On March 13, China, Iran, and Russia concluded the Security Belt 2025 joint maritime exercise near Iran’s strategically important Chabahar Port, close to critical maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. These drills involved sophisticated maritime strike operations, anti-piracy patrols, and coordinated search-and-rescue missions, and notably featured advanced scenarios, including night live-fire drills and combined aerial and naval maneuvers. Observers from multiple countries, including South Africa, Pakistan, and Oman, attended, underscoring the level of international interest.
Although Beijing reiterated that these exercises were not aimed at any specific nation, their systematic implementation since the inaugural trilateral drills in 2019 signals deeper strategic motivations. These regular exercises reflect China’s strategic intention to enhance regional maritime security capabilities, safeguard critical energy supply routes, and promote flexible minilateral security cooperation as a viable alternative to traditional multilateral institutions and Western-led security alliances.
Although the United States often characterizes the growing China-Russia-Iran alignment as an emerging “new axis of evil,” China’s minilateral security cooperation extends far beyond its engagements with Moscow and Tehran, reflecting a widespread and increasingly prevalent trend. Since 2018, China has actively developed minilateral frameworks in diverse regions such as Southeast Asia and East Africa. For instance, the Aman Youyi 2018 joint military exercises, initially involving Malaysia and Thailand in anti-terrorism and anti-piracy operations, expanded significantly by 2023 to encompass Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Similarly, in 2024, China extended its minilateral reach into Africa through the Peace Unity joint counterterrorism exercises with Tanzania and Mozambique. On an even broader scale, China’s Pure Homeland 2023 multinational mine clearance initiative saw the active participation of 14 countries, including Cambodia, Indonesia, New Zealand, and Russia, highlighting China’s increasing role as a constructive global actor advocating inclusive, practical security collaboration rather than forming exclusive geopolitical blocs.
Minilateralism: China’s New Playbook
Minilateralism, characterized by limited membership, specific objectives, and flexible cooperation mechanisms, represents a strategic governance model between traditional bilateral alliances and comprehensive multilateral institutions. From China’s perspective, minilateral frameworks represent a pragmatic response to contemporary security dynamics, addressing non-traditional challenges and circumventing limitations inherent in larger, often inefficient multilateral platforms like the United Nations.
The strategic calculus behind China’s active promotion of minilateral security cooperation, exemplified by the recent Security Belt 2025 maritime exercise, can be understood through four interconnected motivations:
First, safeguarding essential maritime trade routes remains paramount for China’s national interests. As the world’s largest importer of energy resources, China relies heavily on oil shipments transiting maritime chokepoints, especially critical corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. The regular joint drills with regional partners such as Iran and Russia in these strategically crucial areas underscore China’s intention to ensure maritime stability, deter piracy threats, and safeguard uninterrupted energy supply lines. The repeated presence and active participation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in these waters enhances regional maritime security and signals Beijing’s long-term strategic commitment to protecting its vital economic lifelines through cooperative rather than unilateral security measures.
Second, minilateral exercises substantially enhance China’s naval capabilities, interoperability, and global maritime presence. Engaging routinely in joint exercises with competent naval forces such as Russia, which possesses extensive maritime operational experience, and regionally influential stakeholders like Iran allows the PLAN to accumulate invaluable practical skills and operational proficiency. These collaborative efforts significantly improve the PLAN’s ability to conduct sophisticated operations, including coordinated maritime strikes, anti-piracy patrols, aerial and maritime integration, and multinational search-and-rescue missions. Such regular operational exposure directly contributes to China’s naval modernization, accelerates the development of expeditionary capabilities, and bolsters confidence in operating beyond China’s traditional maritime periphery. Consequently, these cooperative exercises align seamlessly with China’s ambition to become a globally influential maritime power capable of securing its expanding overseas interests.
Third, China aims to provide an alternative to Western-led exclusive minilateral security groupings. In recent years, the United States has actively promoted frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – comprising the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia – and the trilateral AUKUS partnership among the U.S., United Kingdom, and Australia. Beijing perceives these alliances as explicitly designed to constrain China’s strategic flexibility, forcing other states into binary choices and thereby exacerbating geopolitical polarization and regional tensions. In response, China has strategically embraced inclusive minilateralism, emphasizing openness, functional cooperation, and the avoidance of confrontation. China’s expanding engagements across Southeast Asia, Africa, and the South Pacific illustrate its efforts to involve diverse partners and minimize the risk of diplomatic isolation or encirclement. This approach reflects a strategic intention to reshape the regional and global security order through practical and cooperative means rather than ideological or confrontational blocs.
