Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 provoked global outrage and isolated the country from many of the world’s most important global markets and institutions. Three years later, Russia remains estranged from the West but is far from lonely. Outside of its near abroad, partnership with Moscow is less encumbered by fear of conflict and coercion. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia, where the appeal of Russian influence is enhanced by dissatisfaction with the West’s global leadership and fears of the region becoming a battleground between the U.S. and China.
Southeast Asia is an especially appealing strategic frontier in Moscow’s dream of a multipolar world. In an October 2024 essay in Russia in Global Affairs, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov named the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as one of several interstate organizations which will play an increasingly important role in Russia’s vision of the future international order. In this vision, ASEAN would become more tightly integrated into the BRICS group and form part of the broader Eurasian security architectures.
While there is plenty of will and opportunity for Russia to cultivate new markets and strategic partnerships in Southeast Asia to replace its frayed ties with the West, the reality of Russian engagement in the region is much more complicated. The Kremlin’s information operations, aimed at winning popular support for the war in Ukraine in the region by aligning it with the broader anti-imperial struggles of the people of the Global South, have largely been unpersuasive. Russia’s attempts to deepen defense and economic ties with Southeast Asia, have also yielded modest results. The greatest value Russia has to offer the region is increasing the bargaining power of ASEAN states by promoting a more competitive strategic landscape as an alternative influence to the U.S. and China. Capitalizing on this opportunity will be far easier said than done.
Regional Pragmatism Outweighs Russian Ideology
Russia desires support from countries in the Global South for its war in Ukraine. Since February 2022, pro-Moscow narratives have become particularly prevalent in Southeast Asia, with the legacy of colonialism and Russia’s historical role in the region helping the pro-Russian perspective take root. Historical sympathies aside, the war is still a divisive topic for the region.
Singapore has adopted the most pro-Kyiv stance by joining in the sanctions regime against Russia. Most other Southeast Asian states have tried to position themselves as neutral. For instance, Indonesia as president of the G-20 in 2022 offered to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv and attempted to encourage the West to moderate on Russia. Malaysia is the 2025 chair of ASEAN and, during a head of government meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russia, invited the Russian leader to the upcoming ASEAN Summit. Vietnam enjoys arguably the strongest relationship with Russia, even hosting Putin in June 2024.
In the United Nations, General Assembly voting behavior is mixed. All ASEAN states bar Laos and Vietnam voted to condemn the Russian invasion in a March 2, 2022 U.N. resolution, while Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand abstained during an April 2022 vote to expel Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council.
The war in Gaza has inspired far greater anti-Western sentiment in the region than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has anti-Russian sentiment. Russia has been keen to seize the opportunity to highlight the perceived hypocrisy of the West for supporting Israel’s military campaign in Gaza after denouncing Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. Russia’s efforts to inflame public passions have not, however, directly translated into making Russia a model anti-imperialist hero in the region.
A 2024 survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute illustrates the region’s complicated views about the war. Fundamentally, Southeast Asian states are concerned about the war, and 14.6 percent of respondents expressed fear of the implications of weakening the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but 68.4 percent expressed their main concern as the impact of rising energy costs and inflation triggered by the war. This reflects the region’s pragmatic concerns. By and large, Southeast Asian states value non-alignment and do not want to lose Russia as a potential partner. In this milieu, Moscow may find more sympathy for its position, especially if it can offer security and economic deals.
Uncertain Future for Defense and Economic Ties
For a region with longstanding security concerns about China and an unwillingness to align too closely with the United States, Russia is a natural defense partner. Moscow poses no direct security threat to ASEAN, and its inheritance of the Soviet defense industry makes it a legacy partner of Southeast Asia, particularly for the communist states Laos and Vietnam. From 2004 to 2023, Russia provided 25 percent of arms sales to Southeast Asia, the largest single share.
The war in Ukraine has threatened Russia’s primacy in the regional defense industry, due less to concerns over its foreign policy, than depletion of its available stocks of arms. Russia’s demands for its own military machine led to a sharp reduction in Moscow’s arms sales to historic partners such as Vietnam. From 2000 to 2023, 80 percent of Vietnam’s arms imports came from Russia, or around $9 billion since the mid-1990s. Today, Hanoi in particular is slowly diversifying away from its dependence upon Russian weapons, with the prospect of U.S. sanctions making the acquisition of new capabilities more challenging.
