China’s ambitious mediation initiative — the Beijing Declaration on Palestinian Unity — once signaled a bold new chapter in the long-stalled quest for Palestinian reconciliation. Brokered in July 2024 among 14 historically rival factions, the declaration was hailed as a critical step toward bridging deep-seated divisions and fostering a unified Palestinian voice. Yet, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has spiraled into a renewed and devastating phase, Beijing’s early assertive role appears to have diminished. In its place, traditional Arab and American mediators have reclaimed the spotlight, forcing China to reassess its position amid an increasingly complex diplomatic landscape.
Shifting Diplomatic Dynamics
In March 2025, the resumption of Israel’s bombing campaign on Gaza shattered the fragile ceasefire that had been brokered between Israel and Hamas just two months earlier. The ceasefire, which had offered a fleeting glimpse of hope after the conflict erupted on October 7, 2023, quickly gave way to renewed hostilities. This violent reversal exposed the inherent fragility of third-party mediation efforts, even for a rising power like China. Faced with the sobering reality of over 50,000 Palestinian casualties and the escalating human toll of the conflict, Beijing has recalibrated its diplomatic calculus.
The renewed bombing campaign did more than just reignite violence, it signaled a dramatic shift in regional dynamics. The fragile truce, achieved through third-country mediation, was undone by the overwhelming momentum of the conflict, raising questions about the efficacy of external interventions. With the risk of miscalculation ever-present and the potential for severe political backlash mounting, Beijing appears to have decided that the costs of spearheading mediation in such a volatile environment far outweigh the potential diplomatic rewards. Consequently, China has stepped back, allowing more experienced mediators from Qatar, Egypt, and the United States to navigate the treacherous terrain of conflict resolution.
Adding further complexity to the situation, U.S. President Donald Trump introduced his controversial “Riviera of the Middle East” real-estate reconstruction plan in early March 2025. Promoted as a blueprint for rebuilding Gaza, the plan was widely derided for its top-down approach — devised without meaningful consultation with Gazans — and for its overt attempt to reshape the region along distinctly American lines.
Simultaneously, Arab League leaders, with Egypt at the helm, unveiled an alternative, multi-step blueprint that sought to end the Gaza War and reinvigorate the dormant prospect of a two-state solution. Upon release, China publicly declared its support for the Arab plan at a press conference given on March 7, 2025, during which Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced China’s support to the plan “initiated by Egypt and other Arab countries” along with “restoring peace in Gaza.” Wang also added that “if the major country truly cares about the people in Gaza, it should promote comprehensive and lasting ceasefire, ramp up humanitarian assistance, observe the principle of Palestinians governing Palestine, and contribute to the reconstruction in Gaza.” In doing so, he implicitly critiqued the U.S. approach while reaffirming China’s historical pro-Palestinian stance, setting the stage for a recalibrated role on the mediation front.
A Contrast in Mediation Strategies
The current state of Chinese diplomacy stands in stark contrast to its proactive engagement just months earlier. Last July 2024, China had demonstrated remarkable diplomatic resolve by uniting 14 disparate Palestinian factions, a move that resonated not only with Palestinian leaders but also with regional powers. Delegations from Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Russia, and Turkey converged on Beijing to witness the signing of the declaration, a moment that symbolized China’s rising status as a potential superpower mediator. The Beijing Declaration laid out an ambitious “three-step” approach: first, to establish a sustainable ceasefire that would allow the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza; second, to form a temporary reconciliation government to ensure Palestinian self-governance; and third, to renew efforts for Palestine’s formal membership in the United Nations as part of a broader two-state solution.
Yet, the promise encapsulated in the Beijing Declaration has been hampered by a critical shortcoming: its inherent ambiguity. Despite the document’s groundbreaking nature, it failed to delineate clear timelines, institutional frameworks, and enforceable mechanisms necessary for its ambitious agenda. As the conflict escalated in the following months, these gaps became more pronounced. The absence of specific commitments left many regional stakeholders skeptical about whether the declaration could be translated into a practical, long-term solution. Beijing’s recent retreat from the forefront of mediation, therefore, not only reflects a cautious recalibration in the face of mounting risks but also exposes the limitations of its earlier diplomatic initiative.
Challenges to Sustained Mediation
Several interlocking factors have contributed to China’s cautious withdrawal from active mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the heart of the matter lies a classic cost-benefit calculation: assuming the mantle of the lead mediator in such a volatile conflict carries immense risks. Unlike the United States, which benefits from entrenched ties with Israel and extensive on-ground networks, China’s influence in the region remains comparatively underdeveloped. Its limited operational experience and lack of established contacts with key players on both sides of the conflict have necessitated a more measured, risk-averse approach.
