Central Asia is in the proximity of restive regions on Chinese and Indian peripheries, making it a key factor in Beijing’s and New Delhi’s security calculations. To pursue their fundamental interests, China and India have used various tools – defense diplomacy, joint exercises, and military agreements – to bolster their security profiles in the region. The regional dynamic is changing, however, given Russia’s distraction with Ukraine and China’s prioritization of security ties with Central Asia.
Chinese security interests in Central Asia are predominantly defined by the region’s geographic location. China shares approximately 3,300 kilometers of land border with three Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. These neighbors of China have at least two things in common: they are susceptible to social instability, and they are located close to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, an area within China that is also prone to unrest. Against this backdrop, China’s paramount interest is to promote stability in Central Asia, to avoid spillover of social strife from its Western neighborhood.
The second aspect of China’s security interests in Central Asia relate to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), the land-based pillar of the BRI, was launched in 2013 in Kazakhstan. The massive program strives to link China to overseas markets via ports, railways, highways, and various other modes of connectivity. The initiative is predominantly economic in nature, but it has security implications as well. China’s investments in Central Asia in the past three decades surpassed $60 billion, and the assets constructed by Beijing need to be protected from harmful actors.
Indian security interests in the region follow a similar logic. While India is not a direct neighbor of Central Asian states, it considers the area to be a part of its “extended neighborhood.” Social volatility in Central Asia could spill over and sow unrest in Kashmir, a restive and disputed region on India’s northern periphery. Preventing such a scenario is a key priority for India to maintain social stability.
Both states conduct their security outreach under their respective diplomatic frameworks. In the case of China, this framework has at least two pillars: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and more recently the Global Security Initiative (GSI). The SCO was established in 2001 between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The organization today includes ten full members after India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2022, and Belarus in 2024. Members collaborate on a variety of areas, such as politics, economy, trade, and culture. In the field of security, the member states strive to fight the “three evil forces”: terrorism, separatism, and extremism. These are the most prominent areas of security cooperation, but this collaboration includes other facets as well, such as tackling transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking and arms smuggling.
The GSI was proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum in April 2022. The proposal envisions a global pursuit of security that is guided by principles closely aligned with Chinese preferences of conducting international affairs, including opposition to unilateral sanctions and double standards as well as support for non-interference. In the speech, Xi stated that “security is the precondition for development,” implying that the Chinese leadership sees a connection between the success of the BRI and the stability of its partner countries. The Central Asian states are willing partners in the pursuit of the GSI, as they confirmed at the China-Central Asia Summit in 2023.
India’s security outreach to the region is coordinated under the “Connect Central Asia Policy.” The initiative was proposed in 2012, during the first India-Central Asia Dialogue. The policy includes cooperation in political, economic, cultural, and security areas. The security aspect of the initiative focuses on military training, research, counterterrorism, and coordination of policies in Afghanistan. At the same time, India is also a member of the SCO and participates in related activities involving Central Asian states.
China’s and India’s diplomatic initiatives translate into a security footprint in Central Asia that can be captured and compared by looking at their SCO activities and bilateral security exchanges with regional states.
Between 2020-2023, the SCO had one or two security-related activities annually, such as the “Peace Mission 2021” counterterrorism drill or annual meetings between defense ministers. In 2022, China, India and the Central Asian republics also joined in the “Vostok 2022” exercise organized by Russia.
In 2024, the SCO was more active, with the “Interaction 2024” joint counterterrorism exercise organized in China, as well as the regular meeting between SCO defense ministers. In addition to these engagements, the SCO organized exchanges between young-and-middle aged officers, as well as an SCO international military cooperation meeting.
On the bilateral level, India reached a deal with Tajikistan in 2002 to revamp the Ayni airbase, an unused Soviet facility. The renovation made progress with technological and infrastructural upgrades. India’s interest in the project sparked speculations about potential permanent military deployment there, but conclusive proof of such a presence is lacking.
India’s security footprint in Central Asia is underpinned by regular bilateral military drills with Kazakhstan (exercise Kazind), Kyrgyzstan (exercise Khanjar) and Uzbekistan (exercise Dustlik). The year 2024 marked the 11th edition of Khanjar, the eighth edition of Kazind, and the fifth edition of Dustlik. These exercises are usually aimed at counterterrorism.
In addition, India’s defense officers often utilize the SCO sidelines to have bilateral meetings with their Central Asian counterparts. Furthermore, India has funded the 2024 establishment of a high-technology laboratory to contribute to the Uzbek armed forces capacity building.
In contrast to India’s well-established bilateral security engagements with Central Asian states, China has been less active beyond the scope of the SCO.
Past reports suggested that China stationed troops in Tajikistan and that Beijing had been building a facility there for more than a decade. The purported aim of the facility is to mitigate threats arising from the movements of jihadi Uyghur fighters. Furthermore, the outpost could also be used as a surveillance foothold to monitor nearby states, like India or Pakistan. Both China and Tajikistan have denied the claims.
Going beyond the controversial facility, China conducted counterterrorist drills with Tajikistan in 2021, followed by a 2023 agreement between the two sides, committing to organizing such exercises on a biannual basis.
In addition to Tajikistan, China also had bilateral security engagements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, when former Defense Minister Wei Fenghe visited those countries in 2022 to enhance military-to-military cooperation, among other goals.
While China’s bilateral security engagement with Central Asian states has been modest in the 2020-2023 period, recent developments suggest that the dynamic is changing. Russia traditionally has been the “primary security guarantor” in Central Asia, but Moscow’s resources have been drained by the protracted conflict in Ukraine since 2022. China, on the other hand, articulated a clear ambition of stepping up security engagement with Central Asia at the China-Central Asia Summit in 2023.
Following up on the commitment, China and Kazakhstan signed a military agreement in April 2024. In September, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun met with Tajik Defense Minister Sherali Mirzo on the sidelines of the 11th Beijing Xiangshan Forum. In October, China sent a military delegation of young and middle-aged officers to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Most of these exchanges are focused on peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and personnel training, and reference the “three evils,” among other areas.
As the U.S. and EU strive to step up their engagement with Central Asia, they have to account for a new normal there. The geopolitical landscape of the region is undergoing a change, with China striving to match its economic clout with commensurate security presence in the area.