Other governments, such as the military junta in Myanmar, have fewer options and continue to turn to Russia. According to a 2023 U.N. report, $406 million dollars’ worth of arms had been acquired by the Myanmar military, most importantly aerial capabilities, including helicopters and combat aircraft. Indicating Moscow’s interest in Myanmar, Russia sold six SU-30s to the military junta in Naypyidaw in late 2024, when its own forces were suffering record losses in Ukraine.
Beyond arms sales, Russia continues to pursue security relationships. At an ASEAN level, Russia participates in ASEAN-led initiatives like the annual East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus. Although far less active than the United States or China, Russia on occasion engages in military cooperation outside ASEAN’s auspices. For instance, in November 2024, Russia and Indonesia conducted their first joint naval exercises near Indonesia. Sergei Shoigu, a longtime ally of Putin and current Russian Security Council secretary, traveled to Indonesia and Malaysia in February of this year to make Moscow’s case for a multipolar world order.
On the economic side, Russia has a smaller footprint in Southeast Asia. Trade rose by 10 percent to $17 billion in the first three quarters of 2024, with foreign direct investment in 2022 reaching $159.9 million. Compared to China and the United States, or even Japan and Australia, these are minuscule numbers. However, there are still important aspects that merit attention, namely the energy sector.
Dating back to the Soviet-era, Russian oil and gas firms Zarubezhneft and Gazprom have operated offshore facilities in Vietnam within parts of the South China Sea claimed by China under its expansive “nine-dash line.” Chinese vessels have at times harassed the Russian-operated rigs in order to apply pressure on Vietnam and advance Beijing’s claims to the sea zone. Vietnam-Russia energy cooperation continues to advance, however, and Moscow appears willing to ignore China’s frustrations in the South China Sea.
Russian nuclear energy is the other pillar of Putin’s economic outreach to Southeast Asia, which is set to accelerate in 2025, as clearly signaled in ASEAN-Russia statements. Myanmar and Vietnam are the two countries most interested in actively cooperating with Russia on nuclear power. The Communist Party of Vietnam committed to overcoming years of challenges in developing a civilian nuclear program by signing a cooperation agreement with Moscow during a visit by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to Hanoi in January. In March, Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Moscow featured the signing of an agreement to build a small-scale nuclear plant in Myanmar.
Inherent Constraints of a Transformative Partnership
Russia appears eager to emphasize an optimistic vision of its role as alternative regional power capable of uplifting the region in global decision-making bodies. Russia heralded the expansion of BRICS during its 2024 chairmanship of the group, announcing the inclusion of Indonesia as a new member and Malaysia and Thailand as partner nations, and welcoming Vietnam to seek membership. More recently Russia moved quickly to provide rescue teams to assist Myanmar’s military government following the country’s devastating earthquake in late March.
These positive gestures by Russia are welcomed in the region, but the true value proposition for Russia in the region is one that it may not be able to provide, that of an independent pole of power and influence which can create options for nations squeezed by U.S.-China rivalry. The Soviet Union played a significant role as an alternative great power partner in Southeast Asia in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War. It supported Hanoi over Beijing during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, while the Chinese government supported the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia against Vietnam. Today, Myanmar and Vietnam in particular see Russia as a hedge against dependence upon China, much like India.
Despite the occasional disagreement between Moscow and Beijing, Russia is unlikely to risk a new rupture in relations over a dispute involving interests in Southeast Asia. Unlike North Korea, which recently engaged in its own a transformative partnership with Russia, Southeast Asia is both far from Russia’s borders and is a central theater of China’s grand strategy. Vietnam may take comfort that a Russian-operated oil rig is less likely to attract China’s wrath, but, if a Vietnam-China conflict erupted, it is unlikely that Moscow would jeopardize its partnership with Beijing for Hanoi. This goes double for Myanmar’s military regime, as China’s stranglehold on the country grows tighter and tighter.
Russia’s need to retain China as a key ally, or at least to avoid provoking its ire, necessitates leaving potentially valuable opportunities to engage with nations comprising hundreds of millions of people underdeveloped. This challenge highlights a fundamental tension behind the broader plans Russian leaders have articulated for shaping a multipolar world: competition between two superpowers creates demand for new patrons, but makes it very difficult for viable alternatives to emerge.
The views expressed are the authors’ alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.