The significance of China’s inclusive minilateral approach in counterbalancing U.S.-led alliances is multi-dimensional. Beijing recognizes that exclusive Western alliances effectively isolate China by consolidating strategic blocs that are overtly hostile to Chinese interests. Through inclusive minilateral cooperation, China systematically cultivates diversified diplomatic and security relationships, reducing vulnerabilities associated with geopolitical isolation. This strategic diversification enhances China’s international leverage and reinforces Beijing’s global image as a constructive, proactive contributor to international security rather than a competitive actor engaged in zero-sum rivalry.
Fourth, China’s minilateral security strategy aligns closely with its broader diplomatic framework – the Global Security Initiative (GSI) – which emphasizes political dialogue, peaceful negotiations, and inclusive approaches to resolving global security challenges. China’s successful diplomatic mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 under the auspices of the GSI vividly demonstrated Beijing’s diplomatic efficacy and its potential to reshape regional security dynamics traditionally dominated by the United States and its allies. Similarly, China’s consistent engagement in trilateral maritime drills with Russia and Iran further enhances its credibility as a responsible and stabilizing actor capable of effectively managing complex regional security challenges. These engagements serve as practical demonstrations of China’s cooperative approach and as a tangible alternative to Western-led security mechanisms, showcasing Beijing’s capacity to deliver diplomatic and security outcomes through non-confrontational means.
Prospects for Expanded Minilateral Security Cooperation
China’s minilateral security cooperation is expected to expand geographically and thematically. These flexible and pragmatic arrangements allow China and partner states to adapt swiftly to emerging security needs. Thus, the geographic scope of China’s security collaborations is likely to extend well beyond existing operational areas, potentially encompassing diverse global regions.
China’s minilateral defense cooperation with ASEAN vividly illustrates this growth trajectory. China and Southeast Asian states have substantially intensified minilateral defense engagements from 2016 onwards. The frequency of such interactions between China and Southeast Asia notably increased from just four activities recorded in 2016 to a peak of 13 in 2023, despite temporary disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Over this period, a total of almost 50 minilateral defense events were organized, covering a wide range of non-traditional security themes, including disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, maritime security, and counterterrorism. These numbers reveal a robust upward trajectory, underscoring a clear strategic shift toward minilateral cooperation as a preferred mode of engagement.
In addition, a recent development highlights this trend of expanding geographical scope vividly. In a move that attracted considerable international attention, China conducted a live-fire naval exercise in the South Pacific, situated strategically between Australia and New Zealand. Although the drill officially aimed at enhancing maritime rescue operations and emergency response capacities, the location and timing raised significant interest, signaling China’s readiness to operate far from its immediate periphery. Such exercises indicate Beijing’s willingness and capacity to cooperate in security wherever regional conditions permit, as long as willing hosts or regional stakeholders express openness.
This strategic flexibility indicates considerable potential for China to initiate or participate in similar minilateral frameworks in various regions globally. Areas like the South Pacific, Africa, Latin America, and the Arctic – all of strategic interest to China due to economic ties, trade routes, resource access, or geopolitical significance – could soon witness similar cooperative security initiatives. China’s inclusive security cooperation model offers partner states practical security benefits without forcing them into confrontational blocs or ideological alignment. It increases its attractiveness to diverse international actors, particularly in regions traditionally underserved by existing Western-centric security frameworks.
Conclusion
Ultimately, China’s sustained and growing commitment to minilateral security cooperation signals a calculated response to the evolving geopolitical landscape. By providing pragmatic security benefits while strategically positioning itself as an inclusive alternative to exclusive Western alliances, China seeks to safeguard its strategic interests, counter perceived containment efforts, and reshape international security governance.
Given the success of recent initiatives and the strategic rationale – such as the Security Belt exercises with Iran and Russia and the emerging maritime security drills in geographically distant regions – the scope and frequency of China’s minilateral security cooperation activities will likely increase substantially. As China continues to expand its global security footprint through pragmatic minilateral partnerships, the international community must carefully consider how these evolving frameworks may recalibrate global and regional security dynamics in the years ahead.
