On February 12, the Trump administration declared its plans to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The United States will not back Ukraine’s goals of returning to its pre-2014 borders or obtaining NATO membership. Moreover, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth emphasized that U.S. troops will not participate in any peacekeeping operations in Ukraine. A potential summit between President Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Saudi Arabia will settle the conflict, with possible Ukrainian and European participation.
This development practically marks the United States’ abandonment of Ukraine’s resistance against the Russian invasion. Worse yet, the Trump administration conceded all of Ukraine’s core demands before negotiations even began, putting the pro-Ukraine alliance in a highly disadvantageous position.
As the first interstate war fought on European soil in many decades, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has global security ramifications. While the Biden administration provided robust support for Ukraine, the Trump White House shows little to no interest in continuing the policy. The withdrawal of U.S. support for Ukraine, NATO allies, and its increasingly isolationist policies will affect states elsewhere confronting authoritarian aggression. Taiwan, sitting at the center of the First Island Chain, looks ever more vulnerable.
The settlement of the Ukraine conflict in a manner reminiscent of the 1938 Munich Agreement and the United States’ abandonment of its global leadership responsibilities could entice more states to resolve disputes militarily, leading to greater instability worldwide. Sensing U.S. weakness in Europe and domestic turmoil, China may be tempted to seize the opportunity and launch its long-awaited invasion of Taiwan.
Unlike Ukraine, which still retains support from European allies, Taiwan does not have the same level of backing from Asian countries. Deterrence against China depends heavily on U.S. commitment. Recent U.S. threats of tariffs against Taiwan and the abandonment of Ukraine in desperate times signal to China a steep decline in the credibility of U.S. support for Taiwan. Despite the existence of the Taiwan Relations Act, the Trump administration has demonstrated little regard for conventions and legal obligations in other contexts.
To Beijing, the United States, now turning inward, is unlikely to come to Taiwan’s aid in the next four years. This presents a critical window of opportunity for Chinese leaders, who have spent years building up the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for military operations across the Taiwan Strait.
Nevertheless, even with a rise in the likelihood of war between China and Taiwan, there are still factors constraining a potential Chinese use of force. First of all, Beijing recognizes that Trump is a lot friendlier to Russia than China. The U.S. president has persistently expressed admirations for Putin since his 2016 presidential campaign and has taken measures over the years to improve Russia-U.S. relations. Although Trump has occasionally praised Xi Jinping, his actions suggest otherwise. China-U.S. relations hit rock bottom in Trump’s first term and the prospects for a turnaround are nowhere in sight. Therefore, if China takes military actions against Taiwan, Beijing understands that the Trump administration’s response will likely not be as tepid as its approach to Russia.
Second, Beijing remains concerned by Trump’s unpredictability. Compared to his first term in office, Trump is even more unpredictable in his behavior and foreign policy style. It may be argued that, beyond tariffs and isolationism, the most predictable facet of Trump’s foreign policy is his unpredictability. This presents a dilemma for Chinese leaders when considering a Taiwan invasion. As opposed to an innately weak leader, Trump’s unpredictability could lead to either no U.S. response to a Chinese invasion or an overwhelming U.S. military response to support Taiwan. This increases Beijing’s uncertainty in committing to using force against Taiwan.
Lastly, Chinese leaders are concerned about the capability of the PLA. In recent years, the PLA has witnessed significant instability among its leadership. Xi has purged a number of senior commanders in the name of combatting corruption, including members of the Central Military Commission. Investigations have revealed that corruption has reached into sensitive defense projects and the military supply chain. Simultaneously, China’s defense industry has also faced purges. Recently, unusual events at China’s defense state-owned enterprises suggest that a new purge is likely underway. Thus, although the PLA seems to be gaining operational capability, its actual capacity to wage a cross-Taiwan Strait campaign remains untested and uncertain – further fueling Beijing’s apprehension of a protracted war.
To conclude, the United States’ abandonment of Ukraine’s effort to resist Russian aggression may entice China to pursue reunification with Taiwan by military means. For Beijing, the next four years of the Trump administration presents a decisive window of opportunity, unseen in many decades, as Trump works to dismantle the United States’ established role as the global leader and security guarantor for its allies.
Looking ahead, Xi has nine years to fulfill his ambition before reaching the ripe age of 80, when he must focus on important domestic priorities, such as cultivating a successor and ensuring his legacy is well protected. The Russia-Ukraine War has shown both the strength and fragility of the Western alliance, in addition to providing China with important lessons on modern warfare and the need to employ maximum force to conclude the conflict as quickly as possible. Against that backdrop, an invasion of Taiwan could be highly devastating.
Still, there are forces constraining China’s desires to conquer. If Beijing intends on invading Taiwan, there will probably be an increase in probing operations in the Taiwan Strait to test the readiness of Taiwanese forces and the resolve of the Trump administration. Watching out for these initiatives will be critical in the coming years.
