Marco Rubio’s appointment as Donald Trump’s secretary of state raised hopes among some Latin American governments and analysts that the region would once again figure among the United States’ diplomatic priorities. Will the United States under President Trump and Secretary Rubio devote more attention to Latin America, and in particular try to contain China’s growing clout in the region?
Rubio’s Latino background, his experience as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and his credentials as an opponent of China and socialist autocracies in Latin America were seen as indicators of his willingness to engage further with countries in the region. However, regardless of the leanings or predisposition of the secretary of state, significant hurdles must be overcome for there to be more meaningful engagement between the Trump administration and Latin American countries.
First of all, it is crucial to understand what counts as Latin America for U.S. policymakers, regardless of who occupies the White House. Washington’s concerns in the region revolve mainly around three themes. The first two are by far the most important from a domestic political standpoint: controlling migration into the United States, particularly illegal migration, and combating the flow of illicit drugs – previously dominated by cocaine but now centered on fentanyl. A distant third concern involves reversing the democratic decline in neighboring countries, primarily by containing socialist autocracies.
Within these priorities, the United States’ focus remains on its immediate periphery: Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean basin. Mexico, Central America, Colombia, and Venezuela are seen as hotspots for addressing illegal immigration and illicit drug trafficking. Regarding socialist autocracies, the primary targets of the U.S. containment strategy have been Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
Whatever small amount of attention U.S. policymakers can devote to Latin America will be concentrated on these priorities. Tellingly, only one of Rubio’s first 20 or so calls as secretary of state was reported to be to an incumbent leader in the region (Costa Rica), underscoring the low priority of broader Latin American engagement in Washington’s foreign policy agenda.
What does this mean for the rest of the region? It probably means business as usual. China has long surpassed the United States as the primary trading partner and source of financing for most countries in South America. Besides China, intra-Mercosur trade and trade with the European Union are more relevant than that with the United States for some countries in the region. And while U.S. investors remain the top source of foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in several countries, new flows from the United States have diminished in importance. Chinese investment, in particular, has grown and diversified. China originally focused on big projects involving state-owned entities’ investment in natural resources and infrastructure. More recent Chinese projects involve private companies investing in manufacturing consumer products and components for the green economy.
For some time now, South American countries have relied on a diversified set of international relations as sources of investment, credit, and diplomatic support. While the absence of a more permanent U.S. role may be lamented by some, particularly during the tenure of hard-right regimes in Argentina under Javier Milei and previously in Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro, these countries have long been accustomed to pursuing their own paths. The trend toward regional autonomy and diversification of partnerships appears set to continue, regardless of changes in U.S. policy.
One way Latin American countries might figure prominently in U.S. international relations under Trump is as scapegoats or “punching bags.” Colombia has already provided an early example by initially refusing to receive flights carrying deportees, only to backtrack after being threatened with tariffs and a visa embargo. This was amplified by a social media spat between Trump and Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro. The Petro-Trump feud highlights the limits of Rubio’s influence. Whatever good intentions he may harbor, he is acutely aware that his primary constituency is Trump. It is the president’s priorities – and his appetite for publicity – that will ultimately shape U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America.
As for countering China, it is often said that the United States government lacks the principal tool Beijing uses to win friends and influence in the developing world: its ability to mobilize both state and private-sector resources toward achieving political objectives. Not only is it unlikely that the Trump administration could channel as much investment and credit to Latin America as China has, but it is also difficult to imagine an administration whose motto is “America First” prioritizing investment in other countries.
Even if the new U.S. administration were to sponsor a policy of near-shoring or friend-shoring, few countries in Latin America display the combination of decent infrastructure, a vast underpaid working force, and a willingness to suppress wages that have made China and other Asian economies so attractive. Xi Jinping himself is said to have criticized Latin America’s “welfarism,” which he argued doesn’t incentivize people to work. In any case, Trump does not seem interested in fostering industrial activity anywhere other than in the United States, so Latin American governments better not count on a manufacturing surge driven by U.S. investment.
By contrast, China’s strategy in Latin America – a combination of trade agreements, infrastructure investment, and state-backed financing – has been steadily eroding U.S. influence in the region. While Rubio’s anti-China rhetoric aligns with Washington’s broader geopolitical goals, the tools at his disposal are insufficient to match Beijing’s economic engagement. Without a coherent, long-term strategy to re-engage with Latin America, the United States risks ceding even more ground to China in a region that was once considered its traditional sphere of influence.
Ultimately, the Trump administration’s approach to Latin America under Marco Rubio’s stewardship appears likely to prioritize domestic concerns over broader regional engagement. Issues like migration, drug trafficking, and the containment of socialist autocracies will dominate the agenda, leaving little room for proactive initiatives or meaningful partnerships. Meanwhile, South American countries will continue to chart their own courses, leveraging China’s economic support and pursuing regional cooperation where possible. As a result, maybe except for its role as inspiration for hard-right movements, the United States will continue to be a reactive rather than a proactive player in Latin America, further diminishing its influence in the region.