China’s cautious stance is further underscored by its implicit critique of the U.S. policy in the region. The global backlash against the Trump-era reconstruction proposal has only amplified perceptions of Washington’s partiality and ineffectiveness in mediating the conflict. By contrast, Beijing’s long-standing non-alignment and its historical commitment to a pro-Palestinian narrative have positioned it as a potential neutral interlocutor. However, this moral high ground is undermined if Beijing’s rhetoric is not backed by tangible, on-the-ground initiatives. The very ambiguity that characterized the Beijing Declaration — its lack of definitive timelines and concrete institutional arrangements — has contributed to a perception of inertia. In an environment where every diplomatic misstep can have catastrophic consequences, Beijing’s preference for de-escalation over bold intervention is understandable, even if it means forgoing the opportunity to drive a comprehensive peace process.
Moreover, the shifting alliances and evolving power dynamics in the region have further complicated Beijing’s role. The traditional mediators of the Middle East, particularly Arab states and the United States, continue to wield significant influence. Their renewed leadership in negotiations, coupled with their deep-seated historical relationships with the conflicting parties, places China at a disadvantage. Beijing’s calculated decision to step back from a leadership role can be seen as an effort to avoid overextension — a pragmatic move in a scenario where any miscalculation could not only undermine its credibility but also expose it to severe political backlash.
Opportunities for Reinvention
Despite these formidable challenges, China’s mediation efforts should not be dismissed outright. Its reputation as a relatively neutral actor, unburdened by the colonial legacies that tarnish the credibility of many Western powers, remains a valuable asset. In a region where perceptions of impartiality are in short supply, Beijing’s consistent pro-Palestinian stance and its emphasis on intra-Palestinian dialogue resonate deeply with both regional and international audiences.
Looking ahead, there is potential for China to reassert its relevance by adopting a more collaborative and multilateral approach to mediation. Rather than positioning itself as the sole architect of a peace process, Beijing could work in tandem with established mediators from the Arab world, the United States, and Europe. Such a multilateral framework would allow China to leverage its unique strengths — its moral authority, its growing economic clout, and its commitment to non-alignment — while mitigating the risks associated with direct intervention in a volatile conflict.
This collaborative strategy would involve a series of concrete measures. First, China could advocate for an expanded mediation framework that incorporates not only the traditional Quartet of the U.N., EU, the U.S. and Russia but also emerging regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt. By facilitating a platform for regular dialogue and coordinated action, Beijing could help synchronize diverse diplomatic efforts and ensure that humanitarian imperatives — such as the delivery of aid and the reconstruction of Gaza — remain central to the peace process.
Second, Beijing’s role could be reimagined as that of a neutral facilitator, one capable of engaging with hard-to-reach factions such as Hamas. While the United States leverages its historical and strategic ties with Israel, China could focus on building trust and opening channels of communication with Palestinian factions that have traditionally been marginalized by Western diplomacy. Such an approach would not only broaden the scope of dialogue but also create opportunities for innovative, bottom-up peace initiatives that draw on the insights of civil society, track II diplomacy, and emerging youth leadership.
Third, China should integrate humanitarian and political initiatives into its mediation strategy. The immediate imperative is to establish secure corridors for humanitarian aid to alleviate the suffering in Gaza. Yet, long-term stability will depend on coordinated efforts to rebuild infrastructure and stimulate economic development. By working with the European Union and Gulf states, which possess extensive expertise in institution-building and governance, Beijing could help create a comprehensive blueprint for Gaza’s reconstruction — one that addresses both the immediate humanitarian crisis and the underlying political and economic challenges.
At the same time, Beijing must navigate the delicate balance between maintaining its principled stance and avoiding the pitfalls of ideological rigidity. Its repeated emphasis on intra-Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation is designed to empower the Palestinian people to determine their own future. However, without clear operational mechanisms, this high-minded rhetoric risks being dismissed as symbolic rather than substantive. To overcome this challenge, China must move beyond abstract declarations and work toward a tangible, actionable peace plan that integrates diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental components into a coherent framework.
The global context further underscores the need for such an integrated approach. As the US influence in the Middle East wanes amid growing skepticism over its pro-Israel bias and controversial policy proposals, alternative models of mediation are gaining traction. Beijing’s efforts, if recalibrated and reinvigorated, could offer a fresh paradigm for peace-building — one that champions multipolarity, respects regional sensitivities, and prioritizes both de-escalation and reconstruction. In doing so, China would not only bolster its image as a fair and principled mediator but also contribute to a broader rebalancing of power in a region long dominated by Western hegemony.
