In November, Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Hoa Binh proposed to the National Assembly that the Ninh Thuan nuclear power project, which was put on hold in 2016, be revived. To Lam, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), also underlined the Central Committee’s strong consensus on resuming the country’s nuclear power program.
Leaders in Hanoi possess ample justification for moving forward with its stalled nuclear energy plans. In the coming years, the country’s energy consumption is projected to rise substantially to meet its economic development goals. In 2025, with a gross domestic product (GDP) growth target of 6.5-7 percent, electricity demand is anticipated to increase by roughly 12-13 percent. From 2025 to 2030, MB Security Joint Stock Company projections indicate that energy demand will grow significantly, with a compound annual growth of 9.3 percent.
To keep up with this increase, Vietnam must double its current power generation capacity by 2030 and quintuple it by 2050, as outlined in the National Electricity Development Plan 2021 to 2030. The plan’s reliance on renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar, is substantial; these sources are expected to constitute almost 30 percent of total capacity by 2030 and over 60 percent by 2050. Nuclear power, however, is not part of this masterplan. Without nuclear energy, however, Vietnam’s current power sources might not be sufficient to meet the country’s energy needs.
Vietnam plans to halt the construction of new coal plants by 2030 and phase out all existing ones by 2050. Yet delays in five coal power projects could lead to their termination. Meanwhile, hydropower is reaching its peak production capability, and raising its capacity to 29,346 megawatts by 2030 is fraught with dangers related to natural disasters and climate change. Similarly, over-reliance on natural gas, especially liquefied natural gas, will make Vietnam susceptible to global fuel price fluctuations.
Wind and solar energy, on the other hand, cannot provide the reliable baseload that Vietnam requires. Due to their intermittency and vulnerability to environmental changes, these energy resources are unable to provide daily demand, particularly during peak hours. Critical minerals, the input materials used for making wind and solar power equipment, may see price fluctuations as a result of protectionist measures induced by U.S.-China trade tensions. An instance of this would be the 25 percent tariff that Washington imposed on Chinese rare-earth magnets and critical minerals in May 2024. There may be a decrease in the use of wind and solar power if their production costs were to rise.
Given the uncertainty of renewables and the vulnerability of coal, hydropower, and gas, nuclear power looks like the obvious way to resolve Vietnam’s energy conundrum. Nuclear power is an efficient and plentiful energy resource, since one kilo of uranium produces 20,000 times more energy than coal. Additionally, nuclear power plants provide operational flexibility, which helps stabilize the system and meets variable energy demands.
Nuclear power also has the added benefits of being cost-effective and unaffected by international variables, such as volatility of fuel prices. Compared to coal plants, where fuel accounts for 60-70 percent of operational expenses, nuclear fuel incurs far lower fuel costs. Nuclear energy produces almost no greenhouse gas emissions, further solidifying its reputation as a “clean” energy source. Each kilowatt-hour of nuclear power emits about six grams of CO2, significantly less than coal, which produces 70 times this amount, gas (40 times), solar (four times), and hydro (double).
From parliamentary debates to statements by top leaders, Vietnam’s political establishment has reached a consensus that in order to secure its economic future, Vietnam must pursue nuclear power.
Easier Said Than Done
It would be myopic, however, to jump to such a conclusion without first examining whether nuclear energy is politically viable. This issue, while fundamental, has yet to be adequately discussed.
When viewed through a political lens, nuclear energy exposes a host of non-technical concerns that demand prudent deliberation. To start, is Vietnam’s political will to maintain nuclear power strong enough to last?
The time needed to prepare and build a nuclear power plant is typically 10-15 years, which is long enough to be the tenure of three separate Vietnamese presidents. This timeline is subject to extension if Vietnam does not meet the prerequisites for the safe construction and operation of a nuclear power plant, let alone obtaining approval from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The next question is, what guarantees are there that nuclear power would remain a policy priority for Vietnam over an extended period? This question is important, considering other major projects that call for huge investments. With a total projected cost of $67.34 billion, the North-South High-Speed Railway Project is a prime example. Vietnam also needs to secure capital for various other projects, including energy infrastructure, the semiconductor industry, and port systems. Meanwhile, the investment required for nuclear power is huge. A large-scale unit from France with a capacity of 1,600 megawatts costs up to $10 billion – nearly 3 percent of Vietnam’s GDP in 2023.
