trade environment. But the core logic holds: a bold, centralized push can align individual ambition with national priorities. Beijing has the tools to make it work – vast central fiscal resources, a knack for mobilizing labor, and a track record of mega-projects. What’s missing is the vision to see youth unemployment not as a liability but as an opportunity. The state has long excelled at steering industrial policy; why not apply that same muscle to human capital?
Skeptics might argue this is too costly or ambitious, but the cost of inaction is steeper. A generation left to fend for itself risks not just economic stagnation but social unrest – a prospect the Chinese Communist Party can ill afford as it navigates an aging population and slowing growth. The CCC wasn’t cheap either, yet it paid off by revitalizing the United States’ workforce and infrastructure. China’s leaders often invoke “high-quality development” as a mantra; a youth-focused public works program fits that bill, delivering tangible gains in skills, jobs, and morale.
Nor is this about forcing young people into roles they’d resent. The beauty of a modern CCC is its flexibility – tailor it to the strengths of China’s graduates. Tech-savvy youth could lead digital initiatives; engineering majors could design sustainable systems; humanities grads could spearhead community outreach. Pair that with practical incentives – loan forgiveness, housing stipends, or even fast-tracked civil service entry – and it’s a package that could lure even the most skeptical.
The “lying flat” crowd isn’t slacking off; they’re disillusioned. Millions of young Chinese are hustling in the margins and scraping by on ingenuity and grit. Give them a mission worth believing in, and they’ll rise to it.
Beijing’s latest employment plan hints at the right instincts – jobs in strategic sectors, attention to youth – but it stops short of the transformative leap China needs. The data from February is a wake-up call: 16.9 percent youth unemployment is a crisis that won’t resolve itself. A Chinese CCC could be that chance – a bold, state-led investment in the country’s future. Roosevelt’s vision lifted the United States from despair to prosperity. With the right execution, China’s could do the same and turn a restless cohort into an engine for growth.
