If intelligence sharing is the backbone of a country’s national security, then the United States has long been the central hub for the Indo-Pacific. Washington has played a pivotal role in providing allies with critical intelligence, enabling coordinated responses to emerging geopolitical threats. Through networks like the Five Eyes, this intelligence exchange has not only bolstered U.S. influence but also reinforced its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in countering China’s growing assertiveness and North Korea’s advancing nuclear program.
However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent appointments of Tulsi Gabbard and Kash Patel as the director of national intelligence (DNI) and director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), respectively, have threatened the effectiveness of the Indo-Pacific’s security apparatus. These appointments will likely force key U.S. regional allies – like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – to (partially) shift away from Washington’s network and establish intelligence pacts outside of Trump’s influence.
The biggest concerns related to Gabbard’s and Patel’s appointments pertain to their foreign policy dealings and trustworthiness amid conflicts of interest. Regarding Gabbard, the former lieutenant colonel not only has minimal experience within the intelligence community, but she also previously parroted Russian propaganda. Most notably, Gabbard endorsed the alleged existence of “dozens of U.S.-funded biolabs” in Ukraine, which was one of the main justifications used by Moscow to invade the country.
Similarly, in December 2023, Gabbard publicly questioned on X whether a remilitarized Japan was in the interest of the United States, writing, “We need to be careful that shortsighted, self-serving leaders do not end up bringing us again face-to-face with a remilitarized Japan.” A critique of the legality of Japan’s constitutional revisions and remilitarization does have its merits. However, the public questioning of the United States’ closest Indo-Pacific ally by the now-DNI – especially amid growing tensions with China – likely raises concerns in Tokyo. Japanese officials may be concerned that any intelligence shared by the U.S. will now either be incomplete or have significant strings attached, or the U.S. will opt to deal with issues unilaterally without consulting Tokyo, effectively neutralizing its autonomy vis-à-vis its national security concerns.
In contrast, Kash Patel’s appointment as FBI director presents a particularly notable threat to the Indo-Pacific region, given his intended policy changes and business interests in China.
After his appointment, the FBI ordered the transfer of 1,500 staff from its Washington headquarters – which focuses on international threats – to other regional U.S. field offices. This change appears to align with Patel’s promises to reduce the agency’s overseas activities and shift its focus back toward “domestic” concerns. Indeed, the FBI’s Washington office is known to handle counterintelligence and national security investigations, including those on threats from outside the U.S., such as China or North Korea. As such, the downsizing of the Washington office will likely lessen its ability to gather critical and timely intelligence about such issues as North Korea’s and China’s cyber programs. Additionally, it will also dampen counterintelligence activities aimed at reducing the success of North Korean, Chinese, or Russian propaganda campaigns. These endeavors are aimed at sowing chaos in the region and weakening the U.S. coalitions’ joint response to geopolitical events, such as a potential invasion of Taiwan.
Even if Patel allows the FBI to gather intelligence that could benefit U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, there is a risk that he will opt not to share it or to alter the information related to his financial interests. Most notably, Patel’s 2025 financial disclosure report found that he was given stock worth $1-5 million in Chinese retail firm Shein’s parent company, Elite Depot, after providing them with consulting work in 2024. Despite past bureau leaders volunteering to give up their financial stakes to avoid conflicts of interest, Patel has opted to maintain his stake in a foreign company with Chinese ties – a move that the bureau has sanctioned. As such, there is a realistic possibility that intelligence gathered by the FBI on issues such as Beijing’s infringement on Indo-Pacific countries’ economic competitiveness – such as counterfeiting or goods dumping – could be redacted to the point of uselessness, withheld, or altered in a way to benefit Patel’s interests. Such a scenario would cast significant doubts among the U.S. Indo-Pacific security partners on the credibility of Washington’s intelligence and whether the intelligence they share with the U.S. could be used for political ends that do not benefit the collective intelligence communities’ interests.
As of writing, U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific have publicly remained optimistic about the Trump administration’s changes and the potential impact they’ll have on U.S. defense promises. However, privately, some officials in the region have reportedly questioned whether Washington will continue to prioritize defending them from potential conflicts in the area. Nowhere is this concern more apparent than in the case of Taiwan. While Trump’s decision to surround himself with longtime supporters of Taiwan has led some experts to claim that his administration’s support of Taipei will remain “strong,” this perspective disregards the importance of intelligence sharing in Taiwan’s defense.
Even a slight decline in intelligence sharing between the U.S. and its allies – in AUKUS, the Five Eyes, or among regional partners such as Japan and South Korea – could result in key indicators of an impending Chinese invasion or similar scale geopolitical events being missed and not mitigated quickly enough. Japan, in particular, and the U.S. forces stationed within its borders are paramount for Taiwan’s defense, given its geographic proximity to the island nation. However, a decline in the trustworthiness of U.S. intelligence or a reduction in intelligence sharing with the U.S. on critical issues such as Taiwan could provide Beijing with the necessary uncertainty and delay to alter the outcome of a potential war in the Taiwan Strait to a slightly more favorable outcome than is currently predicted.
Faced with mounting doubts over Washington’s reliability, U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific may start charting their own course, prioritizing bilateral intelligence agreements with trusted partners like the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand over deeper cooperation within Five Eyes or AUKUS due to Washington’s presence. Such a shift would weaken U.S. influence in the region and diminish its access to critical intelligence. Over time, the very blind spots created by this growing distrust could leave Washington exposed to threats it once played a central role in countering – both abroad and at home
