A central puzzle for analysts of contemporary Cambodia is how to explain the remarkable durability of the current ruling party, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). In power since 1979, the CPP government, which was led for more than 38 years by former Prime Minister Hun Sen, has gradually managed to neuter or eliminate most forms of political opposition and tighten its grip over the institutions of the state, while resisting outside pressures to liberalize and introduce good governance reforms since the end of the Cold War. The strength of Hun Sen’s grip on the party, and the CPP’s grip on the state, was demonstrated by the broad generational transition that took place in August 2023, when Hun Sen handed power to his son, Hun Manet, and CPP princelings succeeded their fathers throughout the country’s bloated administrative apparatus.
In a new book, Neil Loughlin, a senior lecturer at the University of London, offers an answer to the puzzle of the CPP’s durability. He spoke to The Diplomat’s Southeast Asia Editor Sebastian Strangio about how the CPP has managed to survive, the corruption that has resulted, and the baleful role that Chinese criminal syndicates now play in the Cambodian political economy.
In the book, “The Politics of Coercion,” you tackle the question of why the CPP has been so durable over the past four decades plus. You conclude that the best explanation is the regime’s “concentration of coercive power.” How do you define “coercion,” and what forms has it taken in Cambodia under the CPP?
In the book, I borrow the terms high-intensity and low-intensity coercion.
High-intensity coercion refers to overt, highly visible actions targeting large groups, prominent individuals, or key institutions. We’ve seen this repeatedly in Cambodia, including in January 2014, when authorities fired on protesters, and still today with Kem Sokha’s ongoing house arrest.
Low-intensity coercion is more subtle but encompasses surveillance, intimidation, the disruption of political gatherings, the denial of educational opportunities to opposition supporters, and the use of legal or financial mechanisms to punish regime critics. The book provides many examples, including the shuttering of The Cambodia Daily on a tax technicality and the arrest of Mech Dara.
In the book, I emphasize how this coercion permeates every aspect of Cambodia’s political and economic life. This focus on coercion serves as a corrective to dominant narratives in the academic literature, which have largely emphasized the CPP’s reliance on political clientelism—using resources to buy political support—as the primary explanation for its longevity. This perspective is incomplete, as it downplays the centrality of coercion in sustaining the system.
More broadly, however, when talking about coercion I am also focused on the coercive apparatus of the state and its position within the ruling coalition. So, in the book I trace the origins of the party-state, including the military, police, and paramilitary forces, to show how the state’s coercive apparatus is inextricably linked to, and indeed is part of, the CPP. These institutions are integral to the party and key stakeholders in the regime’s survival, benefiting directly from the system they sustain.
How did the regime’s origins, as an implant of the Vietnamese state following the collapse of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, influence its later development? How did the human and material devastation of the Khmer Rouge period (1975-79) play into this?
Under the Khmer Rouge, nearly all of Cambodia’s pre-1975 political and military institutions were dismantled, and the country’s social and economic structures were devastated. Many former elites were killed or forced to flee. This created the conditions for the Vietnamese to install a new government, led by figures like Hun Sen, following their invasion. The new regime was built around a small party apparatus designed to legitimize the Vietnamese occupation and relied heavily on security forces to maintain control, rather than gaining popular support.
During the 1980s, the regime faced external threats, reinforcing its reliance on coercion and cementing the power of a small elite tied to the state and security forces. When the Vietnamese withdrew and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) attempted to establish a more democratic system in the 1990s, this ruling group already held a significant advantage over its competitors, possessing greater resources and the capacity – and willingness – to use violence to stay in power.
As I show in the book, Hun Sen gradually consolidated his leadership within this group, using both overt and subtle coercion to eliminate challenges from within the coalition and external opposition.
Coercion also became foundational to Cambodia’s crony-capitalist political economy, as the CPP leveraged state resources to form alliances with emerging business tycoons, with the state providing legal and, when necessary, violent cover to protect their interests. These tycoons, in turn, provided funding and resources to sustain the regime, reinforcing a patronage system that enriched the ruling elite at the expense of ordinary Cambodians. The land-grabbing epidemic of the 2000s, with all the violence, dispossession and livelihood destruction it entailed, exemplified this dynamic.
Today, Cambodia’s regime remains shaped by these origins. Its power stems from control over state institutions, security forces, and economic resources rather than genuine popular support. As a result, the state-society cleavages embedded in the process of state and regime formation since 1979 have become entrenched.
Once Cambodia transitioned to a multiparty political system under U.N. auspices in 1991-93, Prime Minister Hun Sen and the CPP justified their rule on the basis that they had helped overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 and brought peace to the country. How much did the public credit the party with these achievements? Has it ever enjoyed significant amounts of public support, either during the 1990s or after?
The CPP’s legitimacy claims, which rest on its portrayal as the party that defeated Pol Pot, brought development, and maintained peace. However, without free and fair elections or accurate polling, assessing the CPP’s true level of public support is difficult. This is why, in Chapter 3, I focus on what can, to some extent, be measured: the nature of CPP support during elections. My analysis reveals significant and consistent public dissatisfaction with the party while emphasizing the central role of coercion in Cambodia’s political system.
For instance, in the 1993 election, despite enjoying the advantages of incumbency, the CPP lost. It responded by forcing its way into a power-sharing arrangement under the threat of secession. The 1998 election, often seen as the start of the CPP’s efforts to expand its popular base, took place in the aftermath of the violent 1997 coup, during which FUNCINPEC – its main rival – was significantly weakened. The 2003 election, though less violent, was still violent and far from free or fair. And despite a fragmented and weakened opposition, large-scale national protests erupted, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with the CPP.
