The transatlantic alliance has sneezed, and the Indo-Pacific could soon catch a cold. As U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration dashes Ukraine’s hope for an immediate security guarantee and dismisses the U.K.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” his Indo-Pacific allies are watching closely. Indeed, many are curious on what Trump might do regarding Washington’s long-standing alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. Based on his Trump’s behavior so far, allies like Japan, Australia, and South Korea are unlikely to be shielded from punitive U.S. action and rhetoric.
Since his inauguration in January, Trump’s Cabinet has tried to soften the president’s rhetoric so as to reassure allies and partners. In the case of Taiwan, Trump has raised the possibility of imposing tariffs on semiconductors and demanding payment for U.S. military assistance. Elbridge Colby, Trump’s pick for undersecretary of defense for policy, nevertheless stated during his Senate confirmation hearing that Taiwan remains a core strategic partner for Washington, albeit a non-existential one. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is also standing firm on the maintenance of a U.S. presence in the Taiwan Strait, but has demanded greater burden-sharing from regional allies.
So far, the Philippines has been spared the worst of Trump’s hostility. Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. Jose Manuel Romualdez and Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro have both optimistically asserted that the security alliance between Manila and Washington will remain intact while hedging by stating that national defense is ultimately each state’s own responsibility.
This cautious optimism stems from both the Philippines’ geopolitical importance and its relatively modest material want.
Geopolitically, the Philippines is the only proactive U.S. ally in Southeast Asia and has not shied away from insisting that Washington maintain a stabilizing presence in the region. As suggested above, Manila’s elites have messaged continuity amid the turbulent U.S. political transition from the Biden to Trump administrations. Even as U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth failed to name even one ASEAN member state during his confirmation hearing, his State Department counterpart Rubio has pledged continued support for the Philippines, including in his recent call with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo.
Materially, the Philippines is arguably not the most burdensome Indo-Pacific ally. Per Defense News Report, the approximately $2 billion worth of U.S. Foreign Military Financing for 2024 is unevenly distributed: $1.2 billion for Taipei, $500 million for Manila, and around $300 million to other partners, such as Vietnam. The Philippines has so far been spared Trump’s sweeping foreign aid cuts, with around $336 million in security assistance exempted.
At this point, the Philippines finds itself in a good position to address two policy goals: lessening its dependence on the United States, while convening U.S. regional partners and allies to work together to resist Chinese revisionism across the political, economic, military, and technological fronts. I call this “like-minded autonomy”: the ability of politically convergent partners to build resilience by developing linked resource and industrial bases and harmonizing their defense capabilities.
On the surface, the idea sounds contradictory – autonomy implies self-reliance, while like-mindedness denotes collaboration – but unusual times call for unusual ideas. Strategically, like-minded autonomy gears state capacity toward linkage and compatibility, in order to meet any threat from common adversaries.
The threats are currently considerable. The Russian economy, while mortgaging its future peacetime in holding ground in eastern Ukraine, has managed to stay afloat despite Western sanctions, thanks to its deepening ties with North Korea, Iran, and China. These nations’ comprehensive strategies, despite their possible mutual mistrust, have nevertheless managed to disrupt the transatlantic alliance and worry Washington’s Indo-Pacific partners.
The “lattice approach” of Indo-Pacific minilateralism, including the Quad, Squad, and the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral, has so far made attempts to bolster members’ resilience, but under the assumption of a high-level commitment by the U.S. to continue convening these groupings. Given the uncertainty in the region, it is time for Indo-Pacific partners to rework the lattice approach along the lines of “like-minded autonomy,” factoring in the possibility of U.S. ambivalence while undertaking the hard work of negotiating resource and industrial linkages in order to create compatible defense capabilities across the board.
This is easier said than done, of course, but the Philippines is in a good position to act as a convener of like-minded autonomy: it is willing to resist China despite its material shortfalls and has so far avoided falling victim to Trump’s transactionalism. Willing is not necessarily able, of course, and there is therefore a strong case for cooperating more closely with Australia, Japan, or South Korea to even the military balance vis-à-vis China.
In this way, Manila has the chance to adapt its statecraft to the current strategic uncertainties, although the country still faces challenges in terms of its domestic political maturity. The outcome of the midterm elections in May will be an important determinant of the Philippine Congress’ willingness to address the country’s resource and industrial shortcomings, for instance, by building an indigenous defense industry. Only time can tell whether the Philippines can fill the gap left by the uncertain U.S. commitment, whether allies and partners get on board, and ultimately, whether the Trump team listens. In the end, “like-minded autonomy” may be a tough pill to swallow to treat the region’s cold.
