The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 was a watershed moment for various jihadist groups in South and Central Asia. It provided many of them with a victory template.
Pakistani militant networks were particularly reenergized by this development. Among other things, the Taliban’s organizational and battlefield discipline, despite the group’s decentralized nature, motivated Pakistani militant groups to overcome internal differences, forge alliances, and woo smaller factions to join their networks to forge a unified front.
In the case of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), for instance, chief Noor Wali Mehsud not only reabsorbed his group’s splinter factions but also mended fences with Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG). In 2024, he even invited them to merge with the TTP, although these negotiations remained inconclusive.
Nevertheless, inter-group cooperation between these groups has continued at the tactical and operational levels.
Being the larger group, the TTP has been more successful than the HGBG in attracting militants from other factions into its fold, including those from the latter. For instance, Aleem Khan and Ali Dawar, HGBG commanders from North Waziristan, joined the TTP in December 2020 and January 2025, respectively.
With Dawar joining the group, the TTP’s influence will extend to North Waziristan, the HGBG’s stronghold and birthplace. Following his inclusion, the TTP has urged other militant factions to join it under its “one group, one emir” strategy to achieve its goal of transforming Pakistan into a Taliban-like “Islamic Emirate.”
In a fluid and multi-actor threat environment, side-switching is frequent where militant factions are always in search of the highest bidder. Usually, smaller groups are attracted to larger ones that can offer better salaries, greater visibility, and power.
Since July 2020, around 75 militant factions from different parts of Pakistan have joined the TTP, including 10 from the restive Balochistan province. Of these, 16 factions merged with the TTP in 2024 and five groups joined it in 2025.
After assuming the TTP’s leadership in 2018, Noor Wali Mehsud’s focus has been on disciplining and uniting different jihadist groups. In doing so, he has tried to expand the TTP’s network beyond the Newly Merged Districts.
He has also sought to resolve the TTP’s differences with its own factions like the lethal Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA). In early 2024, JuA leaders were demoted from the TTP’s Central Shura (the executive council) after they blamed Mehsud for the killing of their chief Omar Khalid Khorasani. In a bid to win back their support, the JuA’s representation in the TTP’s executive council was increased from two to three. However, the JuA has reactivated its propaganda arm, the Ghazi Media, indicating renewed differences with the TTP.
To expand its network, the TTP also convinced other Pakistani jihadist groups to join its platform. For instance, in Punjab, the TTP linked up with the Ghazi Force, madrassa students turned militants of the Red Mosque, and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). The Ghazi Force has a footprint in northern Punjab, and the former LeJ militants have a sizable presence in southern Punjab. Similarly, in Karachi, the TTP has secured the allegiance of LeJ’s Hafiz Naeem Bukhari group, which is notorious for targeting the Shia community in the port city.
The TTP’s ability to attract militants, including those from the HGBG, has sparked a competition for power, influence, and resources between the two as they seek to retain their commanders and subfactions while poaching those of the other.
Tribal rivalries have played a key role in the TTP-HGBG competition. While the TTP primarily comprises the Mehsud tribe from South Waziristan, HGBG militants are drawn from North Waziristan’s Dawar and Wazir tribes. In 2007, the Mehsud-Wazir tribal rivalry was the primary reason for the HGBG and the Mullah Nazir Group’s reluctance to join the TTP.
The HGBG has adopted a two-pronged strategy to tackle the TTP’s growing influence in its backyard. First, it has strengthened its alliance with the LeI. The HBGB entered into a formal alliance with the LeI on January 18 to insulate themselves from the TTP’s growing strength. Compared to the TTP, the HGBG and the LeI are smaller groups.
Second, the HGBG has plucked some key TTP commanders from South Waziristan, the TTP’s birthplace. For instance, following the TTP’s announcement of winning Dawar’s support, HGBG disclosed that a key TTP faction, the Hakimullah Mehsud Karawan from South Waziristan, which pledged allegiance in November 2024, had formally joined it. In February, the Hakimullah Mehsud Karawan claimed responsibility for targeting police personnel in Karachi, which is the first-ever HGBG attack outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
At the same time, the HGBG replaced Dawar with Mufti Farooq on January 19. Furthermore, on January 22, the HGBG poached a TTP faction from Dera Ismail Khan led by Iftikhar alias Umar Gandapur. A militant group led by Commander Mansoor from North Waziristan district merged with the HGBG on January 2 as did another group from Kohat district under Commander Abuzar Bangash on January 14.
Usually, militant groups with similar ideological goals, operating in geographically contiguous conflict theaters against a common enemy, tend to merge or form alliances. All the groups joining the TTP have several points in common: they want to create a Taliban-style Islamic Emirate in Pakistan, operate in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, ideologically subscribe to an austere interpretation of Deobandi Islam, and have enmity with the Pakistani state. These factors combined with Noor Wali’s efforts to unite Pakistani militant factions on his platform have paved the way for these mergers.
At the same time, as discussed above, it has sparked a competition for power and influence between the TTP on the one hand and the HGBG and the LeI on the other. This dynamic can have two potential implications for Pakistan’s internal security.
First, if this competition degenerates into violent clashes, it will undermine the strength of these groups and make them vulnerable to Pakistan’s counterterrorism pressure. It will provide opportunities for Pakistani security forces to exploit the growing fissures to their advantage. However, so far, there is no evidence of violent clashes or propaganda warfare between these groups.
Second, such competition can sometimes lead to higher levels of violence where competing militant groups try to outdo each other by increasing the number of terrorist attacks and casualties to dispel the impression that they have been weakened.
Pakistani forces should carefully monitor the evolving competition of the TTP with the HGBG-LEI duo and exploit it to their advantage.
