The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Julie Yu-wen Chen – professor of Chinese Studies at the University of Helsinki in Finland and a participant in the EU in the Volatile Indo-Pacific Region project – is the 457th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Identify China’s new measures for governing religion.
The State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), which succeeded the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council, served as the primary governmental body in China responsible for overseeing religious matters. SARA was merged into the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2018, leading to the party regaining direct oversight of religious matters. Although SARA continues to operate under its original name, it has lost its status as an independent governmental entity.
Seven further legal measures were introduced from 2019 to 2024: (1) 2019 Administrative Measures for Religious Groups, (2) 2020 Measures for the Administration of Islamic Haji Affairs, (3) 2021 Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy, (4) 2021 Measures for the Establishment of Religious Institutes, (5) 2021 Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services, (6) 2023 Measures for Religious Activities Venues, and (7) 2023 revised Regulation on Religious Affairs of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which became effective in 2024.
When a provision is established in the law, it signifies a well-considered and enduring strategy. Consequently, alterations in the legal framework regarding particular matters can offer a reliable basis for comprehending the present political objectives and aspirations of the ruling elites in China, as exemplified in changes of legal narratives about religious affairs in Xinjiang. In these new measures, there is a significant focus on national security and unity in the regulation of religious organizations, highlighting the need for Chinese religious groups and their activities to remain free from foreign influence. Additionally, the secular character of the education system is underscored, with legal provisions in place that prevent religious entities from directing educational practices in China.
Examine how China’s concept of the “rule of law” is reshaping the country’s religious order.
Different from the Western understanding, the Chinese term for “rule of law,” fazhi, can also mean “rule by law,” conveying a markedly different connotation. In Chinese legal thought, the distinction between these concepts is often blurred, with fazhi historically serving as a tool for governance.
Under Xi Jinping, the connection between fazhi, characterized by Chinese characteristics, and religious affairs has intensified. At the 2015 Central Conference on United Front Work and the 2016 National Conference on Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of enhancing fazhi in the context of religious work. His leadership at the 2016 Conference underscores the significance of religious matters to his administration and likely reflects his concerns regarding the present situation, particularly related to the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In his speech, Xi stated that the CCP members must act as “unyielding Marxist atheists, consolidate their faith, and bear in mind the Party’s tenets.”
Analyze the implications of China’s legal measures on religion for the Chinese Communist Party’s domestic political and ideological agenda.
From a broader historical perspective, the ongoing deterioration of religious rights in China is not bound to a particular leader, in this case, to Xi Jinping. Instead, the increasing restrictions follow the trajectory that was established in the late 1970s when Deng Xiaoping came to power. The CCP as a sole monopolist does not tolerate the existence of any contesting ideology that would attract a large number of followers.
Recent legal initiatives indicate the Chinese party-state’s intention to enhance social-political engineering aimed at Sinicizing religions within China, prioritizing indigenous beliefs over foreign-origin religions. The introduction of specific regulations governing Islamic affairs and internet usage addresses Xi’s concerns regarding contemporary religious issues in China. Essentially, these measures are designed to diminish the influence of religions and restructure their organizations to align with the party-state’s administrative framework, which delineates explicit tasks, responsibilities, and penalties.
In practice, the implementation of these legal measures varies significantly. For example, Xinjiang is subjected to considerable scrutiny, with the religious freedoms of the Uyghurs currently being monitored and suppressed to a much greater extent than those of other religious groups. Furthermore, these legal measures do not accurately reflect the true level of religiosity among individuals in China.
What is the objective behind the CCP’s “Sinicization of religion”?
Foreign religions like Christianity and Islam must inevitably adjust to local cultural contexts to gain acceptance in China. However, the Chinese government’s emphasis on the Sinicization of these religions is fundamentally political, compelling them to align with the ideologies and doctrines of the CCP. This process effectively strips religions of their spiritual essence, reducing them to instruments that serve the interests of the party-state.
The government retains the authority to determine which religious teachings are permissible, allowing only those deemed “healthy, civilized, and modern” by state standards. The ongoing Sinicization efforts are designed to delegitimize foreign belief systems as mere pseudo-religions unless they comply with the adjustments the CCP expects of them.
Assess the impact of China’s tightening control over religious freedom on communities of faith and Beijing’s efforts to export its governance model beyond China.
The frequent reference to “Chinese characteristics” in official narratives poses a threat to the universality of human rights standards as outlined in key international human rights instruments. The administration under Xi is striving to create a novel paradigm of international human rights law that aligns with China’s unique national context, with the intention of promoting this model in other nations in Asia and Africa that face similar human rights challenges.
