On February 28, European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas declared that “the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.” This call to action captures a shifting Europe – one less willing to let its future be decided in Washington or Beijing.
This posture reflects a growing sentiment in Europe, which, despite having braced for the return of the “America First” policy, has been consistently caught off guard by the second Trump administration. For the last two months, tariffs, insults to U.S. allies, and casual references to exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over Canada, Greenland, and Panama have almost become routine.
This situation prompted some to argue that if Europe cannot rely on its transatlantic ally anymore, it should consider building a closer relationship with China, whose economy and political status may help the Europeans face compounded challenges.
Europe finds itself in an ever-more challenging situation to solidify its economic unity and uphold its strategic autonomy – especially when considering increased Chinese assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific.
That said, and despite these temptations, Europe seems to have awakened from its slumber. Multiplying statements affirm its determination to forge its own strategic path and substantially invest in its defense. As such, any receptiveness to Beijing’s charm offensive is fundamentally driven by European interests.
China’s Charm Offensive
Trump’s recent measures have cemented a split between Washington and Brussels, paving the way for Beijing to advance its strategic agenda by widening a nascent transatlantic division. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Xi Jinping has stepped up overtures to European actors such as Germany and Ireland.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s address at the Munich Security Conference is perhaps the best example of this charm offensive. On this occasion, China’s top diplomat indirectly targeted the United States and its rashness while extending a hand to the EU, stating that “China has always seen in Europe an important pole in the multipolar world.”
Rapprochement with Beijing appeals to many, given China’s significant impact on European markets and strategic sectors. However, this must be weighed against initiatives such as the 16+1 China-Central and Eastern Europe cooperation format, which have notably enabled China to exert greater political influence in the EU across critical infrastructure, including telecommunications networks, green technology, and undersea cables.
European Receptiveness to China’s Approach
A certain cooling of tone and more active bilateral engagement in recent months suggest that European policymakers are attentive to the Chinese charm offensive.
When addressing EU ambassadors in February, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, restrained her usual hawkish rhetoric, recognizing that “there is also room to engage constructively with China and find solutions in our mutual interest.” The European Parliament and European nations such as Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom have advanced similar calls for proactive engagement.
The recent U.S. automobile tariffs suggest that Trump’s measures may increasingly target key European sectors, on top of the blanket tariffs that just came into effect on nearly all exports. As such, deepening ties with China may help meet European economic and trade needs, echoing the desire for greater strategic autonomy.
Brussels’ Balancing Act
However, this warming of relations is relative. The EU has thus far remained resolute in continuing its derisking efforts. To borrow the words of Maria Martin-Prat De Abreu, Europe’s deputy director general for trade, the idea that Trump’s policies will cause a complete European rapprochement with Beijing is “but simplistic thinking.”
There is a growing acknowledgment that Europe must bolster its self-reliance in the face of upholding the principles of systemic rivalry with China, which has surfaced in key discussions and EU-wide policy actions.
The EU also recognizes that it must no longer fall victim to the potential weaponization of its most vital resources. China’s stranglehold on Europe’s rare earths heightens the continent’s vulnerability to coercive export bans, prompting Brussels to designate 47 Strategic Projects on minerals. Notably, Stéphane Séjourné, European commissioner for internal market and services, told reporters that “Chinese lithium will not be tomorrow’s Russian gas.”
Similarly, the semiconductor sector also remains vulnerable. As a key market player, Dutch company ASML’s market dominance prompted U.S.-imposed export controls. Shifting decrees from Washington created confusion amid the chip war, pushing China to accelerate advanced semiconductor manufacturing, creating new obstacles for Europe.
Another question is actively discussed in European capitals: What advantages would closer alignment with Beijing realistically bring? Policymakers have already tried to leverage their connections to China to prompt a peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine – without success. As such, skepticism regarding meaningfully deepening Sino-European political relations remains high.
Balancing Engagement
These trends have instigated fierce debate on the European security architecture, which has faced a myriad of challenges since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Instead of a rapprochement with Beijing, however, recent developments indicate that European powers intend to balance facilitating trade with maintaining political distance and safeguarding key sectors. Even the ripple effects of Trump’s policies are insufficient to make Europeans bypass their economic interests or the many contentious issues dividing them from China.
The fundamental values of EU foreign policy center on upholding international law, economic liberalism, and democratic values. However, given Beijing’s policies vis-à-vis Hong Kong, its support for Putin’s Russia, and its posture in the South China Sea, European leaders cannot realistically fully embrace China as a partner.
That said, European nations have yet to unite their diverging China foreign policies – ranging from the more accommodating Spain and Germany to the hawkish Lithuania. The China-Europe-U.S. triangle is hence as much an internal as it is an external challenge.
Where Is Europe Heading?
While the theory that a nation might seek assistance from a stronger power if its previous “patron” abandons seems logical, the practical economic and political realities make this scenario highly improbable within the China-Europe-U.S. triangle.
Rather, early developments suggest that Europe is keener on reducing foreign interdependencies rather than trying to replace their former “patron” with a new one, namely China.
During the recent visit of French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, Paris reiterated its desire to avoid a trade war with Beijing and establish “a strong Sino-French partnership” to address the many crises endangering “the geopolitical stability, and the prosperity and future of our planet.” The envoy also reiterated that Europe would not compromise its “interests” or strategic autonomy.
The increasingly transactional nature of trade, defense, and security ties – spurred by the Trump administration – opens the opportunity for Europe to leverage engagement with China as a bargaining chip. By maintaining flexibility in its diplomatic engagements, Europe can position itself as a balancing force to secure more favorable terms of engagement with the U.S. However, it must maintain a firm position to avoid deepening the transatlantic divide and undermining its own efforts to reduce reliance on China.
As Europe actively grapples with economic realities, it needs to adopt a more active yet more calculated engagement with Beijing. Whether calls to relinquish dependency on foreign actors – an ambition long endorsed by Paris – can be realized in the face of charm and coercion depends on Europe’s collective ability to assert its priorities to secure its strategic autonomy. The extent to which the latter is doable is another question.