Should nuclear power be commenced immediately, Vietnam’s first reactor would not achieve full operation status until the 2040s. In the interim, both local and global political environments may experience considerable changes, impacting both public sentiment and the political resolve of Vietnam’s future leaders. The Ninh Thuan project was halted in 2016 because Vietnam had to “prioritize funding” for other key infrastructure projects. In the absence of determination, a similar delay might well transpire, resulting in further resource depletion.
Another question is whether the running of nuclear power projects can be insulated from corruption and malfeasance, as observed in previous major projects. This issue requires profound reflection, as nuclear power involves two sectors – electricity and infrastructure – that are both particularly exposed to malpractice and corruption.
Take, for example, the September prosecution of high-ranking officials, including former Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Hoang Quoc Vuong, involved with the state utility Vietnam Electricity (EVN), as an example. The case revolves around their negligence and deliberate modification of a draft policy to enable high-priced electricity sales, resulting in a loss of $36 million for EVN. The energy sector in Vietnam is plagued by poor governance due to “lack of transparency, few checks and balances, bureaucracy and close ties between government and businesses,” according to a 2017 report by Transparency International. No matter how “clean” nuclear power is in environmental terms, there is no assurance that it can be implemented in a “clean” way.
The ongoing “burning furnace” anti-corruption drive is also important. Although public confidence has grown as a result of this campaign, bureaucratic “paralysis” has set in as a result of officials being afraid of disciplinary action and so wary to make decisions. This psychological epidemic has caused significant delays in disbursing public investment funding for projects. As of the first nine months of 2024, Vietnam’s public investment disbursement was still below 50 percent of the allotted plan.
These delays risk slowing project progress and inflating construction costs. In 2024, just 21.5 percent of the annually allocated budget for Ho Chi Minh City’s Metro Line 1 project was disbursed, down from 38.12 percent in 2023. The project has also seen costs more than double from $1.09 billion to $2.49 billion. The project is technically prepared for operation, with 99 percent of the work completed. However, as of September 2024, total project disbursement stands at 67.79 percent, resulting in some contractors remaining unpaid. In 2018, delayed payments nearly impeded the project, leading the Japanese ambassador to warn that unpaid debts, amounting to $100 million at that time, could obstruct progress. In June 2024, Hitachi Ltd., a major contractor, initiated a lawsuit against the project owner for $156.6 million, citing expenses arising from the extended project timeline. This sequence of events highlights the detrimental impact of delays on project completion and economic efficiency.
This problem is not unique to Ho Chi Minh City metro projects; it is a problem with numerous other transportation infrastructure projects across Vietnam. These large-scale projects entail the implementation of complex technologies that are novel for the country, resulting in project owners’ inexperience in management and operation. Additionally, consulting firms often face operating challenges since they are unfamiliar with the local management systems.
The parallels between nuclear power construction and transportation infrastructure projects are crystal clear. Both require extended construction timelines, the involvement of multiple levels of government and intersectoral agencies, and substantial investment capital. Furthermore, the lack of nuclear technology leaves Vietnam susceptible to external dependencies due to its reliance on foreign contractors and resources.
A nuclear power plant is still in the far future, but Vietnamese leaders must pay heed to the non-technical issues that have long plagued the country’s socioeconomic landscape: bureaucracy, corruption, and delays in the implementation of public projects. Should Vietnam’s authorities fail to take the issue seriously and resolve to “do things differently,” future nuclear power projects could face the same pitfalls that plagued metro projects in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
Developing nuclear power is akin to building Rome: it cannot be accomplished in a single day. A nuclear power plant will not materialize instantaneously simply because top leaders declare that “Vietnam must have nuclear power.” To achieve this goal, leaders at all levels must act with integrity and put the common good first. For Vietnam to enter the “Era of Nation’s Rise,” as General Secretary To Lam has consistently underlined, a nuclear power program beset by delays, cost overruns, public discontent, or risks to national energy security would be utterly intolerable.
