The Trump administration’s decision to freeze foreign aid fostered doubts about U.S. commitment to its Philippine ally, but Washington decided to allow more than $300 million in foreign military financing to Manila to move forward. Other positive developments in alliance management – especially early high-level engagements — should help maintain momentum.
The Philippines-U.S. alliance has a new opportunity to be strengthened and the focus this time should be contributing to regional strategic stability, which starts by deterring China in the West Philippine Sea, the portion of the South China Sea within Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and nearby flashpoints.
Strategic stability will have its foundation on deterrence as a mutual goal. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s call with his counterpart in the Philippines, Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro focused on deterrence in the West Philippine Sea. However, there was a subtle difference: the U.S. framed the goal as “reestablishing deterrence” while the Philippine side called for “strengthening deterrence.” While it may just be semantics, these possibly different ways of looking at deterrence indicates that both sides are still unsure as to what the alliance’s impact should be on the West Philippine Sea, much less the broader South China Sea. Is there existing deterrence that only needs to be strengthened, or is deterrence faltering and therefore it needs to be reestablished?
What is clear is that China is not pausing its provocations. Its aggressive conduct in the West Philippine Sea – precisely in Philippine waters and not just in the wider South China Sea – means that Beijing’s activities are getting closer to home for the Philippines. However, the June 17, 2024 incident – where China Coast Guard personnel rammed and boarded Philippine Navy boats, attacking the sailors on board – gave China pause, and provided a diplomatic space to negotiate. Beijing overplayed its hand with actions that could have triggered Article IV of the Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Nevertheless, because Beijing exercises escalation dominance, its strategic objectives can be achieved by constantly threatening Manila against occupying features that the latter actually has a right to, by devaluing the benefits of occupation.
The strategic dilemma for the alliance is thus the choice between possession of the features versus controlling access to the features in the West Philippine Sea. Choosing to deter China from further controlling the waters should be a primary goal of the alliance. This has implications far beyond Philippines-U.S. ties, as ceding control of these waters to Beijing will reduce the importance of UNCLOS and allow force to be the determinant of sovereignty and maritime rights.
Diplomacy is an important tool that the allies must use to check Beijing’s attempts at lawfare. Manila and Washington need to mobilize partners that have been issuing statements of support whenever Beijing’s actions in the West Philippine Sea endanger Philippine sovereign rights. Such mobilization should include actively carrying the message through forums and workshops to ASEAN capitals and beyond. Simply put, Manila cannot rely primarily on bilateral demarches to diplomatically respond to China.
Information campaigns are crucial tools in the fight against misinformation in the West Philippine Sea. A disciplined information campaign to advance Manila’s legal and rightful claims in its maritime domain should be part of an invigorated strategy. Public affairs considerations, however, must not be the main driver of strategic and tactical decision-making. Exposing China’s malign behavior should be a tactical tool when it is warranted but should not be an end in itself. There is no point in responding to all of Beijing’s provocations in the West Philippine Sea, and Manila should choose its fights according to its strategic objectives.
The military aspect of the alliance is the backbone of deterrence against Beijing. Since the Scarborough Shoal incident, Beijing has sought to restrict the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a concession, which hurts Manila strategically. The June 17, 2024 incident is a clear sign that Beijing does not want the AFP to be involved – and that the AFP, rather than the Philippine Coast Guard, delivers the deterrent effects.
The ability to deter Beijing rests on being able to have a collective response against higher levels of escalation. The AFP should not just absorb the costs of coercion, as the PCG does. It must also be able to complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus by demonstrating resilience, such that further escalatory challenges cannot succeed or the level of costs and risks for China’s interests increases to the point that continuing with coercion no longer makes sense. Beijing is doing its best to act against Manila in a manner that does not trigger the Mutual Defense Treaty; its attempts at coercion are also limited when other Philippine partners are involved through joint patrols and multilateral maritime cooperative activities.
In the medium- to long-term picture, strategic stability will be achieved when Beijing complies with the 2016 Arbitration Award. The short-term picture is one where deterrence leads China to cease aggressive actions against the Philippines. More assertive diplomacy coupled with the return of the AFP to the West Philippine Sea should be Manila’s primary tools in addressing Beijing’s increasing control of access to features. Smarter strategic communications should support diplomatic and defense initiatives; the alliance should focus its efforts on these activities.
Dispute management must evolve into deterrence to create strategic stability. If the alliance between Manila and Washington is to have any meaning, then the goal must shift. When deterrence is established, both capitals can be assured that economic cooperation with Beijing in the future cannot be used as a pretext to weaken the alliance, which will allow both countries to work with Beijing on negotiable areas such as economy, trade, and investment.