By 2008, the CPP secured a decisive electoral victory, which some interpreted as evidence of growing popular support. However, this result occurred in a context where FUNCINPEC had been thoroughly co-opted and rendered irrelevant. Meanwhile, the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) and the Human Rights Party (HRP) – precursors to the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) – faced relentless political harassment. In the years leading up to the election, Sam Rainsy was forced into exile, and Kem Sokha was jailed. Given these circumstances, CPP victory was achieved in an atmosphere of coercion and a weak opposition.
Then the 2013 election and the subsequent political crisis provide the most recent insight into CPP support. Overconfident in its popularity based on unreliable evidence, the CPP underestimated the unified CNRP’s challenge. Despite significant barriers, the CNRP mounted a strong campaign, exposing the extent of dissatisfaction with the CPP. The opposition continued to gain momentum ahead of the 2018 election, but in 2017, the CPP pre-emptively eliminated this threat by banning the CNRP outright.
Today, the CPP continues to claim legitimacy through its historical achievements and developmental promises, but if it truly believed in its popularity, it could prove this through free and fair elections. Its persistent refusal to do so underscores a lack of confidence in both its legitimacy narrative and its actual level of popular support.
Do you think there are any continuities between the CPP regime and previous political dispensations, particularly the systems established by Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1955-70) and the Khmer Republic (1970-75)? Where does the CPP differ in its methods?
There were significant levels of coercion during Sihanouk’s time in power and, of course, during Democratic Kampuchea, and it is possible to see some continuity. Hun Sen and others were Khmer Rouge commanders before fleeing and becoming leaders of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in the 1980s. And, as Astrid Norén-Nilsson has shown, Hun Sen has also sought to borrow some of the symbolic legitimacy of Cambodia’s royal family – though with debatable success.
However, I think there are considerable differences. Hun Sen, and now Hun Manet, lack the royalist and monarchical legitimacy that Sihanouk enjoyed. Moreover, there is little to suggest that the CPP today retains any ideological zeal from its Khmer Rouge past.
You argue that the CPP party-state has adapted to and been shaped over time by the dynamics of Cambodia’s “contentious politics.” One of the most significant political developments was the national election in July 2013, when the CPP came close to losing a national election to a new opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party, which united for the first time the majority of the Cambodian opposition. How significant was this moment for the subsequent trajectory of Cambodian politics, and how did the regime evolve and adapt in response?
I think the 2013 election and the crisis that followed reinforced to the regime that coercion was the backbone of its survival. In response, it moved swiftly to strengthen its control through repression. We saw violent crackdowns against opposition demonstrations and broader popular movements, including land, labour and youth protests. The most notable example was in January 2014, but similar actions continued sporadically afterward.
The regime also took steps to strengthen power institutionally. The CPP expanded its Central Committee to include nearly all officials and security force members with command responsibilities, further embedding the military within the party. Similarly, Hun Manet’s promotion as commander of the Royal Cambodian Army placed nearly all troops responsible for regime security – such as the 911 Special Forces Unit and Brigade 70 – under his direct control.
The 2017 commune election was another infection point. The CNRP achieved unprecedented gains, challenging the CPP in the rural areas it had historically dominated. These results further revealed both the depth of the CPP’s unpopularity and the strength of the CNRP’s challenge, particularly heading into the 2018 national election. Faced with this threat, the CPP chose to eliminate even the pretense of genuine electoral competition by dissolving the CNRP. And this marked the transition to the effectively one-party system we see today.
You have written extensively on the baleful role that Cambodia has come to play in Southeast Asia’s online scamming industry. How and why do you think the country became such a hotspot for these operations and the associated human trafficking? Can we take seriously the government’s promises to crack down on these operations?
Much of my work has examined Cambodia’s patronage politics and corruption, and it has been common for state officials to provide legal protection and facilitate illicit activities in exchange for a share of the profits, which I have looked at a lot in terms of logging and land dispossession. While the scam industry is different, at least at the domestic level, I think some of the underlying dynamics are similar.
So, I think we see transnational organized crime syndicates inserting themselves into this system, ingratiating themselves with Cambodia’s political elite to secure state protection, while some Cambodian tycoons are providing land and facilities for scam compounds.
The names of Cambodians associated with these operations are well known to anyone familiar with Cambodia’s history of land dispossession, illegal logging, and wildlife trafficking. And the reason for the lack of enforcement seems clear: senior officials and economic elites benefit directly from the status quo.
Back in August 2023, Hun Sen stepped down and handed power to his eldest son, Hun Manet, as part of a broader generational transition within the ruling party and its apparatus of coercion. How do you assess the success of the transition so far, at least in terms of regime stability, and what challenges do you think the new generation of CPP leaders might face in the years to come?
So far, it remains an open question who is actually in charge. Hun Sen continues to act as a de facto head of state, meeting leaders like Xi Jinping and issuing guidance and commands from the not-so-sidelines. Meanwhile, Manet and the new generation appear responsible for the day-to-day functioning of government. The challenge will be whether Manet can secure the loyalty of those who followed his father. To incentivize this, Hun Sen has demonstrated that his son’s transition is lucrative for the elite more generally, as seen in the promotions of Sar Kheng’s and Tea Banh’s sons.
At the same time, Cambodian politics since 1979 has been replete with episodic contentious politics and structural issues – un- and underemployment, corruption, an economic slowdown, declining Chinese investment, and a worsening personal debt crisis – pose potential sources of future unrest. While the CPP appears firmly in control for now, significant challenges remain that they must confront and navigate.
