Three months into his return to the White House, U.S. President Donald Trump has churned out a series of sweeping domestic and foreign policies. The underlying motivation behind these moves is crystal clear: to solidify a loyal inner circle and consolidate power in Washington – especially as he considers seeking an unconstitutional third term. Trump’s China policy is no exception to this broader strategy.
At the same time, China is also serving as a test case for Trump’s growing authority, a reality underscored by his ongoing restructuring of the Washington bureaucracy. These changes subtly signal a shift in approach, from economic coercion to military confrontation.
In an era of deepening ideological polarization, foreign policy success is often more effective in bolstering a leader’s overall popularity than domestic policy victories. This is because successful foreign policy not only shifts public focus from internal divisions to external challenges – offering a unifying effect – but also because domestic policies take longer to yield tangible results and are unlikely to satisfy an increasingly diverse electorate.
Historically, a U.S. president’s success in handling China can be interpreted in two ways: as either a significant improvement in bilateral relations, as seen in the China policies of Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, or as a demonstration of strength in navigating tensions without causing a major deterioration, exemplified by George W. Bush’s response to the EP-3 incident.
If Trump’s first term established his reputation as the most controversial president in American history, his second term is only deepening that perception. This time, he recognizes that to maintain the support of his hardline conservative base, he must push even more aggressively right-wing domestic policies – albeit at the risk of further alienating independents. Compounding this challenge is his growing impatience, driven in part by supporters frustrated that their lives have not improved as quickly as he promised on the campaign trail. These dynamics help explain his increasingly grandiose foreign policy ambitions, including talk of acquiring Greenland, reclaiming the Panama Canal, and even exerting control over Canada.
While Trump may adopt a more overtly aggressive stance toward weaker political entities like Greenland and Panama, he knows that dealing with a powerhouse like China requires a more calculated approach. After losing his first trade war with Beijing and facing backlash for attempting another, he should by now recognize that economic coercion alone will not yield a successful China policy.
Could Trump use diplomacy to achieve success in his China policy? He could, but at this juncture he won’t, for two key reasons. First, his past diplomatic efforts with China yielded little success. The Phase One trade agreement, which his administration worked hard to secure, ultimately flopped as China failed to uphold its commitments. Given this failure, another similar attempt would be politically irrational.
Second, Trump’s ongoing efforts to downsize the federal bureaucracy will make effective diplomacy even more difficult. Modern diplomacy relies on bureaucratic institutions to advance a country’s soft power initiatives. This is particularly true for the United States, where efforts to promote democracy and human rights are central to its global influence. Engaging diplomatically with China is not just about managing bilateral ties – it is also about maintaining the international order. But Trump’s lack of interest in this broader purpose, combined with his “America First” approach, means diplomacy with China is simply not a priority.
So if the Trump administration claims it wants to counter China while simultaneously shrinking the State Department and restructuring agencies like USAID, what is its actual plan?
The answer is to replace soft power with hard power. If Trump has learned anything new about foreign policy in his second term, it is that effective leverage requires credible threats – something he appears to have grasped through his mediation in the Ukraine-Russia ceasefire talks.
For weeks, U.S. and Russian officials have been negotiating a deal to end the war. But when Russian President Vladimir Putin complicated the process by proposing a U.N.-backed interim government to replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Trump lashed out, threatening to impose a 50 percent tariff on countries purchasing Russian oil unless Putin agreed to a ceasefire. The Kremlin quickly sought to de-escalate, with Russian spokesman Dmitry Peskov affirming that Russia was still “working with the U.S.” This episode suggests Trump is learning how to apply the right amount of pressure to achieve what traditional diplomacy cannot.
If oil tariffs were the right threat against Moscow, what would work against Beijing? Economic coercion – such as tariffs – is no longer an effective tool, especially as China has responded by forming a regional trade agreement with Japan and South Korea. That leaves only one viable option: military confrontation, particularly in the Taiwan Strait.
Although many doubted Trump’s willingness to support Taiwan – especially after he accused the island of stealing the U.S. chip industry – he is not irrational enough to abandon it as a geopolitical card. Taiwan may appear to him as an economic threat, but its strategic value in countering China far outweighs that concern.
The quiet removal of the U.S. State Department’s statement, “We do not support Taiwan independence,” within the first month of Trump’s second presidency is telling. No matter how transactional his approach to politics, Taiwan appears to be an exception.
A newly revealed secret Pentagon memo further underscores Trump’s pivot to hard power in dealing with China. The memo designates deterring a Chinese takeover of Taiwan as a U.S. military priority – a stance that aligns conveniently with the Pentagon’s proposal to cut 8 percent of its budget over the next five years while increasing funding for the U.S. military command focused on China.
Trump may not entirely rule out a deal with Beijing, but the ongoing stalemates in Ukraine and Gaza are pushing him to seek breakthroughs elsewhere. With domestic economic stagnation – or even recession – looming, he is in dire need of a foreign policy victory to solidify his presidency’s legitimacy. If his third-term ambitions are serious, it would not be surprising for him to shed the anti-war image he touted on the campaign trail and once again label himself a “wartime president,” much as he did in 2020. As economic coercion falters, targeting China – this time on the military front – may not be as politically irrational as it seems, no matter how extreme it sounds.
